Essays on Firm Heterogeneity and Quality in International Trade by Bekkers, E.H.G. (Eddy)
Essays on Firm Heterogeneity and Quality in
International Trade
Eddy Bekkers
ISBN 978 90 5170 903 2
Cover design: Crasborn Graphic Designers bno, Valkenburg a/d Geul
This book is No. 427 of the Tinbergen Institute Research Series, established through
cooperation between Thela Thesis and the Tinbergen Institute. A list of books
which already appeared in the series can be found in the back.
Essays on Firm Heterogeneity and Quality in
International Trade
Essays over heterogeniteit van bedrijven en kwaliteit bij internationale
handel
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
op gezag van de rector magnicus
Prof.dr. S.W.J. Lamberts
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties.
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op
18 september 2008 om 11.00 uur door
Eddy Henricus Gijsbertus Bekkers
geboren te s-Hertogenbosch
Promotiecommissie
Promoter: Prof.dr. Joseph F. Francois
Overige leden: Prof. dr. Charles van Marrewijk
Prof. dr. Jean-Marie Viaene
Prof. dr. Doug Nelson
Preface
Writing a PhD thesis seems a long process. Basically, you start with a topic, change
the topic and then you work until you have four papers about the same topic. In the
meantime you have to teach, supervise students and you try to help colleagues if they
have a challenging problem.
A problem with research at the university is that once you go into a certain direction
with your research, you become more and more focused on it. Up to the point that you
are not able to explain anymore what you are doing to friends. After a while you are
able to explain what you are doing, but then the big question props up: is this relevant?
And you also ask yourself: what on earth am I doing? What is the relevance of showing
that there is a unique equilibrium in a rm heterogeneity model under oligopoly not
only in the short-run but also in the long-run? But the next day you work even more
fanatic on deriving the welfare e¤ects of trade liberalization in the same model. And it
really gives satisfaction if you are able to establish these e¤ects clearly and give also an
intuitive account for it.
And what about relevance for society? I would say that the research questions we pose
are important and interesting. In the end they help us to understand the world better
and to conduct a better policy. Often the academic community only develops abstract
theories and tools. But without these theories and tools policy researchers could not
work the way they do right now. As an academic there is the danger that you focus
too much on detailed debates with other people in the eld working on exactly the same
models. Therefore, I will widen the scope of my work in the future and work on di¤erent
topics. And switch from theory work to empirics.
Writing the thesis, I got a lot of help from my supervisor Joe Francois. He is always full
of new and creative ideas, which were very useful in developing the di¤erent chapters
of the thesis. Joe helped me to stay focused on the core questions that the di¤erent
chapters address. And although he always posed several new questions that could also
be dealt with within the framework of a certain model, he stimulated me to nish up the
di¤erent chapters. Almost against his own nature, Joe said to me that certain questions
were really important and interesting, but only for discussion in new and future papers.
I also want to think the members of the committee, Charles van Marrewijk, Jean-Marie
Viane and Doug Nelson for their comments on the di¤erent chapters.
I also beneted a lot from the help of my colleagues, rst the PhD colleagues in Amster-
dam, then the PhD colleagues in Rotterdam and nally the colleagues at the department
of economics in Rotterdam. Of my PhD colleagues, I want to thank Matthijs and Felix in
particular. Matthijs was of great help with the stimulating debates we had on both our
research elds. Felix helped me with many things. I have a strong preference for proving
results analytically with pen and paper. Felix made me enthusiastic to make more use
of the computer and helped me a lot with the computer simulations and with nalizing
the layout of the thesis. He also kept me sharp in the debates about the merits of formal
economic models with the formidable assumptions we always make. I enjoyed teaching
together with my colleagues from the department. The cooperation with Charles, Leon
and Annette was very e¢ cient and I learned a lot about supervising student-assistants,
organizing a course and dealing with students. I also want to thank Leon for his help
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with nalizing the layout of the thesis.
My friends supported me to go on with my research when I thought I was at a dead-end
road and also gave me inspiration for new research ideas. In particular I want to thank
Veysel for his general support and all the discussions with reections on my research.
Finally I want to thank my brother and my parents. With my brother I always had very
interesting and fruitful discussions about my research, which is often surprisingly much
related to his research. My parents enabled me to study as extensive and as long as I
did. I was stimulated to develop my talents as I wanted. And my parents supported me
to go on with the thesis and were always there to help me.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Firm Heterogeneity in International Trade
Models
Traditional trade theory features comparative advantage and factor abundance to ac-
count for inter-industry trade in models of perfect competition. New trade theory
emerged at the end of the 1970s to provide an explanation for the ever larger amount
of intra-industry trade using models of imperfect competition. Whereas the gains from
trade in traditional models are due to specialization, the new trade theory adds four dif-
ferent gains from trade. First, the monopolistic competition model of Krugman (1980)
displays a variety e¤ect with trade enabling the consumption of more di¤erent varieties.
Second, the model of Krugman (1979) features a scale e¤ect besides a variety e¤ect:
trade implies a larger market and the possibility to produce at a larger scale leading
to e¢ ciency gains. Third, the model by Ethier (1982) on intermediate goods trade
contains a labor division e¤ect: trade enables the use of more intermediate varieties in
production. Fourth, the oligopoly model of Brander and Krugman (1983) illuminates
the pro-competitive e¤ects from trade. A larger market raises the number of competitors
and drives down consumer prices.
The imperfect competition models in new trade theory assume that all rms are
equal. Relaxing this assumption leads to a fth gain from trade, the reallocation e¤ect.
Trade enables more productive exporting rms to gain market share at the expense of less
productive rm who only produce for the domestic market. The reallocation e¤ect can be
driven by enhanced product market competition or enhanced labor market competition.
International trade leads to tougher competition on the product market in the former
case, driving the least productive rms out of the market. In the latter case international
trade leads to larger prot opportunities for the most productive rms, creating more
demand for labor and driving up wages. This squeezes the least productive rms out of
the market.
Empirical work nds wide support for the reallocation e¤ect of trade already in
the 1990s. Tybout (1991) uses data from Chile, Colombia and Morocco to show the
importance of reallocation e¤ects and Bernard and Jensen (2004a) do the same with
data from the US. Theory on rm heterogeneity is developed only in 2000. Various
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di¤erent models are proposed. Melitz (2003) includes heterogeneous productivity in a
monopolistic competition model with CES demand. Bernard et al. (2003) propose a
model of Bertrand competition with rm heterogeneity. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
create a rm heterogeneity model with monopolistic competition and linear demand. In
Melitz (2003) the reallocation e¤ect works through enhanced labor market competition,
whereas in the other two papers the reallocation e¤ect works through tougher product
market competition. The rst contribution of this thesis is to propose a model of rm
heterogeneity in an oligopoly setting with Cournot competition. This model displays an
intuitive reallocation e¤ect through tougher product market competition in a basic and
parsimonious model. It is a natural extension to the oligopoly model of Brander and
Krugman (1983) and also nests the Ricardian comparative advantage model as a special
case.
With the growing availability of rm-level datasets recent years have seen a huge
increase in the number of empirical studies on rm heterogeneity. Besides the oligopoly
model mentioned in the previous paragraph, the work in this thesis provides theory work
to account for various ndings in the empirical literature on rm heterogeneity. A rst
chapter takes as starting point the empirical nding that many rms quit the exporting
market shortly after entry. It generalizes the rm heterogeneity model of Melitz (2003)
adding exporting uncertainty. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to the popularity
of their good, the popularity varies across markets and rms are uncertain about the
popularity of their good in each market. Therefore, a considerable fraction of rms that
start exporting have to leave the export market, because they cannot sell protably.
A second and third chapter takes the empirical ndings by Schott (2004) as a start-
ing point. Schott (2004) nds that within detailed product categories goods from richer
and more capital and skill abundant countries display higher unit values. Two models
are proposed to account for these ndings. First, a rm heterogeneity model with en-
dogenous quality is put forward, where more productive rms sell higher quality and
higher priced goods. Second, a monopolistic competition model with equal rms and
capital abundance dependent on the quality of goods is created to account for the fact
that more capital and skill abundant countries sell higher quality higher priced goods.
1.2 Contribution of the Thesis
This section discusses the models put forward in the thesis into more detail and addresses
in particular the contribution these models make to the literature.
1.2.1 Heterogeneous Popularity and Exporting Uncertainty
The model on exporting uncertainty and heterogeneous popularity starts from the em-
pirical nding that many exporting rms leave the export market shortly after entry.
Eaton et al. (2007) nd for example in a sample of Colombian rms that more than
two-third of the exporters drop out of the export market in the rst year. Besedes and
Prusa (2006) show that around one third of the imports in a certain product category
stop within one year. The model presented to account for this nding is a rm het-
1.2 CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS 3
erogeneity model where rms are heterogeneous with respect to the popularity of their
variety. The popularity varies across markets but is correlated. Firms dont know their
popularity before they enter a specic market and have to pay a sunk entry cost to get
to know it. So, when they know the popularity of their good on the domestic market
they dont know how successful they will be on the exporting market. The implication
is that a fraction of rms tries to enter the exporting market, but has to leave shortly
after entry because it cannot sell protably.
There are three types of trade costs, iceberg trade costs, sunk export costs and xed
export costs. Comparative statics show that lower trade costs lead for each of the three
types to a higher domestic cuto¤ popularity level and hence a reallocation e¤ect towards
rms with a higher taste parameter. But the e¤ects of lower xed export costs and
lower sunk export costs on exporting success (the probability of protable sales in the
export market conditional upon entry in the export market) are opposite. Lower xed
export costs raise the export success rate, whereas lower sunk export costs decrease the
probability of export success.
The contribution of the model is threefold. First, the model provides a natural
interpretation for the large fraction of exporting rms that quit the export market shortly
after entry. Two competing explanations for the relatively large fraction of (quick)
exit from the export market are a network model of trade put forward in Rauch and
Watson (2003) and a model with shocks to variables a¤ecting exporting protability
featuring in Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2006). Second, the model generalizes the rm
heterogeneity model of Melitz (2003) in a non-trivial way to account for exporting
uncertainty. Third, the model generates interesting comparative statics results on the
probability of exporting and the exporting success rate.
1.2.2 Firm Heterogeneity in An Oligopoly Model of Trade
The model on rm heterogeneity under oligopoly is a natural extension of the Brander
and Krugman (1983) reciprocal dumping model. There is CES demand across sectors
and Cournot competition within each sector between rms with di¤erent productivities.
Production is constant returns to scale and rms have to pay a sunk entry cost to get
to know their productivity. There is a short-run and long-run analysis depending on
the presence of a free entry condition. All results are derived for a general distribution
of productivities. The chapter nds several interesting results and thus makes several
interesting contributions. In a basic and parsimonious set-up the model generates a
reallocation e¤ect of (freer) trade. Both in the short-run and the long-run the least
productive rms are squeezed out of the market and market prices decrease. The model
nests the reciprocal dumping model and the Ricardian comparative advantage model as
special cases. As in Brander and Krugman (1983) the welfare e¤ect of lower trade costs
can be negative in the short-run because of increased cross-hauling. But the analysis in
the present model can make more precise statements on when the welfare e¤ect is positive
depending on the distribution of productivities. The model also contains predictions on
the e¤ect of trade costs and importer country size on the probability of zero trade ows
and importer unit values. A nal interesting result is that unilateral liberalization leads
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to lower prices in the short-run but higher prices in the long-run in the import liberalizing
country. This is due to relocation e¤ects.
1.2.3 Firm Heterogeneity and Endogenous Quality
The model on rm heterogeneity and endogenous quality takes the empirical paper by
Schott (2004) as its starting point. Schott (2004) relates US unit values to exporter
characteristics. He nds at a detailed product level that richer countries export goods
with higher unit values. To the extent that in richer countries rms are on average more
productive, these ndings are at odds with the standard rm heterogeneity model of
Melitz (2003). In this model more productive rms have a lower marginal cost and
given the xed markup thus charge a lower price.
A model is put forward to bring the rm heterogeneity model of Melitz (2003) in line
with the empirical ndings by Schott (2004). It extends the rm heterogeneity model
with endogenous quality. Each rm has a di¤erent productivity to produce quality and
more productive rms will choose to produce higher quality goods which also involve
higher xed and marginal costs. The implication is that more productive rms charge
higher prices. The contribution of this chapter is straightforward. It tries to bring the
rm heterogeneity model of Melitz (2003) in line with empirical ndings by Schott
(2004) on unit values and exporter characteristics. Besides that, various empirically
testable implications are derived.
1.2.4 Within-Sector Specialization in a Monopolistic
Competition Model of Trade
The model on within-sector specialization also starts from Schotts (2004) empirical
ndings. Another important nding in Schott (2004) is that within detailed product
categories more skill-abundant and more capital-abundant countries export goods with
higher unit values. A monopolistic competition model with non-homothetic production
is proposed to account for the empirical ndings of Schott. Higher quality goods require
relatively more skilled labor in production. The implication is that more skill abundant
countries propose higher quality goods. Because marginal costs increase with quality
in the model, also unit values rise in relative skill-abundance. The contribution of this
model is similar to the contribution of the previous model. It aligns a very inuential
model in international trade with important empirical ndings on unit values and relative
factor-abundance.
1.3 Outline
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains a survey of the three most inu-
ential models on rm heterogeneity and of the most important empirical work on rm
heterogeneity. The chapter starts with a brief review of the homogeneous productivity
imperfect competition literature. Chapter 2 nishes with a comparison of the three most
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inuential models of rm heterogeneity and the oligopoly model put forward in the the-
sis. Chapter 3 addresses exporting uncertainty under heterogeneous popularity. Chapter
4 contains the chapter on rm heterogeneity under oligopoly. Chapter 5 constitutes the
models on rm heterogeneity and endogenous quality. Chapter 6 points out the within-
sector specialization model. Chapter 7 addresses the e¤ect of importer characteristics
on unit values and the role of markups and quality to explain this e¤ect. Chapter 8
concludes.

Chapter 2
Models of Imperfect Competition
and Firm Heterogeneity in
International Trade
2.1 Introduction
Rising intra-industry made the inclusion of imperfect competition in trade models an
urgent task in the 1970s. The development of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of mo-
nopolistic competition allowed the introduction of imperfect competition and increasing
returns to scale with proper microfoundations in international trade models. This gave
rise to the so-called new trade theory explaining intra-industry trade. Krugman (1979,
1980) and Ethier (1982) were the rst to use the Dixit Stiglitz framework in interna-
tional trade. International trade creates various gains from trade in their models. Gains
manifest themselves through an increasing number of varieties available to consumers
(Krugman (1980)), a larger scale of production (Krugman (1979)), a larger degree of in-
ternational labor division (Ethier (1982)) and more competition driving down markups
(Brander and Krugman (1983)). Recently, Melitz (2003), Bernard et al. (2003) and
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) among others add a fourth gain of international trade as-
suming heterogeneous productivity of rms in the so-called new new trade theory. More
productive rms can expand through exporting reducing the market share of the less
productive ones. Average productivity rises in the economy through this composition
e¤ect.
This chapter provides an overview of the most important theoretical models in the
new new trade theory on rm heterogeneity. It starts with a brief review of the new
trade theory addressing variety, scale, competition and labor division e¤ects. This part
also contains a summary of empirical evidence on the new trade theory. Following,
three models of the new new trade theory on rm heterogeneity are outlined in detail.
The seminal work of Melitz (2003) is discussed as well as the model by Bernard et
al. (2003) (BEJK in the remainder) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) (MO in the
remainder). The exposition of these models is followed by a discussion of empirical work
on rm heterogeneity and reallocation e¤ects. This chapter closes with a comparison of
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the di¤erent models containing both an outline of the di¤erences in modeling setup and
a confrontation of the modeling outcomes with the ndings in empirical work.
2.2 Gains from Trade in Imperfect Competition
Models
This section presents the di¤erent gains from trade in the older literature on monopolistic
competition and international trade and discusses empirical evidence on the importance
of these gains. Subsection 2.2.1 presents the basic Dixit-Stiglitz model used by Krug-
man (1980) displaying a variety e¤ect. 2.2.2 points out various ways in which there
can be a benecial scale e¤ect from international trade. Subsection 2.2.3 lays out the
basics of the Brander and Krugman (1983) model where trade generates a benecial
competition e¤ect. 2.2.4 discusses Ethier (1982) with gains from trade through labor
division/specialization. Subsection 2.2.5 presents empirical work on the di¤erent gains
from trade that show up in the older monopolistic competition models.
2.2.1 Variety E¤ect of International Trade
Krugman (1980) uses a standard version of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) love of variety
model leading to gains from trade because of a larger variety of products in the economy.
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) formalized the concept of monopolistic competition. In their
model a monopolistic competition industry is characterized by rms having market power
through the supply of a unique variety, free entry and exit driving economic prots
to zero, the absence of strategic interaction between di¤erent suppliers and increasing
returns to scale in production. In the Dixit Stiglitz model used by Krugman (1980)
all consumers have the same CES-utility over the di¤erent potential varieties V in the
economy with elasticity of substitution :
U =
 X
vV
c
 1

v
! 
 1
(2.1)
As the CES-utility function is homothetic one can calculate a unique price index dened
formally as the minimum expenditure to attain a level of utility of 1:
P =
 
NX
v=1
p1 v
! 1
1 
(2.2)
pv is the price of variety v and N is the number of products actually produced. Maxi-
mizing utility subject to the budget constraint,
NP
v=1
pvcv = w, direct demand for a variety
cv is given by:
cv =
pv
P
  w
P

(2.3)
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All rms use the same production technology displaying increasing returns to scale with
a xed cost of production f and a marginal cost of production a. There is only one factor
of production, labor l, which is homogeneous in the economy. There are L workers in the
economy. Therefore the total demand facing a rm is xv = Lcv. Total cost of producing
xv units of output is given by:
C (xv) = w (f + axv) (2.4)
Each rm produces a unique variety to benet optimally from the market power this
generates. Assuming that the number of varieties N is large, there is no impact of the
price a rm sets on its demand through the price index P . Hence it faces a constant
demand elasticity equal to the elasticity of substitution . Consequently, the optimal
markup of price over marginal cost is also constant:
pv =

   1aw (2.5)
Note that price is independent of output or the number of rms, because of the xed
mark-up. Consequently, output per rm is also constant.
As all rms face the same market demand and have the same technology, they all set
the same price, so the subscript v can be dropped in the remainder. The revenues of an
arbitrary rm are given by:
r (x) =


   1aw
1 
wLP  1 (2.6)
By free entry and exit economic prots are driven down to zero:
 (x) =
r (x)

  f = px  awx  wf = 0 (2.7)
Two equilibrium conditions can be added to the model. First, with a xed labor supply
L, full employment leads to:
N (f + ax) = L (2.8)
Equilibrium in the goods market is given by:
x = Lc (2.9)
Equation (2.5) and (2.7) can be combined to produce an expression for output per rm
which is xed because of the xed mark-up:
x =
f (   1)
a
(2.10)
Combining (2.8) and (2.10) one nds the number of varieties in the economy:
N =
L
f
(2.11)
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The variety gains of international trade in this model can be seen in an easy way. Assume
the modelled economy starts to trade with an identical economy of the same size and
abstract from trade costs. The absence of trade costs (or the identical size) guarantees
that the countries have equal wages. Again all rms produce distinct varieties to use their
market power optimally. As there are no trade costs, all domestic and foreign varieties
will be consumed at equal amounts by all consumers. So, the amount of varieties available
to a consumer will double generating a welfare gain. The scale of production remains
constant as the elasticity of substitution is constant, cf. equation (2.10). Each consumer
reduces its consumption of each variety by 50% to double the number of varieties it
consumes. In this way total demand for a single variety remains constant. Formally, one
can see these results by considering a doubling of the labor force, which is equivalent to
international trade as the countries are identical in all respects. Equation (2.10) shows
that production per rm remains constant. Therefore, from labor market equilibrium
equation (2.8) one nds that the amount of varieties N rises proportionally with the
labor force. The product market equilibrium equation (2.10) requires that consumption
per consumer declines proportionally with the labor force. The next section considers
di¤erent ways to generate a benecial scale e¤ect from international trade.
2.2.2 Scale E¤ect of International Trade
There are various ways to create a scale e¤ect from international trade. This section
discusses three of them. They all lead to a price elasticity of demand that is dependent
on the number of competitors. International trade increases the number of competitors,
increasing the price elasticity, which in turn decreases the price. Because the markup of
rms declines, the scale of production has to rise to restore the zero prot condition. As
a consequence some rms disappear. The rst approach is to generalize the CES-utility
function in the model of 2.2.1 to create a non-xed elasticity of substitution dependent on
the number of rms. Second, one can change the preference structure, using Lancasters
(1979) ideal variety approach leading as well to a non-xed elasticity of substitution.
Third, one can relax the assumption that a price change has no impact on demand
through the price index leading to a price elasticity depending on the number of rms.
Krugman (1979) proposes a model identical to the model in the previous section,
with one exception: the utility function is not CES, but is left unspecied:
U =
X
v2V
u (cv) (2.12)
The rst order condition of the consumer can be expressed with the Lagrange multiplier
of the budget constraint :
u0 (cv) = pv (2.13)
Plugging the goods market equilibrium equation (2.8) into (2.13) one nds an implicit
expression for the demand facing an individual rm. As the number of goods is large,
its pricing policy has a negligible impact on the marginal utility of income . Therefore,
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one nds the following price elasticity of demand:
"v =   u
0 (cv)
u00 (cv) cv
(2.14)
Krugman (1979) assumes that this price elasticity declines in consumption per consumer
cv, which is crucial to create a scale e¤ect. The remainder of the model is equal to the
model in 2.2.1, so again the variety subscript can be dropped as all rms have equal
technology. One nds the same pricing equation, zero prot equation, goods market
equilibrium equation and full employment equation as in 2.2.1 with the elasticity of sub-
stitution substituted by the price elasticity of demand from (2.14). Thus, a combination
of the rst two gives:
x =
f (" (c)  1)
a
(2.15)
Again the e¤ects of international trade can be seen most easily by considering trade
with an identical country in all respects abstracting from any trade costs. International
trade is then like doubling the labor force. Using equation (2.9) and (2.15) one can see
the impact on the scale of production. In the model of 2.2.1 a doubling of L leads to a
proportional decline of c, as can be seen from (2.10). With a variable elasticity of demand
the decline of c causes production per rm x to rise, confront equation (2.15). When rms
face less consumption per consumer the price elasticity rises and the markup declines.
The prot level of rms declines and to restore zero prot the scale of production has
to rise. The result is that the increasing labor force and so the larger market is now
absorbed by a rise in the amount of varieties N , but also in the scale of production of
each rm, x. This e¤ect is caused by the non-xed price elasticity of demand.
The weakness of the rst approach is that the elasticity of demand declines in by
assumption, to create reasonable results. A second way to get a non-xed elasticity of
demand is to make a small-group assumption. There is only a small group of rms,
implying an e¤ect of price on demand through the price index. The model is identical to
the model in 2.2.1 using a CES-utility function again, but the price elasticity of demand
changes:
"v =  + (1  ) p
1 
v
NP
v=1
p1 v
=  +
1  
N
(2.16)
The second equality sign in (2.16) is justied when all rms are identical. Equation
(2.16) shows that the elasticity of demand rises when the number of rms in the market
rises; rms get less market power and their pricing decision has less impact through the
price index when N rises. Combining the pricing equation and the zero prot equation
shows that output per rm rises in the number of rms through a competition e¤ect:
x =
f
a
(   1)

1  1
N

(2.17)
Again the e¤ect of international trade can be addressed by an increase in the labor force.
Combining full employment equation (2.8) with equation (2.17) it can be seen that both
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the number of varieties N and the scale of production x rise when L grows. A larger
market leading to more varieties makes competition ercer, lowers prot margins and
thus requires a larger scale of production.
A third way to create a scale e¤ect is to leave the love of variety approach to pref-
erences and switch to Lancasters (1979) ideal variety approach. In this approach con-
sumers do not appreciate variety, but each consumer has an ideal variety. All consumers
prefer di¤erent varieties and are distributed uniformly over a unit circle. This model
set-up leads to demand equations similar to the love for variety approach above. The
di¤erence is that the elasticity of substitution depends positively on the number of vari-
eties (see Helpman and Krugman (1985), chapter 6 for details). This model generates
again a scale and variety e¤ect of international trade. An increasing labor force leads to
more varieties. Because the elasticity of substitution rises in the number of varieties this
in turn enhances competition, lowers prot margins and increases the scale of production.
2.2.3 Enhanced Competition E¤ect of International Trade
Brander and Krugman (1983) propose an oligopoly model of international trade to show
the benecial pro-competitive e¤ects of international trade. In a setting with Cournot
competition between equal rms, international trade increases the number of competitors
and drives down the market price. In the long-run (with a free entry condition) this will
unambiguously raise welfare. In the short-run the welfare e¤ect of (freer) trade can be
negative, because more trade also involves a larger amount of costly transport of goods.
Brander and Krugman (1983) show that the welfare e¤ect of freer trade is positive in
the short run when trade costs are negligible and that the welfare e¤ect is negative when
trade costs decline from a prohibitive level. The intuition is that there are no welfare
costs of cross-hauling (pointless shipping of goods) when trade costs are negligible. And
the benecial e¤ect on prices is only marginally di¤erent from zero when tari¤s decline
from a prohibitive level, because the (exporting) entrants on the market have a negligible
market share, whereas the negative welfare e¤ect from increased cross-hauling is larger,
because trade costs are large.
The model of Brander and Krugman (1983) consists of two identical countries and
one sector with Cournot competition. There are n rms in each country. A domestic
rm produces output x in the domestic market and output x in the foreign market.
A foreign rm produces y in the domestic (exporting) market and output y in its own
foreign market. Total market sales in the domestic and foreign market are equal to Z
and Z, respectively. Firms have equal marginal costs c, xed costs f and face iceberg
trade costs  . Prots of a domestic and foreign rm are equal to:
 = xp (Z) + xp (Z)  c (x+ x) 0  f (2.18)
 = yp (Z) + yp (Z)  c (y + y)  f (2.19)
One can concentrate on one of the markets as the two countries are equal The rst order
conditions for the domestic rm and for the exporting rm for sales in the domestic
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market are equal to:
x = xp
0 + p  c = 0 (2.20)
y = yp
0 + p  c = 0 (2.21)
The rst order conditions can be solved to nd an expression for the market price:
p = c ( + 1)
"n
2n"  1 (2.22)
" is the price elasticity of domestic demand. Brander and Krugman (1983) show that
the welfare e¤ect of lower trade costs is always positive in the long-run, i.e. imposing a
zero prot condition. Furthermore they derive the intuitive result mentioned before that
the welfare e¤ect of trade liberalization in the short-run is always positive when trade
costs are negligible and is always negative when trade costs are prohibitive.
2.2.4 Labor Division E¤ect of International Trade
Ethier (1982) introduces a love for variety into the production function of the man-
ufactures sector. The more varieties of intermediate goods a nal goods producer of
manufactures can use, the more productive he/she will be. International trade enlarges
the number of di¤erent intermediate goods varieties available and thus raises productiv-
ity of the nal goods producers. Di¤erent countries produce di¤erent varieties, so it is
international labor division that raises productivity in the manufactures sector.
Ethier (1982) considers a two sector model of wheat and manufactures with two
factors of production, capital and labor. This is unnecessary for the purposes of this
paper and a simplied version is outlined. With two sectors in the model, Ethiers
model is considerably more di¢ cult than the presentation below, in particular due to the
external economies from the amount of resources available in the manufactures sectors
in both/all countries. For the basic goals of this section, to present the labor division
e¤ect of international trade and to show that marginal costs decline with international
trade in Ethiers model, the simplied version su¢ ces.
Consider thus a model with one sector in the economy, manufactures, and one factor
of production, labor. Final goods M are produced with a constant returns to scale
technology using varieties of intermediate goods xv. The production function is CES
and displays a love of variety e¤ect:
M =
 
NX
v=1
(xv)
 1

! 
 1
(2.23)
N is the number of available varieties and  the elasticity of substation between the
di¤erent varieties. It is assumed like in 2.2.1 that  > 1. With this assumption there are
constant returns to scale in each intermediate xv, but increasing returns in the amount
of varieties N . These increasing returns are external to an individual producer of nal
goods. Intermediate goods are produced under (internal) increasing returns to scale
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using labor with the same parameters as in 2.2.1. All rms have an identical technology:
lv = axv + f (2.24)
All producers of intermediate goods choose to produce a unique variety like before. They
face a demand curve with price elasticity equal to elasticity of substitution . Combining
their optimal pricing behavior with a zero prot equation leads to equation (2.10) of 2.2.1.
Assuming that labor supply is given by L, full employment equation (2.8) of 2.2.1 also
applies.
In this simplied version of Ethiers model international trade with an equal country
can again be modeled by a rise in the labor force. Equation (2.11) shows that the amount
of intermediate varieties available rises in the labor force. The di¤erence with the models
before is that the rise in the number of varieties does not a¤ect consumer welfare, but the
productive capacity of the economy. International trade raises the number of varieties
available to producers, a process of specialization in the (world) economy. An important
result is that marginal cost in the nal goods sector declines with international trade.
This can be seen from the cost function given by:
C (M) =MN
1
1  p (2.25)
This result shows that the novelty of heterogeneous productivity models where marginal
costs decline with international trade also appears in Ethiers model.
2.2.5 Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Trade in Early
Monopolistic Competition Models
There is no abundance of empirical work on the gains from trade through scale, variety,
competition and labor division. Welfare gains through an increase in variety are studied
by an examination of the impact of new varieties on the import price index. The most
recent and complete study is Broda and Weinstein (2005, 2006). They use the framework
by Feenstra (1994) to calculate the welfare gains from an increased number of imported
varieties for the USA between 1972 and 2001. Feenstra (1994) derives the impact of
a changing composition of varieties (with disappearing and emerging varieties) on an
exact price index assuming CES-utility. This price index is based on changes in market
shares of disappearing and emerging varieties instead of on changes in the number of
available varieties. The latter could overstate the decline in the price index when many
new varieties are included with a small market share. Broda and Weinstein (2006)
calculate di¤erent elasticities of substitution between varieties from di¤erent countries.
They nd that a rise of the number of varieties by 251% leads to a drop in the import
price index of 28.1%. Assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences for imported and domestic
goods this represents a welfare gain of about 2.8%.Only using the increase in the number
of consumed varieties instead of Feenstras approach would lead to a welfare gain of 6.52%
and thus overstate it. Assuming that there is only one elasticity of substitution with
a value of 2 for all imported goods as Romer (1994) does, generates a welfare gain of
8.47% and is thus a strong exaggeration.
2.2 GAINS FROM TRADE IN IMPERFECT COMPETITION 15
Broda and Weinstein (2006) note that 2/3 of the varieties included in their sample
are intermediates or capital goods. The gains from a larger variety of intermediates are
theoretically gains from labor division. But in a monopolistic competition model with
homothetic production, the drop in the prices of imported intermediates is fully passed
through to lower output prices. So, the amount of welfare gain calculated by Broda and
Weinstein (2006) remains valid.
There are many CGE-models featuring imperfect competition and economies of scale
calculating the gains from trade through scale e¤ects. The gains depend on the size of
scale e¤ects assumed. Tybout and Westbrook (1995) review the CGE-studies and nd
that most studies assume returns to scale between 1.1 and 1.33. This leads to gains
from trade between 1% and 5%. Tybout and Westbrook (1995) argue that these gains
are too large, because engineering studies nd usually smaller returns to scale than 1.1.
Econometric estimates of returns to scale are even smaller. Returns to scale as large as
used in CGE-models may in fact describe the large number of small plants in a typical
industry, but these plants account of only a small fraction of sectoral output (Tybout and
Westbrook (1995), p.133).Furthermore, empirical work shows that scales of production
in import-competing sectors do not rise after trade liberalization and in some studies
even decline (Tybout (2001)). Roberts and Tybout (1996) explore the gains through
scale expansion in another way. They make a decomposition of productivity changes in
Mexicos manufacturing industry between 1984 and 1990, a period of trade liberalization.
Productivity change is decomposed into a composition e¤ect, a scale e¤ect and a residual
term. The scale e¤ect leads only to a 0.55% productivity growth, which is less than 5% of
the total productivity growth. So, estimates of returns to scale and the scarce empirical
work on trade liberalization and scale suggest that the gains from trade through scale
e¤ects are modest.
There are various empirical studies on the pro-competitive e¤ect of trade. Roberts
and Tybout (1996) nd that larger import competition goes along with lower markups
in studies on Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Morocco. Tybout (2001) reviews the work
of other authors and comes to the same ndings that markups decline in the amount
of import competition. Despite these benecial e¤ects on markups, more imports could
still have a negative welfare e¤ect when the adverse e¤ects of cross-hauling dominate.
Friberg and Ganslandt (2006) address this possibility. They estimate a structural model
of the bottled water market in Sweden. Using the estimated coe¢ cients they perform
a counterfactual simulation without trade to see if welfare increases. They do not nd
evidence that in the no-imports case welfare would increase. A nal study to mention
on this topic is a simulation study of the e¤ects of trade liberalization in Cameroon
by Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) featuring pro-competitive e¤ects. They nd that the
positive welfare e¤ects from trade liberalization are driven by the pro-competitive e¤ects.
Empirical work on the gains from trade through increased division of labor is scarce.
The study by Broda and Weinstein (2005) discussed above shows that a large part of
the increased number of imported varieties are intermediate goods. Thus the gains they
calculate from a lower import price index are actually gains from labor division. Another
study by Feenstra et al. (1992) uses the same framework as Broda and Weinstein (2005)
to calculate the gains from a larger variety of intermediate inputs in Korean business
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groups, chaebols. Chaebols are strongly vertically integrated, thus intermediate inputs
from a new member of a chaebol will be used by the other members of the chaebol.
Feenstra et al. (1992) calculate the impact of new members in a chaebol on its total
factor productivity (TFP). They nd that new members have a signicant impact on
TFP of a chaebol. Tybout (2001) criticizes the result for an obvious reason: unobserved
heterogeneity could drive both TFP and the inclusion of new members into a chaebol.
Feenstra et al. (1992) include deviation from long-term growth of a chaebol, its capital
labor ratio, the imports over consumption ratio and R&D expenditure as controls. So,
for example the development of a new product not accounted for by R&D expenditure
could be an unobserved variable driving both TFP and new members into a chaebol.
2.3 Three Firm Heterogeneity Models
Heterogeneous productivity of rms creates another gain from trade. Trade changes
the composition of rms. More productive rms gain market share at the expense of
less productive ones, raising the average productivity in the economy. Two mechanisms
can create a composition e¤ect. The rst one, appearing in Melitz (2003), is ercer
competition on the labor market as a result of trade. Assuming exporting requires xed
beachhead costs to enter a market, only more productive rms can export. The possibil-
ity to trade raises their demand for labor, driving up real wages. As a consequence less
productive rms disappear changing the composition of rms: more productive rms
expand their production and less productive rms disappear. The second mechanism,
featuring in Bernard et al. (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), is stronger com-
petition on the product market as a result of trade. International trade extends the
number of competitors. This drives the less competitive rms out of the market. The
models di¤er in their set-up to create this e¤ect. The next three subsections describe
the three di¤erent models. Section 2.4 discusses empirical evidence on rm heterogene-
ity and reallocation e¤ects of trade and section 2.5 contains a comparison of the three
modeling approaches.
2.3.1 Melitz (2003)
The model appearing in Melitz (2003) is identical to the Dixit-Stiglitz model in Krug-
man (1980) with the di¤erence that rms have heterogeneous productivity. So, there
is CES-demand with constant elasticity of substitution, each rm produces a unique va-
riety creating monopoly power, rms use only labor and there are increasing returns to
scale with a xed cost of production. Krugmans model is extended by explicitly model-
ing entry and exit of new rms creating a distribution of rm productivities. The main
equations solving the model are changed in two ways compared with Krugman. First,
entry is costly, creating a di¤erent free entry condition and also a di¤erent labor market
equilibrium equation as labor is used as an input into the entry costs sector. Second,
average productivity becomes endogenous depending on the distribution of productivi-
ties. First, the basic model in a closed economy is considered followed by the extension
to an open economy with trade.
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The Model in a Closed Economy
Utility of a representative consumer is given by equation (2.1), the price index by equa-
tion (2.2) and the demand facing a rm by (2.3) with the notion that summations should
be replaced by integrals. Costs of production, the optimal price, revenues and prots
are given by respectively (2.4), (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) with the notion that marginal cost
ai varies per rm i. So, heterogeneity in productivity is modeled by a di¤erence in the
marginal cost of production. Fixed costs are equal for all rms. In the remainder wages
are normalized at 1. The ratio of revenues of two rms can be expressed as a function
of the ratio of marginal costs. This turns out to be convenient when relating average
productivity to the cuto¤ productivity, the productivity of the rm making zero prot.
r (ai)
r (aj)
=

aj
ai
 1
(2.26)
Next assumptions about the distribution of productivities are needed. Melitz assumes
that there are an unbounded number of potential rms that can enter the market by
incurring a sunk entry cost fe. Before entering potential rms do not know their pro-
ductivity. After having paid the entry cost, they draw a productivity level at random
from a distribution function G (a). This is a reasonable assumption, as it is very di¢ cult
for an entrepreneur to know how a new product will be received in the market without
a market study.
When rms know their productivity, they will decide to enter the market or not
depending on whether their productivity level can generate positive prot. Productivity
levels do not change over time. The productivity at which a rm makes zero prot is the
cuto¤ cost level, a. Below this marginal cost level rms make positive prot and stay
in the market and above this level rms leave the market immediately. The zero cuto¤
prot (ZCP) condition leads to a useful expression for revenues of a rm with cuto¤
marginal cost level:
 (a) = 0) r (a) = f (2.27)
To create a steady state productivity level of rms in the market, Melitz assumes that
rms with positive prots also leave the market with same xed per period probability .
Assuming that there is no time discounting, the value of a rm with marginal cost lower
than cuto¤ marginal cost will be
1P
t=0
(1  )t  (a) = (a)

. Melitz shows that a steady
state can be found where the number of entering and leaving rms is equal and the
distribution of marginal costs of producing rms (to be dened below) does not change
over time.
From the distribution function of initial marginal costs , one can dene a probabil-
ity density function of marginal costs of producing rms  (a). This is the truncated
distribution of :
 (a) =
8<:
g(a)
G(a) if a  a
0 if a  a
(2.28)
The probability of producing is thus given by pin = G (a). The distribution of cost
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levels of producing rms  (a) can be used to express the price index P from equation
(2.2) as a function of cost levels. The price index becomes a function of marginal cost a
instead of a function of varieties v in this way:
P =
1R
0
p (a)1 N (a) da
 1
1 
(2.29)
N is the number of rms. Substituting pricing equation (2.5) one nds the following
expression for the price index:
P =

   1N
1
1 ea (2.30)
ea is a measure for average marginal costs:
ea = aR
0
a1  (a) da
 1
1 
(2.31)
Next, equation (2.28) can be substituted into equation (2.31) to get a relation between
average cost levels and cuto¤ cost levels. The cuto¤marginal cost will then comprise all
information about the price index and thus welfare
ea =  1
G (a)
1R
0
a1 g (a) da
 1
1 
(2.32)
The cuto¤ marginal cost can be determined by two conditions: the zero cuto¤ prot
condition and the free entry condition. Both conditions are a relation between average
prot and cuto¤ marginal cost. The zero cuto¤ prot condition imposes the condition
that a rm with cuto¤ marginal cost has a prot of 0. It can be found by rst writing
average prot as a function of average revenues, then writing average revenues as a
function of the revenues of the rm with cuto¤ marginal cost and the ratio of average
marginal cost and cuto¤ productivity using equation (2.26) and nally imposing zero
prot for the cuto¤ cost level. These steps are shown below:
e =  (ea) = r(ea)

  f
r (ea) = r (a)  aea  1
 (a) = 0) r (a) = f
9>>>=>>>;e =
"
aea (a)
 1
  1
#
f (2.33)
The free entry condition is found by equating the expected value of the rm to the xed
entry cost. The expected value of the rm is equal to the present discounted value of
average prots (discounted by the exit probabilities) times the probability that marginal
cost is below cuto¤ marginal cost. So, one gets:
G (a)

e = fe , e = fe
G (a)
(2.34)
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The zero cuto¤ prot condition and the free entry condition can be combined to nd a
unique cuto¤ marginal cost level. Melitz shows that for a general distribution of initial
cost levels, the ZCP condition is upward sloping in (a; ) space and the FE-condition
downward sloping. The slopes reect the mechanisms in the model. When the average
prot is larger, the cuto¤marginal cost should be larger as well. Suppose average prot
rises. A higher average prot implies a higher prot for the rm with cuto¤marginal cost
as well. Therefore, the rm with the old cuto¤ marginal cost will make positive prot.
So, the cuto¤marginal cost rises. More rms can make positive prots. A lower marginal
cost cuto¤ requires a higher average prot to satisfy FE. Suppose the cuto¤ marginal
cost is smaller. This implies that the probability of a good draw of productivities is
smaller and therefore expected prot, the value when one has a good draw, should be
larger too.
The upward sloping ZCP-line and the downward sloping FE-line determine a unique
cuto¤ marginal cost level. Note that the slopes of the lines are di¤erent from the slopes
in Melitz, because he uses productivity instead of costs.
As remarked before, Melitz shows that one can nd a stationary equilibrium of entry
and exit where the distribution of productivities stays constant. As there is free entry, in
equilibrium all income will go to labor. Labor is either used for production or the xed
costs to set up a new rm. Therefore aggregate expenditures (or revenues) R, are equal
to the total amount of labor as wages are normalized at 1. The number of produced
varieties N is equal to total revenue divided by average revenue per rm:
N =
Rer = L (e + f) (2.35)
As wages are normalized at 1, welfare per worker is equal to the inverse of the price
index:
W = 1=P =
   1

N
1
 1ea (2.36)
So, like in Krugmans model welfare can increase as a result of trade when the number
of varieties rises. The di¤erence is that in this model welfare can also rise, because of
an decrease of average cost levels due to the change of the composition of producers.
Before turning to the introduction of trade, it is important to note that welfare can be
expressed as a function of some parameters and the cuto¤ marginal cost. By equation
(2.26) average marginal cost can be expressed as a function of the cuto¤ marginal cost
and average and cuto¤ revenues. From equation (2.35) an expression for average revenue
is substituted and from equation (2.27) an expression for cuto¤ revenues. Combining
gives:
W =  1

N
1
 1eaea = a  r(a)
r(ea)
 1
 1
= a

f
L=N
 1
 1
9=;gW =    1 Lf 1a (2.37)
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The Model in an Open Economy
Melitz makes four assumptions when international trade is introduced in the model.
First, a rm knows its productivity on the foreign market before it has to decide whether
to enter the foreign market or not. Second, there are per unit transport costsof the
iceberg type with. So,  > 1 units have to be exported to make one unit arrive at the
destination. Third, it is assumed that the di¤erent countries in the model are identical.
In the absence of a homogeneous good sector, equal size of the countries is necessary to
create equal wages (Krugman, 1980). Fourth, it is assumed that there are sunk costs
to enter a foreign market, fex. Fixed entry costs in export markets are a reasonable
assumption, as rms have to gather all kinds of information before they can enter a
foreign market and a distribution channel has to be set up. These so-called beachhead
costs to enter a foreign market are introduced in the literature by Baldwin (1988) and
Baldwin and Krugman (1989) and there is empirical support for its existence (Roberts
and Tybout, 1997). Because a rms information does not change after it has entered
the foreign market the one time investment costs can also be expressed as per period
xed costs using the discount rate. This gives: fx = fex. The assumption is crucial,
because without xed entry costs, trade liberalization would mean nothing more than
just an extension of the market without any impact on productivity levels.
Prices charged abroad are still a mark-up over marginal cost, now including transport
costs. So, export prices and export revenues are given by:
px =

   1a = pd (2.38)
rx =


   1a
1 
UP  =  1 rd (2.39)
Variables with an index x denote export variables and with a d domestic variables.
Prots from domestic and exporting sales are equal to, respectively:
d (a) =
rd (a)

  f (2.40)
x (a) =
rx (a)

  fx = 
1 rd

  fx (2.41)
The probability that a rm is exporting conditional on protably selling in the domestic
market is given by px =
G(ax)
G(a) . Using this probability the number of exporting rms can
be expressed as a fraction of the total number of producing rms, Nx = pxN . Thus
with countries m + 1 countries, the total number of varieties available in every country
is Nt = N +mNx = N (1 +mpx). Like in equation (2.32) for the model without trade,
average cost levels of domestically selling rms and exporting rms can be written as
a function of their cuto¤ cost levels. These average cost levels can be used to write an
expression for overall average marginal cost as a function of average marginal costs of
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domestic producers and exporting producers, which is given by:
eat = ( 1
Nt
"
Nea1  +mNxeax

1 #) 11 
(2.42)
Like in the closed economy, the price index (and welfare) is a function of this average
marginal cost and thus of cuto¤ marginal cost:
W = 1=P =
   1

N
1
 1
teat =    1

L
f
 1
 1 1
a
(2.43)
Cuto¤ marginal cost is again at the intersection of the free entry condition and zero
cuto¤ prot condition. The free entry condition remains the same, given in equation
(2.34). The zero cuto¤ prot condition does change however, because the cuto¤ cost
level is not related to average prot only through the domestic market, but also through
the foreign market. Average prot is found by adding up domestic prot and exporting
prot, correcting for the number of countries and the probability of exporting.
e = d (ea) + pxmx (eax) (2.44)
Average domestic and exporting prots are both related to their cuto¤ cost level by zero
cuto¤ prot conditions:
ed = " aea (a)
 1
  1
#
f (2.45)
ex = " axeax (ax)
 1
  1
#
fx (2.46)
Combining equations (2.26) and (2.39) one can express the domestic cuto¤marginal cost
as a function of the exporting cuto¤ productivity:
ax = a
 1


f
fx
 1
 1
(2.47)
Crucial in Melitz model to create a composition e¤ect is that only relatively more
productive rms can export. This requires that the exporting cuto¤ marginal cost level
is smaller than the domestic cuto¤ marginal cost level. Condition (41) implies that this
condition is satised when:
 1fx > f (2.48)
Melitz argues that this condition is likely to be satised as not all rms are exporting.
This is an instrumentalist way to justify an assumption: not by the realism of the
assumption itself, but by the truth of the predictions it generates (Friedman (1953)).
The realism of the assumption can be questioned. fx is the xed per period cost of
introducing a certain variety abroad and f is the xed cost of production at home. So,
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f includes the xed costs to produce like overhead costs as well as the costs to introduce
a new variety at home, the beachhead costs in the domestic market consisting of for
example marketing costs and setting up a distribution network. fx includes only the
latter type of beachhead costs for the exporting market. Baldwin and Forslid (2004)
interpret the xed costs of production as only the beachhead costs f . In this reading of
the model, there are no xed overhead costs and condition (2.48) requires that exporting
beachhead costs are larger than domestic beachhead costs. This assumption seems fair:
beachhead costs abroad are larger than beachhead costs in the domestic market, because
of information advantages in setting up a distribution network in the domestic market
for example. The problem with this reading of the model is that somehow xed overhead
costs are assumed away. There are only xed costs involved in setting up a new variety,
fe, and in entering a market with a new variety, the domestic and exporting beachhead
costs, f and fx. Including overhead costs, satisfying equation (36) requires that the
xed overhead costs are small relative to the di¤erence between domestic and exporting
beachhead costs.1
So, average prots in (38) are related to the cuto¤ productivity a, giving the ZCP-
condition. The open economy ZCP-condition lies above the closed economy one, because
a higher cuto¤productivity does now a¤ect total average prot through average domestic
prot and average exporting prot. When the ZCP-line shifts upward the new cuto¤
marginal cost declines. Cuto¤ marginal cost declines, because real wages rise implying
that the least productive rms cannot make positive prots anymore. Real wages rise
for two reasons. First, in an open economy the very productive rms can not only sell
at home, but also abroad. They expand their production and therefore need more labor.
So, labor demand rises driving up real wages. Second, the prospect for a very productive
rm that enters is better in the open economy. Therefore, more rms will try to set up
a new rm and enter. The xed costs involved in entering also require labor.
As productivity changes are fully reected in changed prices the high productive rms
charge lower prices and sell more. Therefore, large exporting rms replace small domes-
tically producing rms. As a result, the number of consumed varieties can be expected
to decline.2 Despite the possible decline in the number of consumed varieties, welfare
always rises as a result of trade liberalization because the rise in average productivity
always dominates a possible decline in the number of varieties. Melitz (2003), p.1722
proves formally that cuto¤ marginal cost declines as a result of liberalization. Equation
(2.43) shows that a lower cuto¤ cost level leads to higher welfare.
To summarize, the e¤ect of trade is a replacement of low-productive domestic rms
who cannot a¤ord the higher real wages anymore by high productive exporting rms
which have more than average productivity. As a result average productivity rises. The
composition e¤ect is caused by the fact that the cuto¤ marginal cost to export lies at
a lower level than the overall cuto¤ marginal cost. The possibility to export allows
only the more productive rms to expand their size of production at the expense of less
1Dening xed costs, f , as the sum of xed overhead costs, fo, and domestic beachhead costs, fdb,
equation (2.48) requires: fo < fx
1
 1   fdb.
2Baldwin and Forslid (2004) show that the number of consumed varieties declines as a result of
trade liberalization when fx < f assuming a Pareto distribution of productivities.
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productive domestic producing ones. It is important to emphasize that this result relies
on the assumption that the xed beachhead costs to export multiplied by a trade barriers
term, 
1
 1fx are larger than the xed costs to produce domestically, f . As discussed
above, this assumption is not evident.
2.3.2 Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003)
Bernard et al. (2003), BEJK, propose a model with CES-preferences and Bertrand
competition between di¤erent (potential) producers of the same variety. There are con-
stant returns to scale. Di¤erent producers of a certain variety have di¤erent marginal
costs. So, each country has a lowest cost producer. Trade allows the replacement of some
domestic lowest cost producers of a certain variety by exporting rms who have lower
marginal costs inclusive of trade barriers. Productivity rises, because the composition
of rms changes as a result of trade: less productive rms are competed out by foreign
rms and more competitive rms can expand selling on export markets. Bernard et al.
(2003) include the use of intermediates in production. International trade decreases the
prices of intermediates leading to another reason for the rise in productivity.
In BEJK there is a continuum 1 of varieties and on each variety there is Bertrand
competition over the price. So, utility is given by equation (2.1) with the notion that
there is a continuum of varieties of size 1. A potential producer of a certain variety faces
demand cv given in equation (2.3). There are constant returns to scale in production. In
each country there are several potential producers for each variety with varying marginal
cost levels. Potential producers in country i can transform one unit of inputs wi into
'i (v) units of variety v. The k th most e¢ cient producer of variety v in country i has
a productivity of 'ki (v). Products can be shipped from country i to country n. For
1 unit to arrive in country n, ni units have to be shipped from country i. So, there
are standard iceberg transport costs like in the previous model. Combining productivity
and transport costs, the k th most e¢ cient producer in country i has the following unit
cost to deliver variety v in country n:
Ckni (v) =

wi
'ki (v)
ni

The lowest cost producer of variety v in country n is the one with the lowest cost among
the lowest cost producers in all di¤erent countries. It has unit cost:
C1n (v) = min
i
fC1ni (v)g (2.49)
As noted, the model assumes Bertrand competition. So, the lowest cost seller in country
n can set a price equal to the unit cost of the second most e¢ cient supplier in that country.
This leads to the following upper limit on the price of the most e¢ cient producer:
C2n (v) = min
i

C2ni (v) ;min
i6=i
fC1ni (v)g

(2.50)
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Here, i is the country with the most e¢ cient producer. So, the price the most e¢ cient
producer can set is either the unit cost of the second most e¢ cient producer from the
same country or the unit cost of the most e¢ cient producer from another country. Still
sometimes the most e¢ cient producer will set an even lower price. This is the case when
the monopoly price of variety v determined by the elasticity of substitution is lower than
the lowest price of potential competitors. So, the price of variety v in country n is given
by:
pn (v) = min

C2n (v) ;

   1C1n (v)

(2.51)
Equations (2.50) and (2.51) show that more e¢ cient rms with a larger productivity
parameter ' can charge a larger mark-up, because the di¤erence of their unit cost with
the unit cost of the second most e¢ cient producer will be larger, an artifact of the
Fréchet-distribution which does make sense.
To continue, BEJK assume that productivities are probabilistic and drawn from
some distribution function. To solve the model the productivities of the most e¢ cient
and second most e¢ cient producers from each country i are needed. The authors assume
a Fréchet distribution given by:
Fi ('i1; 'i2) =

1 + Ti
 
' i2   ' i1

exp
 Ti' i2 	
In this expression  determines how heterogeneous the e¢ ciency of the two most e¢ cient
rms is with smaller values implying more variability. In fact, this parameter determines
how much trade gains can be attained because of comparative advantage. Ti is a para-
meter for absolute advantage of country i. BEJK solve in a web-appendix for the cost
distribution of the most e¢ cient and second most e¢ cient supplier in a certain country.
It is given by:
Gn (c1; c2) = Pr (C1n  c1n; C2n  c2n) (2.52)
= 1  exp nc1	  nc1 exp nc2	 (2.53)
n =
NP
i=1
Ti (widni)
  is a cost parameter and depends on input costs, the two trade
parameters and trade costs.
Two important outcomes of the model can be seen easily. First, exporting rms
display higher productivity. A best potential producer of good j from country i can sell
at home when he/she is cheaper than its competitors in its home market:
wi
'1i
 wkik
'1k
8k 6= i (2.54)
It can export to a country n when it is cheaper than any other supplier to market n:
wini
'1i
 wknk
'1k
8k 6= i (2.55)
Using the triangle inequality that shipping a good directly to a country is cheaper than
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shipping it through another country, nk  niik, implies that winiwknk 
wi
wkik
. So, the
inequality in (2.55) is harder to satisfy than the one in (2.54) and thus exporting requires
a higher productivity. This result simply says that exporting requires on average higher
productivity, because of trading costs when there is competition over the price.
A second result of the model is that more productive rms are bigger. A rm either
sets a Dixit-Stiglitz monopoly mark-up where lower unit costs imply a lower price and
thus more sales. Or if potential competitors are close, a rm sets a price equal to the
unit cost of the second most e¢ cient rm. More e¢ cient rms also face more e¢ cient
competitors assuming a Fréchet-distribution.3 BEJK prove six other analytic results for
their model on among others the mark-up, the price index, market shares and the share
of variable costs in aggregate revenues, which are not of interest for the basic description
of the model and the comparison with the other models.
BEJK calibrate their model on aggregate trade shares and expenditures of 47 leading
US export destinations (including the US itself) in 1992 and on US plant level micro
data from the US Census of Manufactures in the Longitudinal Research Database of the
Bureau of Census. The two parameters  and  are used to create a match between the
productivity and size gains of exporters in the simulation and in the data. Other results,
on the fraction of rms that export and the variability in productivity and in size for
example, are generated by the model and are subsequently compared to real-world data
to assess the t of the model.
To conduct policy experiments, BEJK close their model by including a tradable non-
manufactured good produced in each country and serving as the numeraire. Labor supply
in each country is assumed to be fully elastic with wages equal to labor productivity
in the tradable non-manufactured good sector. Production uses labor and tradable
intermediate inputs. BEJK perform a simulation of the e¤ects of a 5% fall in worldwide
geographic barriers and show that it raises productivity by 4.7%. The main e¤ect is
through the cost declines of inputs for continuing rms (3.9%). Exit of less productive
rms contributes 0.8% and expansion of high productive rms 0.2%.
To summarize the main mechanisms in the model, average productivity rises in this
model because the composition of rms changes towards the more e¢ cient ones as a
result of competition on the product market and because inputs become cheaper. Freer
trade lowers the transport costs and thus foreign rms will be more often the most com-
petitive ones. Therefore, exporting high productive rms can expand and low productive
domestic selling rms disappear.
2.3.3 Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
The model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), MO, unites the heterogeneous productivity
approach in Melitz with the linear demand system in Ottaviano et al. (2002). The
linear demand system displays horizontal product di¤erentiation and love for variety.
Pricing behavior depends on the number of competitors and the average price level in
3Together with a result discussed before, this result shows that the Fréchet distribution displays two
properties: a more productive rm is more ahead of its rst rival and also has a rival that is more
productive. Both results are motivated by Bernard et al. (2003), p.1278, by a sports analogy.
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contrast to standard CES-preferences where prices are xed mark-ups over marginal
cost. Like in Melitz there are sunk set-up costs to start a new variety, but production is
constant returns to scale. There are no beachhead costs in domestic or exporting markets.
Labor supply in the di¤erentiated goods sector is fully elastic through the inclusion of a
homogeneous goods sector. Therefore, the composition e¤ect of trade appears because
of tougher product market competition and not because of factor market competition.
A description of the basic model in a closed economy is followed by a discussion of the
open economy model. The e¤ect of trade liberalization is shown in the model, followed
by a verbal discussion of the e¤ect of other types of trade liberalization.
The Model in a Closed Economy
Utility depends on a homogeneous good, c0, that serves as the numeraire and on a
continuum of di¤erentiated goods, cv:
U = c0 + 
R
v2V
cvdv   1
2

R
v2V
c2vdv  
1
2

 R
v2V
cvdv
2
(2.56)
The parameters  and  measure the relative attractiveness of di¤erentiated goods.
 measures the love for variety or equivalently the ease of substitution between the
di¤erentiated goods. A larger  corresponds with a lower substitution elasticity. Given
that the demand for the numeraire good is positive, the inverse demand function is given
by:
pv =   cv   C (2.57)
C =
R
v2V
cvdv is consumption of all varieties . Upon inversion and multiplication by the
number of consumers L, one nds the demand function facing the rm4:
xv =
L
 + N
  L

pv +
N
 + N
L

ep (2.58)
ep = 1
N
R
v2V 
pvdv is the average price level and N is the number of consumed varieties.
The set of varieties V  for which there is positive demand is given by:
V  = fv j cv  0g =

v j pv  1
N + 
( + Nep) (2.59)
Condition (2.59) shows that a larger number of rms or a lower price level decreases the
price at which there is positive demand. MO characterize this as a tougher competitive
environment. It can be shown that a larger number of rms or a lower price level also
increases the price elasticity of demand.
There are constant returns to scale in both the homogeneous goods sector and the
4Write the inverse demand function for another variety with index w, subtract the two inverse
demands, and integrate the result over w . This gives an expression for C, C = Ncv   1
R
w
(pw   pv) dw
, that can be substituted into the inverse demand function giving the demand function.
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di¤erentiated goods sector. Labor is the only input of production, is homogeneous
and can move freely between the two sectors. This implies that competition on the
labor market cannot drive less competitive rms out of the market like in Melitz. A
unit labor requirement in the homogeneous goods sector implies a unit wage. Firms in
the di¤erentiated goods sector can enter upon drawing a marginal cost from a known
distribution. They have to incur a sunk entry cost, fe, before they know their marginal
cost level like in Melitz. All rms making positive or zero prots stay in business, the
others exit. Firms di¤erentiate their goods to get market power and choose the following
pricing rule:
x (a) =
L

(p (a)  a) (2.60)
There is a rm with cuto¤ marginal cost, a, earning zero prot. (2.60) shows that its
demand is zero. Therefore, equation (2.59) with equality sign gives a relation between
the cuto¤ cost level a and the number of rms N :
a =
1
N + 
( + Nep) (2.61)
The optimal price of a rm can be expressed as a function of its own cost level and
the cuto¤ cost level. By solving equation (2.61) for ep and substituting the resulting
expression in the demand equation (2.58) one nds an expression for market demand
x (a) that can be plugged into (2.60) to give:
p (a) =
1
2
(a + a) (2.62)
Convenient expressions for output, the absolute markup, revenues and prots follow from
the pricing equation:
x (a) =
L
2
(a   a) (2.63)
m (a) =
1
2
(a   a) (2.64)
r (a) =
L
4
 
(a)2   a2 (2.65)
 (a) =
L
4
(a   a)2 (2.66)
To close the model, a free entry condition is imposed. Expected prot should be equal
to the sunk set-up cost:
aR
0
 (a) dG (a) =
L
4
aR
0
(a   a)2 dG (a) = fe (2.67)
G (a) is the distribution of potential unit costs, from which rms draw before entrance.
Firms produce only for one period. This assumption is equivalent to an exit probability
 of 1 in Melitz (2003). The number of entrants is then given by NE = NG(a) . The free
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entry condition determines the cuto¤ cost level a. The ZCP-condition in (2.61) can be
used to determine the number of rms as a function of the cuto¤ cost level and average
costs:
N =
2

  a
a   ea (2.68)
ea = 1
G(a)
aR
0
adG (a) is the average cost of surviving rms and a measure of average
productivity in the economy. Equation (2.67) shows that a larger market L leads to a
lower cuto¤marginal cost. As a result average cost declines and from (2.67) the number
of rms rises. Like in the models of section 2.2, a larger market is in this model equivalent
to the introduction of costless international trade with an equal country. The intuitive
story of a larger market size is that more rms enter the market, making competition
tougher by lowering the average price level. As a result, the cuto¤ cost level declines.
Some less competitive rms cannot survive. It follows that average productivity in the
economy rises. A rm with a certain cost level a sets lower absolute and relative markups
in response to tougher competition, cf. equation (2.64).
MO assume a Pareto distribution of initial productivities to solve explicitly for the
cuto¤ cost level from the free entry condition. Initial productivities 1=a are distributed
according to a Pareto distribution with lower bound 1=aM and shape parameter k  1:
G (a) =

a
aM
k
(2.69)
The truncated distribution of rms with a productivity above 1=a is also Pareto with
the same shape parameter and with lower bound equal to the cuto¤ productivity:
 (a) = g (a j a  a) = ka
k 1
(a)k
(2.70)
A Pareto distribution makes calculations tractable in this model. The question is whether
it is a reasonable assumption. Baldwin (2005), p.7, states that the empirical literature
on rm size distribution suggests that a Pareto distribution is a reasonable approxi-
mation [for the size distribution of rms]. In Melitz with CES-preferences size and
productivity vary inversely and proportionally (cf. equation (2.6)), so a Pareto distrib-
ution for productivity seems fair in that setting. But in the linear demand system size
does not vary proportionally with productivity, cf. equation (2.65). So, the fact that the
size distribution is Pareto does not imply that the productivity distribution is Pareto in
MO.
Plugging equation (2.69) into the free entry condition, equation (2.67), leads to an
explicit expression for a5 and from the ZCP-condition for N :
a =

2fe (k + 1) (k + 2) a
k
M
L
 1
k+2
(2.71)
5Use repeated integration by parts.
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N =
2 (k + 1)

  a
a
(2.72)
The assumed Pareto distribution allows some more comparative statics exercises on
average values. Average cost, price, absolute markup, output, revenues and prots are
given by:
ea = k
k + 1
a ex = L
2
1
k + 1
a
ep = 2k + 1
2k + 2
a er = L
2
1
k + 2
(a)2
em = 1
2
1
k + 1
a e = L
2
1
(k + 1) (k + 2)
(a)2
A larger market size leads to larger average rm size and higher average prots, because
the direct market size e¤ect dominates the e¤ect of lower prices and lower markups.
Also, average absolute markups decline, because the direct e¤ect of tougher competition
dominates the composition e¤ect towards more productive rms with larger markups.
To summarize, as a result of the larger market-size the cuto¤cost level decreases, average
productivity rises, the number of rms and varieties rises, the average absolute markup
declines and average rm size rises. MO show formally that a larger market raises
welfare.
MO consider a short-run equilibrium to address the short-run e¤ects of liberalization.
In a short run equilibrium there is no entry or exit of rms. Firms decide whether to
produce or not, depending on the ability to make prot. In the model this implies that
the ZCP-condition, equation (2.67), remains, but the free entry condition is replaced by
another equation. The other equation gives the number of rms that remain in business
as a function of the pre-existing rms in business (the incumbents), N , the distribution
of costs of these rms G (a) (with support between 0 and the old cuto¤ cost level, aM)
and the new cuto¤ cost level a:
N = NG (a) = N

a
aM
k
(2.73)
So, when the cuto¤cost level in a short-run equilibrium remains equal following a change
in some parameter then the number of rms stays equal and the cuto¤ cost level does
not change. When the cuto¤ cost-level does change, combining (2.73) with the ZCP-
condition in (2.67) gives the new cuto¤ cost level:
(a)k+1
  a =
2 (k + 1)  (aM)
k
N
In the short-run equilibrium a larger market does not change the distribution of produc-
ing rms; all rms adjust production levels in proportion to market size. The reason
is that only a change in the number of rms can change the toughness of competition
leading to a change in the cuto¤ cost level.
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The Model in an Open Economy
Without trade barriers the open economy is just an extension of the market like in section
2.2 leading to more rms, tougher competition, a lower cuto¤ cost level, higher average
productivity, lower average markups, lower average prices and larger average rm size
and prot. Proportional bilateral liberalization generates equal e¤ects as an extension
of the market. Still the inclusion of trade barriers is useful to study di¤erent ways of
trade liberalization.
A model with two countries is considered, indexed by s; t = H;F . The two countries
can di¤er along two dimensions, their size Ls and the iceberg trade costs  s > 1 to
import into a country s. As there are constant returns to scale, the optimal pricing rules
for domestic and export supply are independent:
xsd (a) =
Ls

(psd (a)  a) (2.74)
xsx (a) =
Lt

 
psx (a)   ta

(2.75)
Prices are always dened as delivery prices, so including trade costs. The domestic
cuto¤ cost level in country s, as is related to the exporting cuto¤ cost level in country
t, atx , as they are both determined by the delivery price s in at which a rm just sells a
non-negative amount:
 satx = a
s =
1
N + 
( + Nep) (2.76)
Using the ZCP-condition in (2.76) and the market demand equation, equation (2.58),
one nds the price of a rm as a function of its own cost level and the cuto¤ cost and
all the implied expressions on revenues, markups, etc. Only the expressions for prots
are displayed.
psd (a) =
1
2
(as + a) (2.77)
psx (a) =
 t
2
(asx   a)2 (2.78)
sd (a) =
Ls
4
(as   a)2 (2.79)
sx (a) =
Lt
4
 
 t
2
(asx   a)2 (2.80)
The free entry condition is given by equality of average prots from domestic and ex-
porting sales and the sunk entry cost:
asR
0
sd (a) dG (a) +
asxR
0
sx (a) dG (a) = fe (2.81)
In country t there is a similar free entry condition. Using the fact that exporting cuto¤
cost levels can be expressed as a function of domestic cuto¤ cost levels as in equation
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2.76, and imposing a Pareto distribution, expressions for the cuto¤ cost levels can be
found:
as =


Ls
1  t
1  ts
 1
k+2
(2.82)
s measures trade barriers into country s, s = ( s) k and  = 2fe (k + 1) (k + 2) (aM)
k
is a technology index. The cuto¤ cost level for exporting rms inclusive of trade costs
is equal to the cuto¤ cost level of domestic producers. By the assumption of cost distri-
butions that are equal and Pareto, this implies that the price distributions of domestic
and exporting rms supplying the same market are equal. Therefore, one can solve for
the average price level as a function of the cuto¤ cost level and average cost, using equa-
tion (2.77). Using this expression in the ZCP-condition, equation (2.76), and assuming
a Pareto distribution, one gets the same expression for the number of rms as in the
closed economy:
N s =
2 (k + 1)

  as
as
(2.83)
Equation (2.76) provides some interesting insights. First, opening an economy to trade
has equal e¤ects as an extension of the market. The cuto¤ cost level becomes smaller.6
The reasons for this e¤ect are equal: more rms and tougher competition. In the short-
run equilibrium trade has di¤erent e¤ects than an extension of the market. The reason
is that trade increases the number of competitors in the short-run, whereas an extension
of the market does not raise the number of competitors in the short-run. Opening up
to trade thus decreases the cuto¤ marginal cost in the short-run, because of import
competition. Second, bilateral liberalization between two countries with equal trade
barriers has similar though not equal e¤ects as an increase of the market. This is seen
by reducing equation (2.76) to the following expression when trade barriers are equal.
as =


Ls
1
1 + 
 1
k+2
(2.84)
A decrease in trade barriers, i.e. a rise in , decreases the cuto¤ cost level and thus raises
average productivity. But average rm size declines, whereas an increasing market size
increased average rm size. Total average revenues are equal to:
ers = ersd (a) + ersx (a) = Ls2 1k + 2 (as)2 + Lt2  2 1k + 2 (asx )2 (2.85)
As the exporting cuto¤ cost level is related to the foreign domestic cuto¤ cost level by
asx =
at

, one can write:
ers = 1
2
1
k + 2

(as)2 Ls +
 
atx
2
Lt

6Compare equation (2.82) with the ZCP-condition in the closed economy, equation (2.71), and note
that 1 
t
1 ts .
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Trade liberalization reduces the cuto¤ cost levels in both countries, confront equation
(2.84), hence average rm size declines. Section 2.5 contains a discussion of this seemingly
strange result.
Third, market size of the domestic market is relevant for cuto¤cost levels and thus for
all other important variables in the model. The market size of the trading partner has no
impact in the model. The latter is due to some o¤setting e¤ects caused by the functional
form specication of the model (see for a discussion MO). Fourth, unilateral liberalization
has adverse consequences in the long-run in this model. Equation (2.82) shows that a rise
in s, a decline of trade barriers, increases the cuto¤cost level. Average cost rises as well,
markups rise and the number of rms declines with adverse welfare e¤ects. The reason
is a phenomenon discussed in earlier literature (Venables (1987)): there is a delocation
of rms towards the other country, because they can enter the liberalizing country at
lower trade costs. In the short-run rms cannot delocate. Therefore, the liberalizing
country gains in the short-run as a result of the increased import competition causing
tougher competition and thus a lower cuto¤ cost level.
To summarize, trade leads to more rms resulting in tougher competition. The
markup of a rm with a certain cost level declines, driving the less competitive rms
out of the market. The cuto¤ cost level declines. As a result average cost levels decline,
i.e. average productivity rises. Welfare rises for two other reasons as well: an increase in
the number of varieties and a decrease in average absolute markups. The composition
e¤ect is driven by tougher competition on the product market, like in BEJK and not by
competition on the labor market like in Melitz, because labor supply is fully elastic.
2.4 Empirical Evidence on Heterogeneous Produc-
tivity Models
Although theoretical models of international trade with heterogeneous productivity and
gains from trade through a composition e¤ect are only developed recently, empirical
work on composition e¤ects dates back a longer time. This section starts with some
relevant facts on exporting and productivity followed by a discussion of the direction
of causality between exporting and productivity. Then evidence on composition e¤ects
from di¤erent countries is discussed. The section closes by listing empirical results on
the importance of sunk costs in exporting, the e¤ect of import competition on rm size
and the reaction of markups to trade liberalization.
BEJK list ve empirical regularities on exporting and productivity used as test for
the model they develop. As in all the papers cited by Bernard and various coauthors they
use plant-level and rm-level data from the United States collected in the Longitudinal
Research Database of the Bureau of the Census. The basic facts reported here are from
1984, 1987 and 1992 and taken from Bernard and Jensen (1999). The rst fact is that
there is substantial dispersion in productivity of all rms, exporting and non-exporting.
The standard deviation of the log of value added per worker within four digit industries
is 0.66 for 1992, although measurement error could lead to an upward bias. Second,
exporting rms are more productive. Within four digit industries and within states
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labor productivity is 12%-24% larger among exporters and TFP is 4%-18% larger in
the three years explored. Third, exporting rms are much larger. Controlling again
for four digit industries and states exporters are about twice as larger as non-exporters.
Fourth, only a small fraction of rms export. In the US-dataset used 21% of the rms
report exporting. Fifth, exporting rms earn only a small fraction of their revenues
from exporting. Fewer than 5% of the exporting plants export more than 50% of their
production.
The correlation between exporting and productivity raises the issue of causality.
Do more productive rms become exporters or does exporting increase productivity?
Bernard and Jensen (1999, 2004b) answer the rst question with yes and the second
question with no. The impact of productivity on exporting can be examined in various
ways. First, non exporters who become exporters are compared with non exporters who
do become exporters. Bernard and Jensen (1999) nd that future exporters are 20% to
45% larger in terms of employment, 27% to 54% larger in terms of shipments, 7%-8%
larger in terms of labor productivity and 2%-4% larger in terms of total factor productiv-
ity, although the last di¤erence is not signicant. Second, Bernard and Jensen (1999)
consider a small dynamic model of the decision to export including sunk entry costs.
The binary choice of exporting is estimated with a linear probability model including
xed e¤ects. GMM is applied to the model in rst di¤erences. The estimation shows
that a larger productivity, a larger total employment and a higher level of wages increase
the probability of exporting signicantly. One should keep in mind that this estimation
could su¤er from weak instruments as the number of time periods is only ve (Bun and
Kiviet (2006)). Third, one can conduct Granger causality tests of productivity growth
and export growth. Bernard and Jensen (2004b) nd both on aggregate and on industry
level that productivity growth has a positive and signicant impact on export growth,
whereas export growth has a negative and signicant impact on productivity growth.
The impact of exporting on productivity can be addressed by regressing growth rates
in employment, shipments, TFP and value added per worker on initial export status.
Controlling for initial size and other plant characteristics, Bernard and Jensen (1999)
nd that exporting rms show faster growth in shipments and employment but slower
growth in TFP over annual horizons. Over longer horizons only employment grows
signicantly faster, shipments are not signicantly a¤ected by exporting and productivity
(TFP) grows more slowly. Bernard and Jensen (2004b) explain the distinction between
long run and short run e¤ects by the fact that there is a considerable amount of entry
into and exit out of exporting. So, quite a large fraction of rms that are exporters in
some year might not be exporters anymore ve years later. Average entry is 10% (as a
fraction of the non-exporters) and average exit is 17% (as a fraction of the exporters).
To account for entry and exit Bernard and Jensen (2004b) compare the performance
of continued exporters, entrants, exiting rms and non-exporters. They show that exiting
rms grow signicantly slower than non-exporters on all measures. In contrast, entrants
grow signicantly faster on all measures in the year of entry. Continued exporters have
signicantly larger employment and shipments growth than non-exporters on the long
run, but TFP grows slower, albeit non-signicantly.
To summarize, the US-data show that a higher productivity leads to exporting, al-
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though the impact of size on exporting is much larger. In the other direction, exporting
does not promote productivity growth at the plant or rm-level. Through composition
e¤ects trade and exporting can have impact on aggregate productivity. When exporting
rms are more productive on average and exporting allows a reallocation of resources
towards more productive rms, exporting raises aggregate productivity. Bernard and
Jensen (2004b) consider this possibility. One of the previous paragraphs reported that
exporters have 4%-18% higher TFP. Bernard and Jensen (2004a) make a more detailed
comparison by exploring productivity levels of non-exporters, continued exporters, en-
trants into exporting, exiting rms and switching rms (entering or exiting more than
once). They nd that exporters are 8%-9% more productive than non-exporters con-
trolling for industry and year e¤ects. Entrants move towards the productivity level of
exporters and exiting rms move towards the productivity of non-exporters. The next
step is to examine whether the size of exporting rms grows faster than of non-exporters
implying a reallocation of resources towards exporting, more productive rms. The
ndings are that employment growth at exporters is 0.79%-1.08% larger and shipments
growth 0.57%-1.32% larger. Comparing never exporters with always exporters shows
even di¤erences of 2%-4%. Entrants grow slower than always exporters. So, together
these ndings imply a reallocation of resources towards exporting more productive rms.
To shed light on the importance of the composition e¤ects, Bernard and Jensen (2004a)
decompose productivity growth at the aggregate and industry level into within and be-
tween plant e¤ects. They nd that reallocation e¤ects account for 42% of productivity
growth between 1983 and 1992. More than half of the reallocation e¤ect takes place
within sectors: 22.5% of productivity growth is accounted for by reallocations within
sectors. Exporting contributes 70% to the total reallocation e¤ect.
Tybout (2001) reviews empirical work on composition e¤ects in developing countries.
Tybout (1991) uses revenue per worker as a measure for productivity. He nds in studies
of Chile (data year: 1979), Colombia (1977-1987) and Morocco (1984-1987) that market
share reallocations contribute to productivity growth among tradable goods, but his data
span periods of major macro shocks rather than major trade liberalization episodes, so
it is di¢ cult to argue that the gains are trade induced (p.15). Pavcnik (2000) uses
the same Chilean data set and works with TFP instead of labor productivity. He gets
the same results as Tybout, but can neither prove a clear link between the reallocations
and increased foreign competition. The same studies nd that exiting plants are less
productive then surviving plants, but again there is no link with trade liberalization.
Tybout and Westbrook (1995) use data for Mexico for the unilateral liberalization
episode 1984-1989. They nd that liberalization was associated with productivity gains
due to a reallocation e¤ect. They decompose productivity growth (11.17%) in that
period into a scale e¤ect (0.55%) a reallocation e¤ect (1.02%) and a residual e¤ect
(9.60%). Tybout (2001) emphasizes in his survey that they do not nd strong evidence
that rationalization e¤ects were concentrated in the tradable goods industries (p. 16).
An indirect way to examine reallocation e¤ects raising average productivity is to
look at the distribution of the size of rms. The economic models presented in previous
sections all contain a link between productivity and size: more productive rms have
larger revenues. So, when liberalization would change the size distribution towards larger
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rms, there would also be a shift towards more productive rms. A robust nding in all
research is that larger rms have a larger probability of exporting. This suggests that
more access to foreign markets enables larger rms to expand, implying an increase in
average productivity in the economy. But the studies discussed by Tybout (2001) that
link changes in trade protection with changes in the intra industry size distribution of
rms do not give this clear picture. Head and Ries (1999) nd that large Canadian
rms grew as a result of US tari¤ reductions but shrank as a result of Canadian tari¤
reductions. This suggests just a reallocation towards exporting away from importing
as makes economically sense with liberalization. Roberts and Tybout (1996) nd a
relatively large shrinkage in response to import competition among large rms in Chile
and Colombia instead of among small rms. Dutz (1996) nds that the dismantling of
NTBs during the 80s in Morocco lead to a relatively large decrease in size of small plants
and relatively large increase in exit probabilities of small plants. Tybout et al. (1991)
nd that the whole size distribution of employment decreased in Chile in response to
liberalization between 1967 and 1979. So, with the exception of the study by Dutz (1996)
on Morocco, the evidence on the e¤ect of trade liberalization on the size distribution
of rms does not provide support for the reallocation theory. The ndings on size
distributions conict with those on productivity distributions. Studies on productivity
distribution do nd reallocation towards more productive rms, whereas studies on size
distribution do not nd reallocation towards larger rms. These two ndings can only
be reconciled when there is no perfect correlation between size and productivity, i.e.
part of the size of rms cannot be accounted for by their productivity. Of course, other
possibilities are that the di¤erent datasets used lead to the conicting results or that
there are measurement problems with productivity and/or size.
In the reallocation studies focusing on productivity there is evidence for reallocation,
but Tybout (2001) repeatedly emphasizes that the reallocation e¤ect cannot convinc-
ingly be linked with trade liberalization. The decomposition in Bernard and Jensen
(2004a) does neither contain an explicit link with trade liberalization. But they do show
that the reallocation towards more e¢ cient rms is towards exporting rms. As trade
liberalization can be expected to lead to more trade and exporting, their reallocation
e¤ects can logically be linked with trade liberalization.
Empirical work at the plant level on trade has produced three other empirical ndings
that are of interest in the comparison of the di¤erent theoretical models considered.
The rst nding is on the importance of sunk costs in exporting. Di¤erent authors
have estimated the decision to export as a function of various explanatory variables
and lagged export participation. Bernard and Jensen (2004a) nd that lagged export
participation raises the probability of exporting by 36%. Tybout (2001) summarizes
the evidence in various papers arguing that the probability of exporting increases by up
to 70% when a rm exported last period taking into account serial correlation in error
terms. The hysteresis in exporting is evidence for the existence of sunk entry costs in
the export market: rms already in the export market face another decision problem of
participating in the export market than rms that are new on the export market.
The second nding is on the reaction of markups of rms to an increase in import
competition. The main nding in the literature is that markups decline with increases
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in import competition. Import competition is measured in this literature by import
penetration rates, e¤ective protection rates or license coverage ratios. Roberts and Ty-
bout (1996) study the impact of import competition in Mexico, Colombia, Chile and
Morocco controlling for plant level market shares and industry dummies and nd that
in every country studied relatively high industry wide exposure to foreign competition
is associated with lower margins and the e¤ect is concentrated in larger plants (p. 196).
Explanation for the last nding is that large rms have most market power and their
prices are most responsive to foreign competition. Tybout (2001) discusses other evi-
dence based on the approach in Hall (1988). Hall (1988) writes log output growth rates
as a function of log growth rates in inputs and productivity growth, noting that the coef-
cient on input growth is a function of markups. By allowing this coe¢ cient to vary over
time and with changes in trade policy, one can test whether markups vary with trade
policy. Although this approach is subject to various econometric problems, the evidence
conrms other results that markups decline with an increase in import competition.
The third nding is on the impact of trade liberalization on average rm size. Tybout
(2001) argues that a general conclusion in the literature on this topic is a declining
average rm size in response to increasing import competition. Tybout et al. (1991) use
panel data and nd in a study of Chile that plants in sectors with relatively large declines
in import protection reduced employment levels. Tybout and Westbrook (1995) nd in
their study on Mexico that rms facing relatively large declines in license coverage ratios
grow relatively slow. These empirical ndings are problematic for the early monopolistic
competition models where liberalization leads to welfare gains through an increase in
the scale of rms. Empirical work shows that average rm size declines in response to
liberalization. When there are increasing returns, the scale e¤ects generated lead to
welfare losses. An obvious possibility is that all the empirical work only considers short-
term responses, whereas in the long run rms are squeezed out of the market leading
to a larger rm size. Furthermore, the empirical work focuses on changes in import
competition, whereas decreasing costs of exporting should also be taken into account.
2.5 Comparison of Firm Heterogeneity Models
This section contains a comparison of the three theoretical models presented in previ-
ous sections and the oligopoly model discussed in the next chapter which is based upon
Bekkers and Francois (2008) (BF in the remainder). The models are compared with
respect to (i) the modeling assumptions and mechanisms and (ii) the impact of liber-
alization in the models on various variables like the average size of rms, the markup
of rms and the productivity of rms. The modeling mechanisms and outcomes are
confronted with the empirical evidence available.
Table 2.1 contains a summary of the basic modeling setups of the three models.
Preferences, production structure, the existence of sunk setup costs and sunk export
costs, entry and exit into the market, labor market structure, product market structure
and type of composition e¤ect are addressed. Melitz, BEJK and BF work with CES
preferences. MO use a linear demand system. The di¤erence between Melitz and MO
on the one hand and BEJK and BF on the other hand is that in Melitz and MO there
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is only one producer for each variety and competition is between producers of di¤erent
varieties. In BEJK and BF on the other hand there are many (potential) producers of
each variety. In BEJK there are di¤erent potential producers of each variety and the
cheapest takes the whole market, whereas in BF there are di¤erent producers of each
variety.
In Melitz there are increasing returns to scale through xed costs of production.
BEJK, MO and BF use constant returns to scale in production. In Melitz, MO and BF
labor is the only factor of production. In BEJK labor and intermediates are the inputs
of production. Melitz, MO and BF assume that rms have to incur sunk setup costs to
develop a new variety. BEJK abstracts from setup costs which is logically linked with
the fact that there are several potential producers of a certain variety. The omission of
setup costs in BEJK raises the question how varieties can be developed.
In Melitz, MO and BF of all the rms that incurred the setup costs, only those rms
with su¢ cient productivity to make positive operating prots really enter the market.
Firms exit the market with a certain xed exit probability or when the cuto¤ cost level
declines as a result of liberalization or an extension of the market. In BEJK the entrance
of rms into the domestic market is not modeled. The number of varieties is xed in
BEJK. Firms enter the export market when they become the lowest cost producer of a
certain variety. Firms exit the domestic and/or export market when they are no longer
the lowest cost producer of a certain variety in a market.Only Melitz and BF include sunk
costs to start exporting. Empirical evidence shows that sunk entry costs are important,
so this adds realism to Melitzmodel. A problem of Melitz is the required assumption on
the size of the sunk entry costs. To guarantee that only more productive rms export,
per period sunk export costs multiplied by a measure of trade costs should be larger
than the xed costs to produce. Or when one assumes that the xed costs to produce
consist of on the one hand overhead costs and on the other hand per period sunk costs to
enter the domestic market, these two type of costs should be lower than the sunk costs
to export (multiplied by a measure of trade costs).
The structure of the labor market is modeled in two di¤erent ways. Melitz assumes
that total labor supply is fully inelastic. This assumption is responsible for the realloca-
tion e¤ect in Melitz. Trade liberalization increases production possibilities for the most
e¢ cient rms. They hire more workers driving up the real wage in the economy as labor
supply is fully inelastic. Entry becomes also more attractive, as a low cost draw enables
more exports. More productive workers move away from the less productive rms who
cannot a¤ord the increased wages. As a result the less productive rms disappear. In
BEJK, MO and BF labor supply is fully elastic by including a homogeneous goods sector
from which additional workers can be hired without a¤ecting the real wage rate. As a
result there is no reallocation e¤ect of these models because of labor market competition.
The reallocation e¤ect of these models takes place through increased competition on the
product market.
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In MO an increase in the number of rms decreases the average price level. The
e¤ect is that the less productive rms cannot sell positive amounts of output anymore
and vanish. In BEJK more competitors also leads to the disappearance of less productive
rms, as there is a larger probability that one of the competitors has a lower cost level.
In BF international trade leads to more rms in the market and lower market prices
driving the least productive rms out of the market. In Melitz in contrast an increase
in the number of rms and increased product market competition does not drive less
productive rms out of the market as the markup of rms is xed.
A third way to model the labor market would be by including transition costs of
workers between rms. This would slow down the movement of workers towards the
more productive rms and could be able to account for certain empirical regularities on
the short-run.
In the comparison of the setups and mechanisms of the model, the way the reallo-
cation of resources works is an important characteristic. So far, there is no conclusive
empirical evidence on the relative importance of the two types of reallocation e¤ects.
An interesting empirical nding in this respect is that markups decline as a result of
increased import competition. This fact is support for the product market competition
view of MO, where the markups decline. Work by Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2007)
using rm-level and worker-level data from Brazil in the 1990s seems to falsify the la-
bor market view and support the product market competition view. Menezes-Filho and
Muendler (2007) nd that more import competition leads to a net lay-o¤ of workers
in comparative advantage sectors and a growth of employment in the informal sector.
These ndings do not support the mechanism proposed in Melitz that trade liberalization
leads to increased competition for scarce labor resources driving up real wages
The impact of trade liberalization on various variables in the four models can be con-
fronted with the empirical evidence available. Melitz, BEJK only consider a symmetric
fall in per unit trade costs, i.e. bilateral liberalization. MO and BF discuss also unilat-
eral liberalization, BF for the short-run. When relevant the outcomes of this exercise
are included in the comparison. Table 2.2 contains an overview of the impact of trade
liberalization on average productivity, average markup, average rm size and the num-
ber of consumed varieties in the three models and in empirical work. First, consider the
impact of trade liberalization on productivity. In all four models average productivity
rises as a result of trade liberalization. Less productive rms get squeezed out by the
di¤erent mechanisms discussed above and as more productive rms gain market share,
average productivity in the economy rises.7 As discussed, in the empirical evidence from
developing countries it is di¢ cult to relate the rise in average productivity through reallo-
cation to trade liberalization. The evidence in Bernard and Jensen (2004a) from the US
shows rising productivity levels, because of increased exporting, which could obviously
be linked to trade liberalization.
A second variable to consider is the markup of rms. Trade liberalization has dif-
ferent impacts on this variable in the three models. MO consider the absolute markup,
7Unilateral liberalization leads in MO to a decline in average productivity, but this result is driven
by the relocation e¤ect of rms towards the other country, so it wont be taken into account in the
discussion.
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Table 2.2: E¤ects of trade liberalization in Metliz (2003), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and
Kortum (2003), Mellitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Bekkers and Francois (2008) and in
empirical work
Melitz BEJK MO BF Empirics
Average
Produc-
tivity
Rises Rises Rises Rises Rises because
of reallocation
Average
markup
Constant Rises Constant,
absolute
markup
declines
Declines in
short run
Declines
with increase
import comp.
Average
rm size
Rises Rises Declines Indeterminate Declines
with increase
import comp.
Number
of con-
sumed
varieties
Ambiguous No e¤ect Rises No e¤ect
price minus marginal costs instead of the more familiar relative markup, price divided
by marginal costs. Average absolute markups decline as a result of trade liberalization
in MO. Trade liberalization has two conicting e¤ects on average markups. On the
one hand, tougher competition reduces the markups of all rms. On the other hand,
the least productive rms with the lowest markups are squeezed out leading to higher
average markups. In MO the rst e¤ect dominates and average markups decline, al-
though this conclusion can only be drawn when a Pareto distribution of productivities
is assumed. Average relative markups are constant in MO with a Pareto distribution of
productivities.8 The two e¤ects cancel out.
In Melitz the relative markup is xed, because of the CES preferences and the large
group assumption implying a xed price elasticity. A small group assumption in this
model would make markups sensitive to trade liberalization. The sign of the e¤ect is
not a priori clear, because the composition e¤ect and competition e¤ect would work in
opposite directions, just like in MO.
In BEJK average relative markups rise as a result of trade liberalization. Apparently,
the composition e¤ect towards more e¢ cient rms dominates the competition e¤ect.
BEJK equalize the relative markup to measured productivity of a rm. The reasoning is
as follows: measured productivity is equal to value added divided by the value of inputs.
Dividing by the level of output gives price divided by average costs, equal to marginal
costs because of constant returns to scale. BEJK criticize Melitz because its xed markup
would imply a constant measured productivity. But this critique is not entirely correct
8The average relative markup in MO is equal to:
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as a xed markup only implies constant measured productivity as dened by BEJK when
there are constant returns to scale implying that average costs are equal to marginal costs.
Increasing returns to scale as in Melitz imply that measured productivity as dened by
BEJK increases in revenues of the rm.9 As discussed below, average revenues (rm size)
rises with trade liberalization in Melitz, so measured productivity as well. The critique
of BEJK would apply to MO, because in their model the average relative markup is
constant and production is CRS.
In BF there is a distinction between the short-run and the long-run (when a free
entry condition is added). In the short-run average markups from domestic sales decline
with lower trade costs and average markups from exporting sales rise. Hence, assuming
that in import-competing sectors rms only produce for the domestic market average
markups decline in these sectors. In the long-run the e¤ect on average markups cannot
be determined without specifying a distribution of costs. The competition e¤ect and
composition e¤ect described above work in opposite directions.
Empirical evidence shows that (relative) markups decline in response to increased
import competition. To the extent that these e¤ects are short-run e¤ects, BF is in line
with the ndings in empirical work. In MO markups also decline, but only absolute
markups and not relative markups as used in empirical work.
A third variable to consider is average rm size (average revenues). Empirical work
shows clearly that average rm size declines in response to increased import competition,
although the e¤ects measured could be only short run e¤ects. Furthermore, it does not
take into account the impact of liberalization on the size of exporting rms. In Melitz
average rm size rises when per unit trade costs decline.10 Firms have to share the
market with more foreign competitors. But the less productive rms are squeezed out
of the market and the high productive rms can export more. On balance, average rm
size rises. In BF the e¤ect on average rm size cannot be determined. In the long-run
the balance of competition and composition e¤ect cannot be ranked as with the e¤ect
on average markups and in the short-run calculations are complicated by the fact that
prot income is endogenous.
In MO average rm size declines with bilateral trade liberalization. Applying the logic
of the standard Krugman model with variable price elasticity this is a strange result.
In that model trade liberalization makes competition tougher decreasing prot margins.
This requires an increase in average rm size to satisfy the zero prot condition. So,
one would expect an increase in rm size in this model as well. But in MO rms have
heterogeneous productivity. Trade liberalization makes competition tougher and reduces
prot margins of rms. But the less productive rms are squeezed out of the market
which already raises the expected prot of rms. The increase in size is not needed to
compensate for the declining prot margins as a result of tougher competition. Therefore,
9BEJK dene measured productivity as price over average costs. This gives for Melitz:
p
AC
=
p
MC + fx
=
1
1
markup +
f
px
10Trade liberalization leads to an increase in the average prot level. The denominator of equation
(2.35) shows that average revenues rise in average prots, er = e + f ,which gives the result
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the size of rms can go either way. The declining size of rms in MO apparently depends
on the model setup with linear demand preferences.11 The model results of MO seem
to be well in accordance with the empirical evidence, although the evidence presented
is mainly about increased import competition and could reect only short-run e¤ects.
MO also present model results of increased import competition and distinguish between
the short-run and long-run. In the short-run increased unilateral liberalization leads to
tougher competition. Some plants shut down production and the other rms reduce
their scale of production. The mechanism here is di¤erent than above. Domestic rms
just have to share the market with more competitors and therefore their size shrinks.
Prot levels decline as a result, but they are still positive for the operating rms. In
the long run unilateral liberalization leads to a delocation of rms towards the other
country. Competition becomes less tough, cuto¤ cost levels rise and the average rm
size increases for the same reason as with the declining rm size in reaction to bilateral
liberalization.
BEJK do not report explicitly the impact of trade liberalization on average rm size
and their model is relatively burdensome, so calculating the e¤ect is not as easy as in
MO. It seems that average rm size rises in the model. There is no free entry condition
that imposes conditions on the size of the rm. Preferences are CES, so revenues of a
rm are given by equation (2.6). Integrating this expression over all rms, suggests that
average rm size is equal to nominal income divided by the number of rms. As the
number of rms declines, because some rms are competed out of the market by foreign
rms, average rm size has to rise.
A fourth variable to consider is the number of varieties available to consumers. In
BEJK and BF the number of varieties available to consumers is exogenous. So, trade
liberalization has no impact on it. In Melitz trade liberalization has an ambiguous impact
on the number of consumed varieties. More foreign varieties are imported increasing the
number of consumed varieties, but average rm size rises as well having a negative impact
on the number of consumed varieties. Baldwin and Forslid (2004) show that trade
liberalization decreases the number of consumed varieties with a Pareto distribution
of initial productivities when per period sunk export costs are larger than the xed
cost of production, fx > f . The likeliness of this condition is discussed before. When
the distribution of productivities is not Pareto, a stronger condition is needed to get a
decrease in the number of varieties with trade liberalization.12 Melitz shows that welfare
still increases unambiguously with trade liberalization, despite the possible decline in the
number of consumed varieties. The increase in average productivity always dominates
11In Melitz with CES preferences, the average size of rms rises. In Melitz there is no initial decline in
protability, because competition becomes tougher as markups are xed. The increase in protability
as a result of the squeezing of less productive rms is counteracted by the declining probability of a
good productivity draw and is supported by the rising average rm size. It is likely that a variable
markup initially decreasing protability of rms will also increase rm size to counteract the negative
e¤ect on protability.
12Technically, the reason is that the ZCP-condition is horizontal in cuto¤marginal cost, average prot-
space with a Pareto distribution, whereas it slopes up for a general distribution. Trade liberalization
shifts the ZCP-condition up. The new intersection with the FE-condition is at a larger prot level with
a Pareto distribution than with a general distribution. Therefore, the average rm size rises more with
a Pareto distribution and so the number of producers displays a stronger decline.
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the possible decline in varieties.
In MO (bilateral) trade liberalization unambiguously increases the number of con-
sumed varieties. The increase in the number of rms (and thus varieties) is a basic part
of the model where liberalization makes competition tougher squeezing the less produc-
tive rms out of the market. It also corresponds logically with the decline in average
rm size with bilateral liberalization. Unilateral liberalization decreases the number of
varieties, because of the delocation of rms.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter gave a review of the most inuential work on rm heterogeneity models
of international trade. First the early work on imperfect competition models in in-
ternational trade was exposed briey, that provided an explanation for the ever more
prominent intra-industry trade. This early literature, developed in the beginning of the
1980s, proposed four gains from international trade: an increasing availability of vari-
eties, e¢ ciency gains because of a larger scale of production and because of a larger
division of labor and lower prices because of pro-competitive e¤ects from trade. The
early imperfect competition features equal rms. This gave in the beginning of 2000 rise
to an extension to heterogeneous rms. Firm heterogeneity was not solely an exotic the-
oretical exercise, as it constituted a description of the empirically important reallocation
e¤ect of trade, where more productive exporting rms gain market share at the expense
of domestic producing less productive rms. The rm heterogeneity models discussed
in this chapter were the monopolistic competition CES model of Melitz (2003), the
Bertrand competition model of Bernard et al. (2003) and the monopolistic competition
linear demand model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). The next chapter describes a rm
heterogeneity model of oligopolistic (Cournot) competition.
The three models discussed in this chapter and the oligopoly model were compared
with each other with respect to modeling assumptions and type of reallocation mech-
anisms and the results of their models were confronted with empirical ndings. The
conclusion that can be drawn from this comparison is that none of the models performs
superior. The setup of each model contains strong and weak points and in none of the
models all predictions are in line with empirical ndings. The main weak point in Melitz
is its xed price elasticity implying that markups are xed, whereas empirical evidence
shows that markups decline with increased import competition. The xed price elastic-
ity also implies that a composition e¤ect through increased product market competition
is absent. Another point of concern is the rising average rm size with trade liberaliza-
tion; although the empirical evidence suggesting declining average rm size could mainly
catch short run e¤ects. Finally, the condition on xed costs being larger than per period
sunk entry costs times a measure of trade costs is necessary to get sensible results in the
model, although the realism of this assumption is questionable. Strong points of Melitz
are and its inclusion of sunk entry costs and in particular its use of a very tractable
model that easily be extended to apply it to a wide range of topics.
Strong points of BEJK are the inclusion of intermediates as an input into production
and the fact that BEJK is the only model that has applied real world data to its model
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to run a simulation. Also, the mechanism generating the composition e¤ect is simple
and intuitive. A weak point is that the details of the model are cumbersome. Other
weak points in BEJK are the absence of sunk setup costs and the absence of a dynamic
entry and exit equilibrium. This raises the issue of the origin of new product varieties.
Another point of concern is that average markups increase with trade liberalization
whereas empirical work shows a decline of markups. Finally, there is no reallocation
e¤ect through the labor market.
An important strong point of MO is that it produces an impact of trade liberalization
that seems in accordance with the data. Average (absolute) markups and average rm
size decline in response to trade liberalization. The declining average rm size can also
be seen as a weak point for those who believe that the empirical evidence on the impact
of trade liberalization on this variable reects short-run e¤ects. Another weak point of
the model is its reliance on the Pareto assumption for the distribution of (potential)
productivities.
Pre-dating the exposition in chapter 4 of the oligopoly model, strong points of BF are
that it produces a reallocation e¤ect of trade in a basic model with a parsimonious set-
up; that it provides a natural extension of the Brander and Krugman (1983) reciprocal
dumping model and that it can be nested as a special case of the Ricardian comparative
advantage model. A nal strong point is that its short-run e¤ects of trade liberalization
on average markups seem in line with empirical work. An important weak point is that
the e¤ect on average rm size cannot be derived analytically.
Considering the applications of heterogeneous productivity models to various topics,
it seems that Melitz is the winner. Baldwin and Okubo (2006) apply Melitz model to
economic geography claiming that with heterogeneous productivity agglomeration e¤ects
could be overstated in empirical work; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2004) address the
growth implications of Melitz arguing that heterogeneous productivity which produces
positive level e¤ects because of the composition e¤ect, can lead to negative growth
e¤ects; Bernard et al. (2007) merge Melitz with a traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model
showing that scarce factors of production can still gain from trade liberalization, because
of the decline in price levels generated by the composition e¤ect; Helpman et al. (2004)
consider the choice between exporting and FDI in a Melitz model. These are just a few
applications. The literature is exploding and numerous other applications are appearing
and have appeared in the recent past, making it impossible to give a complete overview
of all applications. This thesis also features two chapters where the Melitz model serves
as the starting point.
Chapter 3
Heterogeneous Popularity and
Exporting Uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
Empirical work shows that a signicant fraction of rms quit the export market soon
after entrance. Bernard and Jensen (2004b) report that 15% of the exporting rms
leave the export market every year in a sample of American rms between 1984 and
1992. Almost 5% of the rms have left the export market already the year after entry
and do not return again on the export market afterwards (calculations from table 5
of Bernard and Jensen (2004b)). Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2006) nd that 16%
of the exporting rms leave the export market every year in a sample of Chilean rms
between 1990 and 1996. They do not calculate which fraction of quitters from the export
market had just entered the export market. Other evidence on quick exit can be found
in Eaton et al. (2007). They show in a panel of Colombian rms between 1996 and
2005 where each single export transaction is recorded that the survival rate among rst-
year exporters is typically around one-third, and in some cases is much lower (Eaton et
al. (2007), p.19). Hence two-third of the starting exporters drop out within a year.
Indirect evidence on the quick exit of rms from the export market after entry comes
from duration analysis on detailed export categories. Besedes and Prusa (2006) show
with a US dataset between 1992 and 2001 of detailed product categories that around
one third of imports (depending on the data) in a product category for di¤erentiated
products stop again within one year. Nitsch (2007) nds in a sample of German imports
between 1995 and 2005 that 40% of the newly emerging import product categories stop
within one year.1
So, empirics show that there is a lot of exit from the export market shortly after entry.
Broadly, two reasons for exit from the export market can be identied. On the one hand,
1These studies correct for censoring as a result of redening product categories. As these data are
on product categories, the hazard rates are a lower bound for the hazard rates for individual rms given
that more rms could trade in one product category. On the other hand continuing exports of a certain
variety could be recorded as exit from a product category when rms switch product categories with
their variety.
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variables a¤ecting protability in the export market display variation. Negative shocks
to such variables can induce rms to drop out of the export market. Baldwin (1988)
and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) for example model uctuations in exchange rates.
Their model shows that sunk export costs lead to persistent trade e¤ects of exchange
rate shocks. Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2006) make productivity a stochastic process
in a Melitz-type model of trade to explain that rms can leave the export market again
after entrance.
On the other hand, rm exit from the export market can be due to the fact that rms
simply do not have (enough) information about protability in the export market. The
model presented in this chapter follows this view. Firms cannot assess the popularity of
their good in the export market before they enter the export market. After entrance, the
popularity of their good could be too low to produce protably. An example of this type
of exporting uncertainty is the withdrawal of Wal-Mart from the German and South-
Korean export market. After a presence of some years on these foreign markets incurring
huge losses, Wal-Mart gathered enough information to realize that their product-type
was not popular enough in these foreign markets.
The model in this chapter is a rm heterogeneity model (in the spirit of Melitz (2003))
taking into account exporting uncertainty. There is heterogeneity in the taste parameter
(the CES-weight) of a variety instead of in productivity and the taste parameters of the
same variety are di¤erent in the domestic and exporting market. Firms are uncertain
about the popularity of their good, reected in the taste parameter, before they start
producing ánd before they start exporting. Sunk costs have to be paid to learn the
popularity of the good both in the domestic and exporting market. Hence there is
uncertainty before a rm starts producing and before it starts exporting.
Heterogeneity in the taste parameter instead of heterogeneity of productivity leads
to a more realistic interpretation of the sunk entry costs. These costs have to be incurred
to explore the desirability of a variety in the market. It is also more realistic to assume
that taste parameters are di¤erent on the domestic and exporting market than to as-
sume di¤erent productivities in both markets. The same product is produced, so why
should the productivity change? Di¤erences in taste parameters have a more natural
interpretation: preferences are di¤erent across countries. It is assumed that the taste
parameters on the di¤erent markets correlate, albeit imperfectly. The models solution
contains an additional parameter, the cuto¤ taste parameter below which a rm does
not consider exporting. A rm with a taste parameter above this cuto¤ value starts
exporting but can be unsuccessful when its product is not popular enough on the foreign
market. This generates the exporting uncertainty. The model generates three cuto¤
taste parameters, a domestic cuto¤ taste parameter, a cuto¤ taste parameter to start
exporting and a cuto¤ taste parameter to be successful in exporting.
The e¤ects of changes in the di¤erent types of trade costs are interesting. The e¤ect
of lower iceberg trade costs is as expected: the domestic cuto¤ value increases raising
average popularity, whereas both exporting cuto¤ levels decrease. But the e¤ects of lower
sunk export costs and of lower xed export costs are di¤erent on the two exporting cuto¤
values. Lower xed export costs decrease the cuto¤ level for successful exporting and
increase the cuto¤ level to start exporting, whereas lower sunk export costs raise the
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cuto¤ level for successful exporting and decrease the cuto¤ level to start exporting. The
implication is that lower sunk export costs decrease the probability of success in the
export market, whereas lower xed export costs raise the probability of successful entry
into the export market.
This chapter contributes to the literature on models with both exporting uncertainty
and rm heterogeneity. Crozet et al. (2007) model uncertainty about the political
environment to explain that less productive rms who were luckynot to face bribes can
enter a market whereas certain more productive rms cannot. In the already mentioned
work of Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2006) rmsproductivities are a stochastic process.
Some exporting rms will have to leave the exporting market because their productivity
experienced a negative shock. Finally, there is structural estimation empirical work
proving the importance of sunk export costs where rms are heterogeneous and face
shocks to various variables (see for example Roberts and Tybout (1997), Das et al.
(2007)).
The chapter di¤erentiates itself from other models of exporting uncertainty and rm
heterogeneity by starting from the view that uncertainty is due to a lack of informa-
tion on exporting protability. There is ample empirical evidence that both sources of
uncertainty, lack of information on, and shocks to, variables a¤ecting protability are im-
portant. Firm level data show that a considerable fraction of exit from the export market
is shortly after entry, although estimates di¤er across studies. Also, not only rms that
leave the export market immediately after entrance are support for the approach in this
chapter. Firms can stay in the market for some years before they know whether their
product is popular enough and whether they can be protable (rms could incur losses
in a foreign market for some years until they are convinced they cannot be protably
like the Wal-Mart example mentioned). Moreover, data on duration of detailed export
categories show that a large fraction the disappearance of non-zero export ows follows
quickly after entry.
This chapter is also related to the literature on the role of networks in trade. Rauch
and Watson (2003) propose a model where buyers are involved in costly search for
potential importers. After being matched with an importer they get to know the cost
of the importer. They can either buy a small amount from the importer generating zero
surplus or invest a lump-sum amount to get to know whether the importer can process
a large order. If the answer is yes a larger surplus from trade can be generated. This
model can also explain a large fraction of exiting rms from the export market soon
after entry. The model in this chapter is similar, the di¤erence is that in this chapter
sellers take the initiative to try and sell a product protably. Another di¤erence is that
in this chapter, exports will be larger to countries that are culturally closer having more
similar preferences, whereas in Rauch and Watson (2003) exports to countries with
closer business ties and denser networks will be larger.
Rauch (1999) dismisses a type of model similar to the one in this chapter where
producers produce varieties that are most popular in the home market and their popu-
larity in other markets declines with (cultural) distance. He puts forward two pieces of
evidence. First, he shows that a dummy for colonial ties between countries raise trade
whereas a dummy for common language has hardly a signicant e¤ect. In his reading
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colonial ties proxy business ties whereas a common language proxies similar tastes. This
implies that the empirical evidence supports the network view in his work and dismisses
the tastes view in this chapter. But it is disputable whether business ties are exclusively
proxied by colonial ties whereas similar tastes are exclusively proxied by common lan-
guage. A common language also eases business ties and colonial ties are likely to lead to
more similar tastes as well as to more intense business ties. Second, he refers to a study
by Gould (1994) who nds that immigration into the USA raises bilateral trade with
the country of origin of the immigrants. The e¤ect is stronger on exports from the USA
than on imports, however, favoring a network view over a shared tastes view. But this
evidence does not prove that the shared tastes view is not important. Indeed Felbermayr
and Toubal (2006) use empirical evidence to show that cultural proximity of countries
raises trade both because this leads to lower trade costs (implying closer business ties
emphasized by Rauch (1999)) and because it implies more similar tastes. Hence, both
channels seem to be important.
The next section points out preferences, demand, revenues and prots when the CES-
model contains taste parameters. Section 3.3 and section 3.4 solve the closed economy
model and open economy model, respectively. Section 3.5 contains some concluding
remarks.
3.2 Heterogeneous Popularity
Assume that all goods in the economy belong to the di¤erentiated goods sector. Utility
of a representative consumer is CES with CES weights or taste parameters that di¤er
across goods:
U =
 R
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
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 1

v dv
 
 1
(3.1)
v is the taste parameter of variety v and di¤ers across varieties. Raising it to the power
1= is an innocuous assumption. It will turn out to be computationally convenient later
on. The demand facing a rm is given by:
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P is the price index dened by:
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The price index can be expressed as a function of the average taste parameter  and the
mass of rms N :
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ea is the average taste parameter and dened as:
ea = 1R

 () d (3.5)
 () is the distribution of taste parameters of producing rms. Note that variables with
a ~ are averages conditional upon successful entry.
Production is increasing returns with a xed cost of production. Wages are normal-
ized at 1 and it is assumed that productivity is homogeneous.2 The cost function is given
by:
C (xv) = axv + f (3.6)
A rm can only start to produce when it has incurred sunk entry costs fe. Paying these
sunk costs reveals a rms taste parameter v. This seems a more natural interpretation
of the sunk entry costs than in Melitz (2003). Firms have to explore the desirability of
their product in the market and this requires sunken investments.
The pricing equation of a rm is independent from the taste parameter:
pv =

   1a
Revenues and prots of a rm do depend on the taste parameter:
r (v) = pvxv = vp
1 
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3.3 Closed Economy Model
Immediately after entry rms decide whether to stay in business or not. When they can
make positive prot they stay, otherwise they exit. The taste parameter value at which
they are just indi¤erent is the cuto¤ taste parameter . There is an initial distribution
of taste parameters G () from which the truncated distribution of taste parameters of
producing rms follows:
 () =
1
1 G ()g () (3.9)
With this expression the average taste parameter from equation (3.5) can be expressed
as a function of the cuto¤ taste parameter:
e () = 1
1 G ()
1R

g () d (3.10)
2This can be generalized, making marginal costs dependent on the CES-weight, like in chapter 5 or
in Baldwin and Harrigan (2007). But such a generalization would not add anything to the analysis and
would not change the main results. Therefore, for computational simplicity the marginal cost is kept
equal across rms.
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To solve the model one has to nd the cuto¤ taste parameter. The cuto¤ taste parameter
determines the average taste parameter. With the average taste parameter one can
express all aggregate variables. To nd the cuto¤ taste parameter a zero cuto¤ prot
condition (ZCP) and a free entry condition (FE) are needed, analogous to Melitz. The
ZCP is given by:
 () = 0 (3.11)
The ZCP can be rewritten as a function of average prot and the cuto¤ taste parameter:
r () = f
r()
r(e) = e
r (e) =  ( (e) + f)
9>>>=>>>;e =  (e) = f
 e

  1

(3.12)
Note that prot and revenue of the rm with average taste parameter are equal to average
prot and average revenue. The FE is given by:
e = fe
1 G () (3.13)
The equilibrium cuto¤ taste parameter is found by combining the ZCP, the FE and the
denition for the average taste parameter, equations (3.12), (3.13) and (3.10) respec-
tively.
3.4 Open Economy Model
To model the open economy, uncertainty in the exporting decision is included. To this
end, the taste parameter abroad is assumed to be di¤erent from the taste parameter
domestically. So, success on the domestic market is no guarantee for success on the
foreign market. Empirically this is important as many rms leave the foreign market
shortly after they entered it.
A di¤erent productivity abroad from the productivity at home would be strange,
as the production process does not change. This is the main reason to introduce the
heterogeneity in the taste parameter. The foreign taste parameter is assumed to be
related to the domestic taste parameter in the following way:
Fv = 
H
v + "v (3.14)
"v is a random variable with mean 0 and variance 2" . 0    1. When " = 0
uncertainty disappears. The superscripts H and F indicate home and foreign variables
respectively. According to equation (3.14) popularity in the domestic market tells some-
thing about popularity on the foreign market, but not everything. The value of  can
be seen as a measure for psychic distance, a concept from the marketing literature.
Psychic distance is an indicator of for example di¤erences in language, consumer be-
havior and cultural standards between markets (Stoettinger and Schlegelmilch (1998)).
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Equivalently it can be seen as a measure for cultural proximity,a similar concept as
psychic distance applied in Felbermayr and Toubal (2006). These authors show that
countries that are culturally more proximate trade more because trade costs are lower,
but also because preferences are more similar.
The remaining assumptions on the open economy keep the economy as simple as
possible. There are two countries, the distribution of taste parameters is equal in both
countries and the size of the economy is equal to ensure equal wages. There are three
types of export costs, iceberg trade costs  , xed (per period) export costs fx and sunk
export costs fex. The sunk export costs are paid when a rm starts exporting. But
the rm is uncertain whether it will be successful on the export market. When there is
no uncertainty in exporting all rms that start exporting continue to export, so it does
not matter whether one expresses the sunk costs as real sunk costs or as the amortized
per period equivalents. But when the exporting decision is uncertain, once rms have
incurred the sunk costs they dont take them into account anymore in deciding whether
to continue exporting or not. So, the sunk costs cannot be expressed as the per period
amortized equivalents. Instead, to account for exporting uncertainty, there are xed
export costs fx in the model as well. Due to the nature of demand (CES) all rms face
at least some demand for their variety. And without xed export costs, each rm that
would start exporting would continue exporting.
The existence of sunk export costs is widely discussed in the literature (Baldwin
(1988); Baldwin and Krugman (1989)). Exporting is very persistent implying the exis-
tence of sunk export costs. Roberts and Tybout (1997) present empirical evidence on
the existence of sunk export costs in a sample Colombian industries. On the existence of
xed export costs there is less empirical work. Some other papers feature the presence
of xed exports costs in their trade model. In particular, Venables (1994), Jean (2002)
and Medin (2003) assume xed export costs in their models.
3.4.1 Solving The Open Economy Model
To solve for the equilibrium of the model, three cuto¤ taste parameters have to be
determined, the domestic cuto¤ taste parameter , the cuto¤ taste parameter that
denes the rm that just starts exporting , and the exporting cuto¤ taste parameter,
x, that determines the rm that just continues exporting. These three variables will
be related as in gure 3.1. There is a fraction of rms with a taste parameter below
the domestic cuto¤ value, which immediately exit after they tried to enter the domestic
market. There is a fraction of rms that produces only for the domestic market. There is
a fraction of rms that enters the export market but leaves immediately, because its taste
parameter is not large enough and nally there is a fraction of rms that produces both
for the domestic and the exporting market. The zero prot condition for exporting to
be dened in equation (3.23), makes it clear that one cannot determine a priori whether
 is larger or smaller than x.
Solving the model requires nding the cuto¤ values. Given the cuto¤ values, one
can determine the number of rms active in the di¤erent markets from the steady state
equations and the labor market equilibrium equations. One starts from the domestic
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Figure 3.1: The di¤erent Categories of Firms
and exporting ZCP: ed = f  e

  1

(3.15)
ex = fx  ex
x
  1

(3.16)
ex is average prot from exporting conditional upon successful entry in the exporting
market. fx are the xed costs in exporting. ex (x; ) is the average exporting taste
parameter, dened as:
ex (x; ) = 11 H (x; )
1R
x
xh (x; ) dx (3.17)
h (x; ) is the distribution of taste parameters in the exporting market conditional upon
entering the export market and can be found from the density functions of , g () and
", f (") as follows:
h (x; ) =
1
1 G ()
1R

1

g

x


f (x   x) dx (3.18)
Without xed export costs, the cuto¤ taste parameter in exporting x would be equal
to 0. All rms that start exporting would also continue exporting (until they die ac-
cording to the death probability ). So, without xed exporting costs, there would be
no exporting uncertainty.
The following equation gives the relation between the exporting cuto¤ taste parame-
ter and the domestic one:
x =
fx
f
 1 (3.19)
To continue solving the model, the average prots in the two ZCP-conditions should be
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added to get an equation in average prot. The latter is the average prot conditional
upon entry in the domestic market. This complicates things as the domestic taste para-
meter is correlated with the exporting taste parameter. Average prot conditional upon
domestic entry is given by:
e = ed + Pr (   j   ) [Pr (x  x j   ) ex   fex] (3.20)
So, (3.20) says that the average prot from exports conditional upon entry into the
domestic market is equal to the probability a rm starts exporting, Pr (   j   ),
times the expected prots of an exporting rm, Pr (x  x j   ) ex   fex. The
conditional probability in the latter term is equal to 1 H (x; ).
Combining (3.15), (3.16) and (3.20) one can express expected prot as a function of
the domestic cuto¤ and the zero exporting prot taste parameters:
e = f  e

  1

+
1 G ()
1 G ()

(1 H (x; )) fx
 ex
x
  1

  fex

(3.21)
The free entry equation is like in the closed economy, as dened in equation (3.13). To
nd the equilibrium values a zero prot equation from exporting has to be added, i.e.
the rm with domestic taste parameter that makes zero prot from exporting inclusive
of sunk export costs should be dened. This rms taste parameter  is dened by the
following zero expected prot condition:
Pr (x  x j  = )E (x j x  x \  = ) = fex (3.22)
Equation (3.22) can be rewritten as follows:
Pr ( + "  x j  = )E (x j x  x \  = ) = fex
Pr ("  x    )
h
E
rx

j x  x \  = 

  fx
i
= fex
(1  F (x    )) fx

x (

x; )
x
  1

= fex (3.23)
With x (x; ) the expected exporting taste parameter for a rm that just enters
the export market, so with domestic taste parameter :
x (

x; ) =
1
1R
x
f (x    ) dx
1R
x
xf (x    ) dx =
1R
x 
("+  ) f (") dx
1  F (x    )
=  +
1R
x 
"f (") dx
1  F (x    )
(3.24)
The three cuto¤taste parameters , x,  and average prot can be found by combining
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equations (3.13), (3.19), (3.21), and (3.23). Appendix 3.A shows that there is a unique
equilibrium solution of the model.
The number of rms producing for the domestic market follows from the steady state
equations and the labor market equilibrium equations (derivation in appendix 3.B):
N =
L
 (e + f + Pr (   j   ) [Pr (x  x j   ) fx + fex]) (3.25)
Using equation (3.25) the number of rms can be calculated as all the cuto¤ parameters
necessary to calculate the variables on the RHS of (3.25) are known once equation (3.13),
(3.19), (3.21), and (3.23) are solved.
Welfare per worker is equal to the inverse of the price index. The price index is
dened as:
P =
"
N
1R



a

   1
1 
 () d+Nx
1R
x


a

   1
1 
h () d
# 1
1 
And it can be rewritten as:
P = N
1
1 
t e 11 t a    1 (3.26)
With average popularity et and the number of available varieties Nt in a country equal
to: et = 1
Nt

N e+Nx 1 ex (3.27)
Nt = N +Nx (3.28)
For welfare evaluation, the price index can also be written as:3
P =

L
f
 1
1 
a

   1 (
)
1
1  (3.29)
3.4.2 E¤ects of Changed Trade Costs
There are three types of trade costs, the iceberg trade costs  , sunk export costs fex
and xed export costs fx. This section discusses the e¤ects of changes in each of these
types of trade costs on the di¤erent cuto¤ popularity levels , x, , on the prob-
ability of entering the export market conditional upon entering the domestic market,
Pr (   j   ), and on the probability of protable exporting conditional upon
entry in the export market (success rate in the export market), Pr (x  x j   ).
Most results are derived analytically without specifying a distribution for  and ". But
some e¤ects cannot be determined analytically and the results from a simulation will
be reported. In the simulation a truncated normal distribution for domestic popularity
 (truncated at 0) and a normal distribution for " are assumed. Simulation results are
3Using et = r(et)r() = L=Nf
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Table 3.1: Baseline Simulation: Chosen Parameters and Results Endogenous Variables
Baseline parameters Endogenous variables
marginal costs a 0.5 domestic cuto¤ value  0.90
xed costs f 1 cuto¤ to start exporting  1.88
xed export costs fx 1 cuto¤ successful exporting x 1.35
sunk entry costs fe 10 prob. to start exporting Pr(Exp) 0.53
sunk export costs fex 5 prob. successful exporting Pr (Succ) 0.54
iceberg trade costs  1.5 average popularity et 1.45
death probability  0.05 number of domestic rms N 23
substitution elasticity  2 number of exporting rms Nx 7
Parameter indicating price index P 0.023
relation CES-weights  0.05
standdev alpha  2
standdev epsilon " 1
number of workers L 100
robust to di¤erent choices of parameter values.4 Table 3.1 contains the parameter values
used for the baseline simulations and the outcomes of the main endogenous variables.
First, the e¤ect of lower iceberg trade costs  is addressed. It can be shown an-
alytically that lower iceberg trade costs lead to a higher domestic cuto¤ popularity
level  and lower cuto¤ popularity levels for entrance in the export market  and
success in the export market x. The probability of entrance into the export market
rises Pr (   j   ). Appendix 3C1 contains the proofs for these results. The
probability of success in the export market, Pr (x  x j   ), cannot be determined
analytically. Table 3.2 displays the e¤ects of changed iceberg trade costs on the prob-
ability of exporting and the success rate of exporting calculated from simulations using
the baseline values. The probability of success in the export market rises with lower
trade costs. If a larger distance between trading partners would exclusively a¤ect the
iceberg trade costs, this model would imply that trade over a larger distance should have
a lower success rate. However, it is questionable that distance only a¤ects variable trade
costs and not xed and sunk export costs as well.
Next, the e¤ects of lower sunk export costs fex are evaluated. In appendix 3C2 it is
proved that lower sunk export costs lead to a higher domestic cuto¤ level , a lower
cuto¤ level to start exporting , but a higher cuto¤ level for successful entry into the
export market x. The implication is that the probability to start exporting rises with
lower sunk export costs, but the success rate of exporting declines. Lower sunk export
costs raise expected prot. To restore the ex ante zero prot condition, the cuto¤ cost
4The robustness check consists of varying all the parameters that a¤ect the equilibrium separately,
i.e. varying f , fe, , , , " and fx, fex,  one at a time. Results and the R-code of the simulation
are available upon request.
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Table 3.2: Simulation Results of Changes in Trade Costs
 1 1.33 1.67 2 2.33
Pr (Exp) 0.82 0.61 0.46 0.36 0.27
Pr (Succ) 0.58 0.55 0.51 0.47 0.42
fx 1 1.33 1.67 2 2.33
Pr (Exp) 0.53 0.45 0.35 0.35 0.17
Pr (Succ) 0.54 0.43 0.33 0.25 0.19
fex 5 6.67 8.33 10 11.67
Pr (Exp) 0.53 0.41 0.32 0.25 0.20
Pr (Succ) 0.54 0.59 0.64 0.68 0.71
level of both domestic and exporting production will have to increase. At the same time
it becomes cheaper to start exporting. More rms start to export, but a lower fraction
of them will be successful.
Finally, the e¤ect of lower xed export costs fx can be calculated. They lead to a
higher domestic popularity cuto¤ level , a higher cuto¤ level to start exporting  and
a lower cuto¤ level for successful exporting x. These e¤ects imply that the success rate
of exporting rises with lower xed export costs, whereas the e¤ect on the probability of
exporting cannot be determined analytically. The simulation results reported in table
3.2 make clear that the probability of exporting increases with lower xed export costs.
Applying equation (3.29), the welfare e¤ects of lower trade costs are positive for all
three types of trade costs, as for all types of trade costs the domestic cuto¤ popularity
level  rises with lower costs. The e¤ects of the di¤erent types of trade liberalizations
are summarized in table 3.3. Signs with a  are determined in simulations. The e¤ects of
lower iceberg trade costs on the di¤erent variables are as expected. It becomes easier to
export and ex ante expected prot rises leading to a reallocation e¤ect that shifts up the
cuto¤ popularity in the domestic market. Comparing the e¤ects of lower xed exports
costs and sunk export costs provides interesting insights. Both lead to higher ex ante
expected prot leading to more entry, more competition for scarce labor resources and
therefore a higher cuto¤ popularity level. But the e¤ects on the two exporting cuto¤
levels are opposite. Lower xed exports costs decrease the cuto¤ level of successful
exporting but raise the cuto¤ level of entrance into the export market, whereas lower
sunk export costs lead to a higher cuto¤ level of successful exporting and a lower cuto¤
level of export entrance. The implication is that lower xed export costs increase the
probability of success in the export market, whereas lower sunk export costs decrease
the probability of successful exporting. The reason behind these di¤erences is that xed
export costs do a¤ect operational prots from exporting, whereas sunk export costs have
no impact on operational prots.
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Table 3.3: Summary of Comparative Statics on Trade Costs
 fx fex
      
 +   +
x + +  
Pr (Exporting)     +
Pr (Success)      
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter modeled export uncertainty due to lack of information among rms about
the popularity of their variety in the export market to explain the large amount of rms
exiting the export market shortly after entry. In other work (by Baldwin (1988) and
Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2006) for example) shocks to variables a¤ecting protability
like productivity are used to account for exit from the export market. The explanation
put forward in this chapter is supported by empirical work that shows that a large
fraction of exit from the export market is shortly after entry. The network view on
international trade as proposed by Rauch (1999) and Rauch andWatson (2003) provides
an alternative explanation for quick exit of rms from the export market: buyers switch
suppliers often and the old seller drops out of the export market.
Work in the present chapter can be extended in various directions. Firstly, an n-
country version of the model could be used to estimate the parameters of the model
with rm-level data on exporting. Secondly, the empirical work by Eaton et al. (2007)
shows that most Colombian rms start with small amounts of exports. This suggests
that rm cannot only learn about the popularity of their variety by incurring sunk
export costs, but also by small sales. An extended model could allow for the possibility
to approach a foreign market in two ways: through market experimentation along with
small-scale sales and through market ooding along with incurring large market research
costs, product development and marketing costs. A third possible extension is empirical
and could try to nd ways to di¤erentiate empirically between the tastes cum lack of
information view and the network view, which both provide an explanation for exporting
uncertainty and quick exit from the export market.
A Unique Equilibrium Open Economy
The equilibrium in the model is found by combining equations (3.13), (3.19), (3.21),
and (3.23) and solving for the three unknowns , x, . Merging equations (3.13) and
(3.21) and rewriting, the model consists of the following 3 equations in 3 unknowns:
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x =
fx
f
 1 (A.1)
fj () + (1 G ()) [fxjx (x; )  fex] = fe (A.2)
fxix (

x; ) = fex (A.3)
With j (), jx (x; ) and ix (x; ) dened as:
j (a) = (1 G ())
 e ()

  1

jx (x; ) = (1 H (x; ))
 ex (x; )
x
  1

ix (x; ) = (1  F (x    ))

 (x; )
x
  1

Uniqueness of the equilibrium is shown as follows. Equations (A.1)-(A.3) are log di¤er-
entiated with respect to the three unknowns ,  and x. Variables with a hat will
indicate relative changes. It will become clear that (A.1) and (A.2) are independent of
the level of . The log di¤erentiation of (A.1) is then substituted into (A.2) to show
that the LHS of (A.2) rises monotonically in . This implies a unique solution. The
log di¤erentiation of (A.3) makes clear that there is a unique corresponding value of .
Log di¤erentiating equations (A.1) and (A.2) with respect to ,  and x gives:
bx = b (A.4)
f
@j ()
@
b   g () [fxjx (x; )  fex] b+ fx@jx (x; )@x xbx+
(1 G ()) fx@jx (

x; )
@ 
b = 0 (A.5)
It can be proved that @j()
@
=   1

[j () + (1 G ())] < 0 and that @jx(x;)
@x
=
  1
x
[jx (x; ) + (1 H (x; ))] < 0. The derivation is similar to the derivation in
appendix B of Melitz (2003) and available upon request. Furthermore, it can be proved
that the two terms in b cancel each other out. The derivation is lengthy but straightfor-
ward and available upon request. Therefore, using equation (A.4), equation (A.5) can
be rewritten as:
 f [j () + (1 G ())] b   (1 G ()) fx [jx (x; ) + (1 H (x; ))] bx = 0
(A.6)
Equation (A.6) shows that the LHS of (A.2) is monotonically increasing in . Further-
more it can be shown that lim
!0
j () = 1. This implies a unique solution for  and
x.
Log di¤erentiating equation (A.3) with respect to x and  gives the following ex-
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pression (derivation available upon request):
(1  F (x    ))
 
x
b  [ix (x; ) + (1  F (x    ))] bx = 0 (A.7)
Equation (A.7) shows that rises monotonically in implying a unique equilibrium value for
corresponding to the equilibrium value . Equation (A.7)) can be simplied to generate
an expression useful for the comparative statics later on:
b = x
 
bx =
0BBB@1 +
1R
x 
"f (") dx
1  F (x    )
1CCCA bx (A.8)
B Derivation Number of Firms
Labor can be allocated to four di¤erent tasks, domestic production, domestic entry,
exporting production and exporting entry listed in this sequence in equation (B.1):
L = Lp + Le + Lp;x + Le;x (B.1)
The labor market equilibria for production in the domestic and exporting markets are
dened as:
Lp = Nerd  Ned (B.2)
Lp;x = Nxerx  Nxex (B.3)
N and Nx are the number of rms producing for respectively the domestic and the ex-
porting market. The labor market equilibria for market exploration to enter the domestic
market and the exporting market are given respectively by:
Le = feNe (B.4)
Le;x = fexNe;x (B.5)
Ne and Ne;x are the number of rms trying to enter the domestic market and the export
market, respectively. Entry and exit on both the domestic and the exporting market has
to be equal in steady state. This implies:
Ne Pr (  ) = N (B.6)
Ne;x Pr (x  x j   ) = Nx (B.7)
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Adding the four labor market equilibrium conditions, i.e. substituting equations (B.2)-
(B.7) into equation (B.1), gives:
L = Nerd  Ned +Ne +Nxerx  Nxex + fexNx
Pr (x  x j   )
= N
erd   ed + e + Nx
N
erx   ex + fex
Pr (x  x j   )

= N
erd   ed + e + 1 G ()
1 G () (1 H (

x; ))
erx   ex + fex
(1 H (x; ))

= N
erd + 1 G ()
1 G () (1 H (

x; )) erx = Ner = Ntr (et) (B.8)
et and Nt are dened in equations (3.27) and (3.28). Average revenues in equation (B.8)
can be rewritten to nd the following expression for the number of domestic producing
rms:
N =
L

e + f + 1 G()
1 G() (fex + (1 H (x; )) fx)
 (B.9)
C E¤ect of Changed Trade Costs
This appendix derives the e¤ects of changes in the three types of trade costs  , fx and
fex on the three cuto¤ values , x,  and on the probabilities of exporting and the
success rate of exporting, Pr (   j   ) and Pr (x  x j   ) respectively.
C.1 Changed Iceberg Trade Costs
Equations (A.1)-(3.22) can be log di¤erentiated with respect to  , , x, . Only (A.1)
contains  , so the log di¤erentiated equations of (A.2) and (3.22) are given in equations
(A.6) and (A.8) respectively. The log di¤erentiation of (A.1) becomes:
bx = (   1) b + b (C.1)
Combining equations (C.1), (A.6) and (A.8), one can solve for b, b and bx as a functionb : b =   (   1) fx (1 H (x; )) exx
f (1 G ()) e
 + fx (1 H (x; )) exx
b
bx = (   1) f (1 G ()) e
f (1 G ()) e
 + fx (1 H (x; )) exx
b
b = x
 
(   1) f (1 G ()) e

f (1 G ()) e
 + fx (1 H (x; )) exx
b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Hence, "; < 0, "x; > 0 and "; > 0. The probability of exporting and the success
rate of exporting can be log di¤erentiated with respect to the three cuto¤ values:
d ln Pr (   j   ) =  g () b+ g ()b (C.2)
d ln Pr (x  x j   ) =
  h (x; )xbx + g ()1 G () ((1 H (x; ))  (1  F (x    ))) b (C.3)
Notice that in equation (C.3), (1 H (x; ))  (1  F (x    )), because the proba-
bility of successful exporting is larger for rms with a larger domestic taste parameter.
Substituting the relative changes in cuto¤ parameters into equations (C.2) and (C.3)
shows that lower iceberg trade costs leads to a larger probability of exporting. The sign
of the e¤ect on the success rate of exporting cannot be determined:
@ ln Pr (   j   )
@ ln 
=  g () "; + g ()"; > 0
@ ln Pr (x  x j   )
@ ln 
=
  h (x; )x"x; +
g ()
1 G () ((1 H (

x; ))  (1  F (x    ))) ";
C.2 Changed Sunk Export Costs
Equations (A.1)-(A.3) can be log di¤erentiated with respect to , x,  and fex. The
log di¤erentiation of equation (A.1) is given by (A.4). The log di¤erentiations of (A.2)
and (A.3) are given respectively by:
 f (1 G ()) e

cx   fx (1 G ()) (1 H (x; )) exxcx   (1 G ()) fexcfex = 0
(C.4)
fx (1  F (x    ))
 
x
b  fx (1  F (x    )) xxcx = fexcfex (C.5)
Solving for c, cx and b from equations (A.4), (C.4) and (C.5) generates:
c = cx = (1 G ()) fex
f (1 G ()) e
 + fx (1 G ()) (1 H (x; )) exx
cfex (C.6)
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b =
f (1 G ()) e
 + fx (1 G ())
h
(1 H (x; )) exx   (1  F (x    )) xx
i
fx (1  F (x    )) fexx
h
f (1 G ()) e
 + fx (1 G ()) (1 H (x; )) exx
i cfex
(C.7)
Equations (C.6) and (C.7) show that  1 < ";fex = "x;fex < 0 and ";fex > 0. Using
equations (C.2) and (C.3) this implies that the probability of exporting rises with lower
sunk export costs whereas the success rate of exporting declines:
@ ln Pr (   j   )
@ ln fex
=  g () ";fex + g ()";fex < 0
@ ln Pr (x  x j   )
@ ln fex
=
  h (x; )x"x;fex +
g ()
1 G () ((1 H (

x; ))  (1  F (x    ))) ";fex > 0
C.3 Changed Fixed Export Costs
Equations (A.1)-(A.3) can be log di¤erentiated with respect to , x,  and fx. This
generates the following three equations:
cx = bfx +c (C.8)
  f (1 G ()) e

c   fx (1 G ()) (1 H (x; )) exxcx
+ fx (1 G ()) jx (x; ) bfx = 0 (C.9)
(1  F (x    ))
 
x
b  (1  F (x    )) xxcx + fex bfx = 0 (C.10)
Solving for c and cx from equations (C.8) and (C.9) leads to:
c =   fx (1 G ()) (1 H (x; ))
f (1 G ()) e
 + fx (1 G ()) (1 H (x; )) exx
bfx (C.11)
cx = f (1 G ()) e + fx (1 G ()) (1 H (x; ))
h ex
x
  1
i
f (1 G ()) e
 + fx (1 G ()) (1 H (x; )) exx
bfx (C.12)
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And from (C.10) and (C.12), b can be calculated:
b =  x
 
f (1 G ()) e
 + fx (1 G ()) (1 H (x; )) ex xx
f (1 G ()) e
 + fx (1 G ()) (1 H (x; )) exx
bfx
Hence,  1 < ";fx < 0, 0 < "x;fx < 1 and ";fx < 0. This implies, using (C.2)
and (C.3), that the probability of exporting cannot be determined without specifying a
distribution of taste parameters, whereas the success rate of exporting rises with lower
xed export costs:
@ ln Pr (   j   )
@ ln fx
=  g () ";fx + g ()";fx
@ ln Pr (x  x j   )
@ ln fx
=
  h (x; )x"x;fx +
g ()
1 G () ((1 H (

x; ))  (1  F (x    ))) ";fx < 0

Chapter 4
Heterogeneous Productivity and
Trade under Oligopoly1
4.1 Introduction
Several di¤erent models of heterogeneous productivity have been proposed in the last
years in the trade literature. Heterogeneous productivity leads to a benecial reallocation
e¤ect of trade liberalization. Less e¢ cient rms producing for the domestic market are
replaced by exporting more e¢ cient rms. For example, Melitz (2003) introduces het-
erogeneous productivity in a monopolistic competition framework with CES-preferences
and Bernard et al. (2003) include heterogeneous productivity in a model with Bertrand
competition. Empirical work has shown that reallocation e¤ects of trade are important.
Bernard and Jensen (2004a) show that almost half of the rise of manufacturing TFP
in the USA between 1983 and 1992 is due to a reallocation e¤ect of resources towards
exporting more productive rms. Also episodes of liberalization in developing countries
show the importance of composition e¤ects (Tybout (2001)).
This chapter explores heterogeneous productivity in a model with Cournot competi-
tion. The goal of this exercise is to show that a relatively easy model can generate the
reallocation e¤ect that characterizes other heterogeneous productivity models of trade.
The model is a two-country, multi-sector model. The e¤ects of trade liberalization are
studied in a model with free entry and a model without free entry. In both models, freer
trade leads to lower prices. In the free entry model this raises welfare unambiguously.
In the model without free entry welfare rises as well under certain conditions on the
distribution of productivities. This is an extension of the Brander and Krugman (1983)
result, who only show that welfare rises with trade liberalization in the short run when
trade costs are negligible. Another interesting result of the extension to heterogeneous
rms is that the decrease in market price as a result of trade liberalization can go along
with a declining number of rms when enough ine¢ cient rms are squeezed out of the
market. Assuming unequal countries, the model nests the Ricardian comparative ad-
vantage model when heterogeneity in productivity disappears. The model also generates
clear predictions on the probability of zero trade ows within a sector and export prices.
1Based on Bekkers and Francois (2008)
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A larger distance between countries leads to a higher probability of zero trade ows and
lower fob export prices. A larger size of the importer country also raises the probability
of zero trade ows and decreases the fob export price. A last remarkable feature of
the unequal country model is the presence of delocation e¤ects: unilateral liberalization
leads to higher market prices in the liberalizing country. All results are derived without
specifying a specic distribution of costs. Preferences are CES.
The chapter is an extension of Brander and Krugman (1983) who examine reciprocal
dumping in a Cournot model of international trade without heterogeneous productivity.
They showed the possibility of cross-hauling and reciprocal dumping. The present chap-
ter is related to other studies of heterogeneous productivity and international trade like
Melitz (2003), Bernard et al. (2003), and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). The value
added of the present model compared to other rm heterogeneity models is threefold.
First, the model is parsimonious: in a very basic model of heterogeneous productivity,
the Cournot model, trade generates welfare gains through a reallocation e¤ect. More-
over, no specic distribution of productivities is assumed like in Bernard et al. (2003)
and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) to generate the results. Second the model nests the
Brander and Krugman reciprocal dumping model and the Ricardian model as special
cases. Third, the model generates clear testable predictions on the probability of zero
trade ows and exporting prices. Ra¤ et al. (2007) also address rm heterogeneity in
an oligopoly model. Their paper is focused on the interaction of trade and R&D. Section
2 lays out the basic model. Section 3 goes into trade without free entry and section 4
addresses trade with free entry. Section 5 exposes the unequal country model. Section
6 concludes.
4.2 Basic Model without Trade
This section lays out the basics of the model without trade. There are Q+ 1 sectors in
the economy, Q sectors producing qj with Cournot competition and 1 sector producing
z under conditions of perfect competition. In the rst sections it is assumed that the
Cournot sectors are symmetric. Later on this assumption is relaxed when asymmetries
in technology, size, and policy are explored. Throughout it is assumed that there are
su¢ cient sectors in the economy so that the e¤ect of a price change on demand through
the price index is negligible for rms (there is no numeraire problem). There are L
equal agents each supplying 1 unit of labor. All prot income from the Cournot sectors
goes to the economic agents. The utility function of each agent is CES. The optimization
problem of the consumer generates the following market demand functions in the Cournot
sectors qj and in the perfect competition sector z:
qj =
IP  1U
pj
(4.1)
z = IP  1U (4.2)
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The price of good z is normalized at 1 and I is the endogenous income of all agents, the
sum of labor and prot income. PU is the consumer price index, corresponding to one
unit of utility:
PU =
"
QX
j=1
p1 j + 1
# 1
1 
=

Qp1  + 1
 1
1  (4.3)
In the remainder one Cournot sector is studied as they are all symmetric. Therefore the
sector index j is omitted. Labor is the only factor of production and there is a labor force
of size L. One unit of labor is needed to produce one unit of the perfect competition
good y. Therefore the wage is equal to 1. In the q sectors productivity is heterogeneous.
One unit of labor can be transformed into 1=ci units of q for the i-th rm which has
marginal cost of production ci. There are no xed costs of production. Therefore the
cost function of rm i is given by
Ci (qi) = ciqi (4.4)
There is Cournot competition between the di¤erent rms in the qsectors. So, rms
maximize prots towards quantity supplied, taking the quantity supplied by other rms
as given. Prot of rm i is given by:
i = pqi   ciqi (4.5)
The rst order condition is dened as:
@i
@qi
= p

1  1

qi
q

  ci = 0 (4.6)
With q =
nP
i=1
qi: n is the number of rms in the market. Using the rst order condition,
the second order condition can be written as follows (derivation in appendix A):
  1

p
q

( + 1) ci   (   1) p
p

< 0 (4.7)
Using the denition for market share, i =
qi
q
, the rst order condition can be rewritten
as:
p

1  i


= ci (4.8)
i = 
p  ci
p
(4.9)
The marginal revenues on the LHS of equation (4.9) should be at least as large as the
marginal costs on the RHS. The larger is market share i, the lower is marginal revenue.
So, for positive sales (i  0) which are implicitly imposed, a rm can satisfy the FOC
by just reducing its market share as long as its marginal cost is smaller than the market
price. There is a cuto¤ cost level c with which a rm would just stay in the market.
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This cuto¤ cost level c is equal to the market price p. The highest cost rm staying
in the market has a cost level equal or just below the cuto¤ cost level and selling an
amount just above zero.
The equilibrium price and quantities sold can be found for a given number of rms.
Below a free entry condition is added to endogenise the number of rms. Suppose for now
there are n rms. Combining the demand equation in (4.1) with n rst order conditions
in equation (4.6) and with the equation for the sum of market shares, one can nd the
following solutions for the market price p, total sector sales q and sales of an individual
rm qi:
p =

n  1
nX
i=1
ci =
n
n  1c (4.10)
q =
IP  1U
c

n  1
n

(4.11)
qi = IP
 1
U
c  ci
c

n  1
n
 1
(4.12)
with c the average cost of rms, c = 1
n
nP
i=1
ci.
Using the fact that the price is equal to the cuto¤ cost level, the price equation (4.10)
can be rewritten to solve for the number of rms as a function of the cuto¤ cost level
and average cost:
n =
1

c
c   c (4.13)
Equation (4.13) gives rise to the following observation.
Observation 1 The cost structure and market structure of industries are related in the
model. In more competitive industries with more rms, the cost heterogeneity is smaller.
Equation (4.13) shows that an increase in the number of rms implies that the rm
with the highest cost needs to have a cost parameter ever closer to average cost. There-
fore, the cost levels of rms become ever closer to each other with more rms in the
market. Observation 1 illuminates that the market structure and the cost structure in
this model are interrelated. In more competitive industries with more rms, the cost
levels of rms should be closer to each other.2
Next, free entry is added to the model. This will endogenise the number of rms n.
Free entry is introduced like in Melitz (2003). Firms have to pay a sunk entry cost fe
2Van Long and Soubeyran (1997) nd similar results. They show that the variance of the cost
distribution and the Herndahlindex of industry concentration are positively related in a model with
Cournot competition: a larger variance leads to more industry concentration. The results in the present
paper are an extension to the results found by Van Long and Soubeyran (1997), because the number
of rms is endogenous in the present paper modeling entry and exit.
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to draw a cost parameter ci randomly from a certain distribution of costs F (ci). Hence,
uncertainty about productivity is a barrier to entry for rms. They start to produce
when they can make positive operating prots. When they cannot make positive prots,
they take their loss and leave the market immediately. Producing rms leave the market
with a certain xed death probability  in each period or when market conditions have
changed such that they cannot make positive prots anymore. The sunk entry costs use
labor. As free entry leads to zero expected prots, all prot income on average is used
to pay labor in the entry sector. Therefore, total income in the economy is xed and
equal to the amount of labor (with wages normalized at 1).
The entry and exit process described leads to a zero cuto¤ prot condition (ZCP)
and a free entry condition (FE). Together these two conditions can be added to the no
free entryequilibrium equations, equations (4.10)-(4.12). The number of rms n can
then be determined.
The ZCP can be derived from the fact that zero prot implies that price should be
equal to marginal cost. The FOC in equation (4.6) shows that this rm will reduce
market share to (just above) zero, to satisfy the rst order condition and make non-
negative prot. One nds as ZCP:
p = c (4.14)
The FE is given by equalizing the ex ante expected prots from entry with the sunk
entry cost:
F (c)
1X
j=0
(1  )j _ = fe (4.15)
~ =
fe
F (c)
(4.16)
~ is the expected prot conditional upon entry. It can be written as:
~ =
cZ
0
[p (c) q (c)  cq (c)] (c) dc = q
cZ
0
 (c) (p  c) (c) dc (4.17)
 (c) is the truncated pdf of all rms producing,  (c) = 1
F (c)f (c).
3 Continuing the
derivation, leads to the following FE:
~ =
LP  1U
(c)
cZ
0


c   2c+ c
2
c

 (c) dc =
fe
F (c)
(4.18)
LP  1U
(c)

 
c   2Ec+ E (c)
2
c
!
=
fe
F (c)
(4.19)
The expectation appearing in equation (4.19) is a truncated expectation, i.e. Ec =
E(c jc  c). All expectations appearing in the remainder of the chapter are the ap-
3Remember that q is the sum of sales of all rms in a Cournot sector
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propriate truncated expectations. Combining the FE and ZCP generates the following
equation:
LP  1U
(p)

 
p  2Ec+ E (c)
2
p
!
=
fe
F (p)
(4.20)
The combined FE/ZCP equilibrium condition generates a stable price equilibrium.
Rewriting equation (4.18) using average prot unconditional upon entry  = F (p) ~,
gives:
 =
LP  1U
(p)

pZ
0

p  2c+ c
2
p

f (c) dc = fe (4.21)
Appendix A shows that the LHS of equation (4.21) rises in the market price from 0 to
1 when the SOC is imposed, implying that there is a unique equilibrium.
The FE and ZCP can be used to solve for the cuto¤ cost level. An explicit solution
requires the choice of an initial cost distribution. Once the cuto¤ cost level c is known
the number of rms can be determined.
In steady state average cost is equal to expected cost, c = E(c jc  c). So, the
number of rms is equal to:
n =
p
p  E(c jc  c) =
1
1  E(cjcp)
p
(4.22)
Equation (4.22) can be log di¤erentiated with respect to the market price p and the
number of rms n:
p^ =  p  E(c jc  p)
p
1
1  "Ec;p n^ (4.23)
"Ec;p is the elasticity of average costs with respect to the market price. Equation (4.23)
implies the following:
Observation 2 When the average cost decreases less than proportionally in response
to a lower market price, a decreasing market price goes along with a rising number
of rms. Or equivalently, a lower market price goes along with more rms when the
average markup declines as a result of a lower market price. When the average cost
decreases more than proportionally with a lower market price, a decreasing market price
goes together with less rms.
Observation 2 follows from equation (4.22). As the market price is equal to the cuto¤
cost level, the relation between the market price and the number of rms depends on the
distribution of costs.4Intuitively, a lower market price can either be caused by more rms
in the market or by more e¢ cient rms in the market. When average costs respond less
4With a Pareto distribution, the truncated mean is linear in the truncation point. Therefore, the
number of rms will be xed. Simulations show that with a lognormal distribution sensible results can
be generated with a reasonable number of rms. Moreover, with a lognormal distribution the number
of rms declines in the market price.
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than proportionally to the market price, a lower market price is caused by more rms in
the market. When average costs respond more than proportionally to the market price,
a lower market price is caused by more e¢ cient rms in the market. In this situation
a lower market price can go along with less rms, because the least e¢ cient rms are
squeezed out of the market. A related result can be derived on the e¤ect of market size
L on the number of rms.
Observation 3 The number of rms rises in the size of the market L when a lower
market price leads to a less than proportional decline of average costs
The combined FE/ZCP in equation (4.21) can be totally di¤erentiated towards p
and L:
dp
dL
=  L
p
pR
0
(p c)2
p
f (c) dc
pR
0
(( + 1) c  (   1) p) f (c) dc
< 0 (4.24)
The denominator is positive by the SOC in equation (4.7). Equation (4.24) shows that
a larger market leads to a lower market price. From observation 2 it is known that the
number of rms rises as a result of a lower market price when the decline in average cost
is less than proportional than the decline in the market price, which implies observation
3. Intuitively, a larger market can be served in two ways: through more rms or through
an increase in the sales per rm. Depending on the distribution of costs one or the other
dominates.5 The number of rms can increase with a larger market, but the number
of rms can also decrease with a larger market, when enough of the least e¢ cient rms
are squeezed out of the market. This result contrasts with the monopolistic competition
model of Melitz, where the number of rms is linear in market size and the increase in
market size is served through a proportional increase in the number of rms. Hence, the
present model is more exible.
4.3 International Trade without Free Entry: The
Short Run
There is international trade between two countries s; r = H; F . There are iceberg trade
costs  in the Cournot sectors. There are no xed trade costs. The perfect competition
sector does not display any trade costs, an assumption often made in international trade
models. The equilibrium market price in the representative Cournot sector becomes:
ps =
ns
ns   1cs (4.25)
with cs = 1nr

ndsP
i=1
cids +
nxsP
i=1
cixs

and ns = nds + nxs
5With a Pareto distribution the number of rms is xed, so the increase in sales as a result of the
larger market is fully realized through more sales per rm. With a lognormal distribution, also the
number of rms changes considerably.
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This section addresses the e¤ects of trade liberalization without imposing the free
entry condition. So, the short-run e¤ects of trade liberalization are examined. This can
be seen as a free exit case, because rms will leave the market as soon as they make
negative operating prots. Total di¤erentiation can be used to make several observations
on the e¤ect of trade liberalization in the model. The rst observation is on the impact
of trade liberalization on the market price, i.e. the e¤ect of a decline of  on the market
price ps. In equation (4.25), there is a direct e¤ect of trade liberalization on the market
price: exporting rms have lower costs and therefore average costs decline. And there is
an indirect e¤ect, because rms producing for the domestic market can disappear and
exporting rms can appear on the market. It can be shown that this indirect e¤ect is
0 at the margin (see appendix B). Therefore, the relative change in the market price is
equal to:
bPs =
nxsP
i=1
cis
ndsP
i=1
cis +
nxsP
i=1
cis
b (4.26)
Variables with a hat denote relative changes, bx = dx
x
. The elasticity of the market price
with respect to trade costs, "p; , is between 0 and 1:
"p; =
nxsP
i=1
cis
ndsP
i=1
cis +
nxsP
i=1
cis
(4.27)
So, one nds that with trade liberalization:
Observation 4 the market price decreases
Equation (4.26) shows that a decline of trade costs  decreases the market price. The
domestic cuto¤ marginal cost is equal to the market price, so it also declines.
Several other observations can be made on the e¤ect of trade liberalization.
Observation 5 Some of the least productive rms are squeezed out of the market
How many rms are squeezed out of the market depends on the price distribution of
the rms, i.e. it depends on how far the highest cost rms are from the old market price.
Observation 6 More rms can export
More rms can enter the export market, as the exporting cuto¤ marginal cost rises
when  declines:
cxr =
Ps

(4.28)
bcxr = bps   b =   (1  "p; ) b (4.29)
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Observation 7 (Average) markups from domestic sales decline and (Average) markups
from exporting sales rise
Markups of all domestic sales decline, as the costs of the rms remain equal, whereas
the market price declines. Markups of the exporting rms rise with trade liberalization,
as the e¤ect of the declining trade costs dominates the e¤ect of the decrease in market
price in the exporting market. Using the letter m to indicate markup, the following can
be derived:
mixs =
Pr
ciK
(4.30)
m^ixs = P^r   ^ = ("p;   1) ^ (4.31)
The e¤ect on average domestic and exporting markups can be calculated as well. The
markups of rms are weighted by market shares in calculating average markups, so as
to give more weight to larger rms6:
mids =
ndsX
i=1
ps
cis
ids =
ndsX
i=1

ps   cis
cis
(4.32)
mixs =
nxsX
i=1
pr
cis
ixs =
nxsX
i=1

pr   cis
cis
(4.33)
Relative changes of the average exporting and domestic markups are equal to:
bmids =
ndsP
i=1
ps
cis
ndsP
i=1
ps
cis
ids
"p; ^ (4.34)
bmixs =  
ndsP
i=1
pr
cis
ndsP
i=1
pr
cis
ixs
(1  "p; ) ^ (4.35)
So, average markups from domestic sales decline and average markups from exporting
sales rise.7 Declining markups in the domestic market t well with empirical ndings
reported in Tybout (2001) from developing countries. Various studies nd that more
import competition goes along with declining markups.
As in almost any model of international trade (for example Armington) rms increase
their market share on the exporting market and their market share is reduced in domestic
6Implicitly it is assumed that the probability of rms to be in the market is equal for all marginal
costs, i.e. that the distribution of costs is uniform.
7Indirect e¤ects because domestic producing rms disappear from the market and exporting rms
enter the market are 0, because the averages are weighted by market shares and market shares are zero
for entering and exiting rms.
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markets. But the relative gain and loss of exporters and domestic producers displays an
interesting pattern:
Observation 8 Large low cost rms lose less market share on the domestic market than
small high cost rms and small high cost exporting rms gain more market share on the
export market than large low cost rms
Observation 8 follows from totally di¤erentiating the expressions for market shares:
dids = 
cids
p
"p;b (4.36)
dixs = 
cixr
p
("p;   1) b (4.37)
Therefore small rms lose relatively more market share on the domestic market and small
rms gain relatively more market share on the exporting market than large rms. So,
more e¢ cient big rms do not gain more from trade liberalization than less e¢ cient small
rms. Apparently the model works such that big rms already have a strong position in
an exporting market, so they cannot grow as much as a result of trade liberalization as
small rms.
Next, the welfare e¤ect of trade liberalization can be calculated. This is complicated
by the fact that income is endogenous as it depends on prot income in the imperfect
competition sector. With free entry prot income is driven to zero, but in the no free
entry case prot income is non-zero and varies.
Welfare in country s is equal to utility in that country:
Ws = Us =
Is
PUs
=
Ls +s
PUs
(4.38)
s is total prot income in the economy. Elaborating upon this equation (see appendix
B) assuming that both countries are equal, one arrives at the following expression:
W =
L (Qp+ p)
p +Q~c
1
PU
(4.39)
~c are the market share weighted average costs, ~c =
ndP
i=1
ciid +
nxP
i=1
ciix. Log-linearizing
welfare towards trade costs  from equation (4.39) and treating the price and the market
share weighted average costs as endogenous, one nds (derivation in appendix B):
W^ =

p
Qp+ p
  p

p +Q~c

p^  Q
p +Q~c
d~c (4.40)
The rst term in (4.40) is the welfare gain through a decline in price. As expected
the gain for the consumer from lower prices outweighs the loss of a lower prot income
with lower prices. The second term measures the possible gain from trade liberalization
of lower costs leading to a higher prot income. Elaborating on the cost e¤ect, d~c, one
gets:
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W^ =  

p
Qp+ p
  p

p +Q~c

p^
  Q
p +Q~c
"
ndX
i=1
ciid^id +
nxX
i=1
ciix^ix +
nxX
i=1
ciix^
#
(4.41)
W^ =  

p
Qp+ p
  p

p +Q~c

"p; ^
  Q
p +Q~c
"
ndX
i=1

c2i
p
"p;  
nxX
i=1

 2c2i
p
(1  "p; ) +
nxX
i=1
ciix
#
^ (4.42)
Equation (4.41) and (4.42) can be interpreted as follows. In both equations is the
rst term on the RHS again the welfare gain from a lower market price. The second
term on the RHS measures the e¤ect on prot income through changed costs. In both
(4.41) and (4.42) the rst term between the second brackets measures the gain from
the declining market share of domestic producing rms. The second term between the
second brackets measures the loss from the rising market share of exporting rms. The
third term measures the welfare gain from lower trade costs with trade liberalization.
Observation 9 Like in Brander and Krugman (1983) the welfare e¤ect of trade lib-
eralization can be negative when the tari¤ is reduced from a prohibitive level due to the
increased costs of cross-hauling. However, the welfare e¤ect can also be positive when
the tari¤ is reduced from a prohibitive level.
Unlike in the model of Brander and Krugman (1983) the welfare e¤ect of trade
liberalization when the tari¤ is reduced from a prohibitive level is ambiguous. It depends
on the cost structure of rms whether the welfare e¤ect is positive or negative. It can be
shown under what condition the welfare e¤ect is negative in general, but this condition
is cumbersome and does not lend itself to any interpretation. Therefore, two examples
are used to show that the welfare e¤ect can go both ways. First an example of a negative
welfare e¤ect from trade liberalization. Suppose there are two identical countries with
each three rms. They have marginal costs of 1, 1 and 2. The autarky market price will
be 2. The iceberg trade costs are equal to 2. This implies that 2 rms can export, but
with a market share of 0. Substitution elasticity  is equal to 1. Equation (4.42) can be
applied to show that a marginal reduction of the tari¤ decreases welfare with 1
2
Q
1+Q
.
An example where the welfare e¤ect is positive is the following. Again there are two
identical countries with each three rms. Marginal costs are 1, 2 and 3. The autarky
market price is 3. Iceberg trade costs are 3. So, only one rm can export. Furthermore,
the substitution elasticity  is 1, so utility is Cobb-Douglas. There are two sectors in the
economy and the Cournot sector has CES-weight (Cobb-Douglas parameter) . When
the tari¤ is reduced from the prohibitive level, the welfare e¤ect from equation (4.42)
is equal to (1  ) 5
9
  4
9
So, when the Cournot sector is small enough ( < 1=5), the
welfare e¤ect of trade liberalization is positive.
76 CHAPTER 4 FIRM HETEROGENEITY AND OLIGOPOLY
Observation 10 The welfare e¤ect of trade liberalization is unambiguously positive
when the tari¤ is negligible, like in Brander and Krugman (1983)
Observation 10 follows immediately from equation (4.42). When the tari¤ is equal to
1, the rst two terms between brackets in equation (4.42) are equal. So, only negative
terms are left and therefore the welfare e¤ect from trade liberalization is positive. Bran-
der and Krugman (1983) only show that the welfare e¤ect is positive when the tari¤ is
negligible. In the present heterogeneous productivity model one can say more on when
the welfare e¤ect is positive. Elaborating upon equation (4.42), the following expression
can be derived for the welfare e¤ect of trade liberalization (see appendix B):
W^ =  

p
Qp+ p
  p

p +Q~c

p^
  Q
p +Q~c
n
p2 (n  1)
nxX
i=1
ci [nc (c + p  2ci) + (n  1)V ar (ci)] ^ (4.43)
In equation (4.43) c and V ar (ci) are respectively the mean and variance of the
marginal costs of domestic and exporting rms,
c =
1
n
"
ndX
i=1
ci +
nxX
i=1
ci
#
(4.44)
V ar (ci) =
1
n  1
 
ndX
i=1
c2i +
nxX
i=1
 2c2i   n2c
!
: (4.45)
Note that the summation in equation (4.43) is over all the terms between brackets. It can
also be shown that the welfare e¤ect is positive when the following condition is satised:
V ar (ci)
2c
 n
(n  1) (n  1) (4.46)
From equation (4.43) and (4.46) the following statements can be made:
Observation 11 The welfare e¤ect of trade liberalization is positive when the exporting
rms are e¢ cient enough. In particular, the welfare e¤ect is unambiguously positive when
all exporting rms have marginal costs inclusive of trade costs lower than the average of
market price and average costs.
Observation 12 The welfare e¤ect of trade liberalization is positive when the coe¢ cient
of variation is larger than the square root of n
(n 1)(n 1) .
Observation 11 follows from equation (4.43). When c + p is larger than 2ci all
terms in equation (4.43) will be negative and hence the welfare e¤ect of trade liberaliza-
tion will be positive. Intuitively, when the exporting rms are productive, their gain in
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market share at the expense of domestic producing rms represents a welfare gain. More
productive rms replace less productive rms. But when the exporting rmsmarginal
costs inclusive of trade costs are larger than the marginal costs of the domestic producing
rms, the shift in market share towards exporting rms can represent a loss. In some
cases this loss can be larger than the welfare gain due to lower prices and lower trade
costs, as shown by the example above.
Observation 12 follows from (4.46).It can be interpreted as follows. When the variance
of trade costs is large relative to average trade costs, the fraction of relatively ine¢ cient
exporting rms will be small. So, the welfare loss from an increasing market share
of relatively ine¢ cient exporting rms will be smaller than the welfare gain from a
decreasing market share of domestic producing ine¢ cient rms. The next section shows
that the welfare e¤ect from trade liberalization is unambiguously positive with free entry.
4.4 International Trade with Free Entry: The Long
Run
In the free entry case, the welfare e¤ect of trade liberalization depends entirely on the
e¤ect of liberalization on the market price as prot income remains zero. Showing that
trade liberalization leads to a lower market price is su¢ cient to show that liberalization
raises welfare. In this section an expression for the equilibrium of the model from the
ZCP and FE is derived. Some observations are made on the equilibrium outcome and
then this equilibrium condition is log di¤erentiated to show that trade liberalization
leads to a lower market price and thus to higher welfare. Also some comparative statics
results are derived.
Firms can make prots from domestic and exporting sales, if they are productive
enough to export. Average prot is dened as:
~s = ~ds +
F (cxs)
F (cds)
~xs (4.47)
_
ds and
_
xsare the expected prots from respectively domestic and exporting sales,
conditional upon entry. There are two ZCP for domestic and exporting sales:
cds = ps (4.48)
cxs =
Pr

(4.49)
Elaborating on expected prots as in the closed economy model, generates the following
equilibrium equations deriving from the ZCP and FE:
LsP
 1
Us
ps
psR
0


ps   2c+ c
2
ps

f (c) dc+
LrP
 1
Ur
pr
prR
0


pr   2c+ c
2
pr

f (c) dc = fe (4.50)
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LsP
 1
Us
ps

"
ps   2Ecds + E (cds)
2
ps
#
+
F
 
pr


F (ps)
 
LrP
 1
Ur
pr

"
pr   2Ecxs +  2E (cxs)
2
pr
#!
=
fe
F (cds)
(4.51)
To determine the impact of trade costs on the market price, one can totally di¤erentiate
the free entry condition in equation (4.50) towards the cuto¤ cost level (which equals
the market price) and trade costs. Both the impact of sectoral trade liberalization and
trade liberalization in all Cournot sectors can be addressed. The e¤ect of sectoral trade
liberalization on the market price is larger. Totally di¤erentiating towards p and  one
nds the following expressions for the e¤ect on market price of sectoral and economywide
liberalization respectively(derivation in appendix C):
p^ =
2
p
R
0
c

1  c
p

f (c) dc
A+B
^ = "p;;sect;FEF ^ (4.52)
p^ =
2
p
R
0
c

1  c
p

f (c) dc
A+B + C
^ = "p;;nat;FEF ^ (4.53)
With:
A =
pR
0
d (c) (( + 1) c  (   1) p) f (c) dc
B =
p
R
0
x (c) (( + 1) c  (   1) p) f (c) dc
C =
Qp1 
Qp1  + 1
(d + x)
"p ;;sect;FE and "p;;nat;FE are the elasticities of the market price with respect to trade costs
in the free entry case with sectoral and nationwide trade liberalization respectively. By
the SOC in equation (4.7) the denominator in both equations is positive and hence the
fraction is positive as well. This gives rise to the following observation:
Observation 13 Trade liberalization leads to a lower market price and higher welfare
in the free entry model
Welfare rises when the market price of q declines as income is xed with free entry.8
Hence, welfare rises in this model as a result of trade liberalization. By observation 2 a
lower market price goes along with more or less rms in the market depending on how
8U = LPU
U^ =   Qp1 1+Qp1  p^
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much average costs decline when the market price declines. This result can be combined
with observation 13. The implication is that the lower market price as a result of trade
liberalization can go along with more but also with less rms in the market, depending
on how many of the least e¢ cient rms are squeezed out of the market. Hence, the
conventional insight of the reciprocal dumping model that trade liberalization leads to
lower market prices, because there are more rms in the market has to be relaxed. Trade
liberalization can also lead to less rms in the market and still decrease market prices,
because enough of the least e¢ cient rms are squeezed out of the market.
The various e¤ects of trade liberalization described in the section on no free entry
can also be examined in the free entry model. The following e¤ects of trade liberalization
are found:
Observation 14 The least productive rms get squeezed out of the market
Observation 14 follows from the fact that the cuto¤ cost level is equal to the mar-
ket price. A lower market price implies that the highest cost producers have to leave
the market. Next, the e¤ect on market shares from domestic and exporting sales is
calculated.
Observation 15 Market shares from domestic sales decline and market shares from
exporting sales rise
Log-di¤erentiating the expressions for market shares, dened implicitly in equations
(4.9) and using equation (4.52) gives:
bid = 1

ci
p  ci p^ =
1

ci
p  ci "p;;FE ^ (4.54)bix = 1

ci
p  ci (p^  b) =   1 cip  ci (1  "p;;FE) ^ (4.55)
The market share from domestic sales declines for all rms. Therefore, the market
share from exporting sales should rise, either because more rms can export or because
the market share of rms that already exported should rise. The market share of rms
that enter the exporting market is zero. Therefore, the market share of rms already
exporting should rise. Equation (4.55) implies that the elasticity of the market price
with respect to iceberg trade costs in equations (4.52) and (4.53) is smaller than 1. This
result is useful in the remainder.
Observation 16 The elasticity of the market price with respect to trade costs is between
0 and 1.
Observation 16 can immediately be used in the following two observations.
Observation 17 More rms can export.
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The exporting cuto¤ cost level cx is equal to
p

. Log-di¤erentiating shows that the
exporting cuto¤ cost level declines with trade liberalization, implying that more rms
can export:
c^x = p^  ^ = ("p;;FE   1) ^ (4.56)
Observation 18 Markups from domestic sales decline and markups from exporting sales
rise.
Markups from domestic sales and exporting sales are equal to p
c
and p
c
, respectively.
Log di¤erentiating shows that markups from domestic sales decline and markups from
exporting sales rise with trade liberalization:
m^d = p^ = "p;;FE ^ (4.57)
m^x = p^  ^ = ("p;;FE   1) ^ (4.58)
The e¤ects on average markups can be calculated as well. Average markups from do-
mestic and exporting sales weighted by market shares are dened, respectively, as:
md =
pZ
0
p
c

p  c
p
 (c) dc =
pZ
0

p  c
c
f (c)
F (p)
dc (4.59)
mx =
p
Z
0
p
c

p  c
p
 (c) dc =
p
Z
0

p  c
c
f (c)
F
 
p

dc (4.60)
Log-di¤erentiating these expressions shows that average markups from domestic sales
decline and average markups from exporting sales rise:
bmd = 

24 pZ
0
p
c
 (c) dc  f (p) p
F (p)
pZ
0
p  c
p
 (c) dc
35 "p;;FE (4.61)
b_mx = 

264
p
Z
0
p
c
 (c) dc  f
 
p


p

F
 
p


p
Z
0
p  c
p
 (c) dc
375 ("p;;FE   1) (4.62)
The terms in f(p)p
F (p)
represent the increased probability weight of all rms in the market,
when the cuto¤point declines as a result of trade liberalization. Hence, the e¤ect of trade
liberalization on average domestic and exporting markups are ambiguous and depend
on the cost distribution of productivities. When there is a lot of probability mass at
the cuto¤ cost levels the probability weight terms could dominate. This would imply
that average markups from domestic sales could actually rise and average markups from
exporting sales decline. The intuition for the possibility of a lower markup from domestic
sales is the following: trade liberalization could squeeze many low productive rms with
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low markups out of the market. The remaining rms all face lower prices and a lower
markup, but they get a larger probability weight, so on average the markup could rise.
For the e¤ect on average rm size we nd a similar result. Average rm size from
domestic sales and exporting sales are dened, respectively, as:
rd =
pZ
0
pqd (c) (c) dc =
P  1U L
p 1
pZ
0
d (c) (c) dc
=
P  1U L
p 1
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p
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
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
 (c) dc (4.63)
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Di¤erentiating these expressions towards trade costs generates:
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P  1U L
p 1
24 pZ
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(1  d (c)) (c) dc  f (p) p
F (p)
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So, like with average markups, the e¤ect on average domestic and exporting rm sales
is indeterminate and depends on the distribution of costs.
4.5 International Trade with Free Entry and Un-
equal Countries
In the free entry model all results were derived assuming equal countries. In this section
the equal countries assumption is Relaxed. Three set of results are derived. First, it is
shown that unilateral liberalization leads to higher prices in the liberalizing country in
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the long run. Second, the impact of country size and distance on the probability of zero
trade and on exporting unit values are derived. Third, it is shown the Ricardian model
with productivity di¤erences can be seen as a nested model of the present framework.
The setup in this section is as follows. There are two countries s; r = H; F . The coun-
tries display di¤erences in country size, in trade costs and in productivity. Productivity
di¤erences are modeled by a di¤erent lower frontier for the marginal cost distribution,
c
¯s
6=c
¯r
. The combined FE/ZCP in both countries become:
LsP
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(4.67)
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(4.68)
Unilateral liberalization can be studied using the above two equations. Assuming that
the two countries are equal in all respects except their trade costs, one can log-linearize
the above system of equations towards market prices ps, pr and trade costs sr, rs.
Appendix D shows that this leads to the following result:
p^r =
2


qs
qr
dcdsdcxr^rs   dcxrdcxs^sr

dcdsdcdr   dcxsdcxr (4.69)
p^s =
2


qr
qs
dcdsdcxs^sr   dcxsdcxr^rs

dcdsdcdr   dcxsdcxr (4.70)
dcds, dcdr, dcxs, dcxr, dcxs and dcxr are respectively the marginal e¤ects on expected
prot from domestic and exporting price changes and from trade liberalization in country
s and r, dened as follows:
dcds =
psZ
0
ds (( + 1) c  (   1) ps) f (c) dc (4.71)
dcxs =
ps
srZ
0
xs (( + 1) c  (   1) pr) f (c) dc (4.72)
dcxs =
pr
srZ
0
xs (c) srcf (c) dc (4.73)
The variables in r are dened accordingly. The marginal e¤ects from domestic price
changes on expected prot dcds and dcdr are larger than the marginal e¤ects from ex-
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porting prices on expected prot dcxs and dcxr, because the domestic market shares d
are larger than the exporting market shares x and the integration frontier is larger for
the domestic cost variables than for the exporting cost variables.
Equation (4.26) shows that in the short run unilateral liberalization leads to a lower
market price in the importing country. Equations (4.69) and (4.70) show that unilateral
liberalization in country s , i.e. a negative rs, decreases the market price in the exporting
country s and increases the market price in the importing country r in the long run. This
gives rise to the following observation:
Observation 19 Unilateral liberalization causes a decreasing market price in the liberal-
izing (importing) country in the short run. In the long run, however, the market price in
the importing country increases and the market price in the exporting country decreases.
Hence, the welfare e¤ect of unilateral liberalization is negative in the importing country
and positive in the exporting country.
The short-run e¤ect of unilateral liberalization is as one would expect. The long-run
e¤ect is due to relocation e¤ects like in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) for example. Due
to unilateral liberalization in country s, expected prot rises in country r. Therefore,
there will be more entry in country r. At the same time, the decreasing market price
in country s reduces entry in that country. The e¤ect of this entry and exit is that the
market price in the exporting country s declines and the market price in the importing
country r rises.9
In empirical work there is considerable attention for the determinants of zero trade
ows (Baldwin and Harrigan (2007)). Below the impact of distance and importer coun-
try size on the probability of zero trade and on export prices is derived. We concentrate
on country r as the importer country. First consider the e¤ect of a change in distance.
We take as proxy a change in trade costs. Equations (4.69) and (4.70) show the ef-
fect of lower trade costs on market prices. Equalizing the change in trade costs, i.e.
^rs = ^sr = ^ , one nds:
p^r =
2

qs
qr
dcdsdcxr   dcxrdcxs
dcdsdcdr   dcxsdcxr ^ = "pr ;UC ^ (4.74)
p^s =
2

qr
qs
dcdrdcxs   dcxsdcxr
dcdsdcdr   dcxsdcxr ^ = "ps ;UC ^ (4.75)
Unless country sizes di¤er a lot leading to strong delocation e¤ects, market prices decline
with lower trade costs in the importing country r. Using the same reasoning as in the
9Mathematically, the reason for the declining market price in the exporting country s and the rising
market price in the importing country r is the following: the marginal e¤ect on expected prot of a
changing domestic price, as represented by cdr and cds, is larger than the e¤ect on expected prot of a
changing price in the export market, represented by cxr and cxs. Therefore, when the expected prot
from exports in country s rise due to unilateral liberalization in country r, the FE can be restored by
decreasing prices in the export market r and/or in the domestic market s. The prices in the two markets
should go in opposite directions, however, because the FE in foreign should also be satised. Because
the marginal e¤ect of domestic price changes is larger, the domestic price (in s) has to decrease and the
exporting price (in r) has to rise. With decreasing export prices (in r) and rising domestic prices (in
s), the FEs could never be satised.
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equal country case, one can prove that the elasticity of price wrt trade costs, "pr ;UC , has
to be between 0 and 1. Market shares of domestic producers in country r and exporters
from country s can be log di¤erentiated to get:
bidr = 1

cir
pr   cir p^r =
1

cir
pr   cir "pr ;UC ^ (4.76)bixs = 1

cis
pr   cis (p^r   b) =   1 cispr   cis (1  "pr ;UC) ^ (4.77)
When distance becomes smaller, the market price in country r, pr, declines (if there are
no strong delocation e¤ects). As a result the domestic market shares in the importing
country, idr decline. Hence, the ixs have to rise to get a total market share of 1 and
therefore 0 < "pr ;UC < 1. This implies that pr= will decline, as the denominator 
declines at a larger rate than the numerator pr. pr= is both the export price and the
cuto¤ cost value for exports from country s to country r. When the cuto¤ cost value of
exports declines, the probability of zero trade rises. It becomes more likely that no rm
is able to export protably. Therefore, we have the following result:
Observation 20 A lower distance between trading partners leads to a lower probability
of zero trade ows and a lower fob export price.
Second, the e¤ect of importing country size on the probability of zero trade ows
and export prices are addressed. The combined FE/ZCP equations, (4.68) and (4.67),
are log di¤erentiated wrt pr, ps and Lr, leading to10:
p^r =   dcdsdr   dcrxsx
(dcdrdcds   dcrxdcsx) qr L^r (4.78)
p^s =   dcsxdr   dcdrsx
(dcdrdcds   dcrxdcsx) qs L^r (4.79)
dcdr, dcxr, dcds and dcxs are respectively the marginal e¤ects on expected prot from
domestic and exporting price changes in country r and country s, as dened in equations
(4.71) and (4.72) for country s. As the e¤ect of domestic price changes on expected prot
are larger, because market shares in the domestic market are larger, the denominator
in both equations (4.78) and (4.79) is positive. When productivity di¤erences between
the two countries are not too large, expected prots from domestic sales of producers
in country r, dr are larger than expected prots from exporting sales of exporters from
country s, sx. This implies that the numerator is also positive. Hence, the market price
in country r decreases in its market size. The fob price of exporters from country s,
pr= , also decreases. Therefore, we have the following result:
Observation 21 A larger market size of the importing country leads to a higher prob-
ability of zero trade ows and lower fob export prices.
10Derivation available upon request. The derivation is similar to the log di¤erentiation wrt pr, ps and
 discussed in appendix D.
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Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) compare di¤erent models of international trade on their
predictions of the e¤ect of distance and importing country size on the probability of zero
trade ows and fob prices. From table 1 in their paper it is clear that the Cournot model
in this chapter generates the same predictions as the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model.
The predictions are di¤erent from the model proposed by Baldwin and Harrigan (2007),
which seems to align with the empirical ndings presented in their paper. However,
whereas the model of Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) contains product di¤erentiation
and quality di¤erences, the oligopoly model in this chapter describes a setting with
homogeneous products. Therefore, the predictions from this model should be tested with
data from homogeneous goods sectors and not with a dataset of all sectors as Baldwin
and Harrigan (2007) do. Intuitively, the di¤erent predictions can be clearly explained
from the di¤erent modeling setups. Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) adapt the Melitz rm
heterogeneity model to allow for quality di¤erences. More productive rms charge higher
instead of lower prices, because they sell higher quality products involving also higher
marginal costs. The probability of zero trade ows rises with distance in our model and
in Baldwin and Harrigan (2007). A larger distance makes it in both models more likely
that trade costs are too high and that no rm is productive enough to sell protably in
the export market. The probability of zero trade ows rises in importing country size in
our model and declines in importing country size in Baldwin and Harrigan (2007). The
intuition in our model is that a larger market leads to tougher competition, more entry
of rms and lower prices. Henceforth, it becomes harder to export to that market. The
model of Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) features xed export costs. In a larger market it
is easier to earn these xed costs back and therefore also the less productive rms with
lower quality and lower price can sell in the market protably.11
A larger distance leads to higher fob export prices in Baldwin and Harrigan (2007)
and lower export prices in our model. In both models a larger distance makes it harder
to export and therefore only more productive rms can export. In our model with
homogeneous goods more productive rms charge lower prices, whereas in Baldwin and
Harrigan (2007) they charge higher prices, because the quality of the good is larger.
Finally, the export price declines in both models in the importing country size. The
reason is di¤erent, however. In our model prices are lower in a larger market due to
intenser competition and for given trade costs this leads to lower export prices as well.
In Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) it is easier to earn back the xed export costs in a
larger market. Therefore, also lower quality, lower price exporters can sell protably and
the average export price will be lower. It could be an interesting exercise to see if the
predictions of Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) on the probability of trade zeros and export
zeros carry through in a sample of sectors with homogeneous goods or if our model of
oligopoly predicts better.
The remainder of this section shows that Ricardian comparative advantage can be
modeled as a nested case of the model in this chapter. Comparative advantage is intro-
11A larger market also implies a lower price index and therefore less sales for an individual rm,
making it more di¢ cult to sell protably in the export market. Apparently the direct e¤ect of market
size dominates. An e¤ect of market size on prot margins is absent in the model of Baldwin and
Harrigan (2007), because they work with CES and thus xed markups.
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duced in the model as follows. There are two types of sectors, country s has a comparative
advantage in the A sectors and country r has a comparative advantage in the B sectors.
Comparative advantage is modeled by the integration frontiers of the initial distribution
of productivities. As only the lower integration frontiers c
¯
appears in the relevant ZCP
and FE equations, attention can be restricted to these. The following assumptions are
made to dene comparative advantage:
c
¯sA
< c
¯rA
(4.80)
c
¯sB
> c
¯rB
(4.81)
c
¯sA
is the lower integration frontier in country s in the A sectors, i.e. in the sectors in
which country s has a comparative advantage.
To show that Ricardian comparative advantage is a nested case of the model, the
distribution of productivities within a country is squeezed, i.e. the heterogeneity of rms
is reduced. The productivity di¤erences between countries remain. When the within
country distribution of productivities collapses to a single point, the model converges
either to a Ricardian model with perfect competition or a Brander and Krugman (1983)
Cournot model with specialization, depending on whether the sunk entry costs disappear
or not.
Before the distribution of productivities is narrowed, the following relations between
the lower integration frontiers, market prices and trade costs apply:
c
¯sA
< c
¯rA
< prA= < prA (4.82)
c
¯sA
< c
¯rA
< psA= < psA (4.83)
The focus in the discussion is on sector A, because sector B is just its mirror image with
a comparative advantage for country r. Equation (4.82) ensures that at least some rms
in country s can export in their comparative advantage sector A and that at least some
rms in country r can produce for the domestic market. Equation (4.83) guarantees that
some rms in country r can also export in their comparative disadvantage market A and
that rms in country s can sell in their domestic market in their comparative advantage
sector A. Hence, there is two-way trade in sector A.
Next, suppose that the distribution of productivities becomes more homogeneous.
This can be seen as a narrowing of the distribution of productivities. The lower integra-
tion frontier moves up and the upper integration frontier moves down. However, only
the lower integration frontier appears in the combined ZCP/FE condition, so mathemat-
ically a more homogeneous productivity distribution comes down to an increase in the
lowest cost.
Uncertainty about productivity is a barrier to entry for rms. The sunk entry costs
are dependent on uncertainty about the prospective productivity. Firms have to incur
research costs to get rid of the uncertainty about their productivity. This interpretation
of the sunk entry costs implies that a squeezing of the productivity distribution decreases
the sunk entry costs. The combined ZCP/FEs in a S sector are given in equations
(4.67) and (4.68) (with symmetric trade costs). Log di¤erentiating these expressions
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towards market prices, the lower integration frontiers and the sunk entry costs shows
what happens when the distributions of productivities become more homogeneous:
qs
psZ
c
¯s
ds (( + 1) c  (   1) ps) fsdcp^s + qr
pr
Z
c
¯s
xs (( + 1) c  (   1) pr) fsdcp^r
  qsc¯s

ps   2c¯s +
c
¯
2
s
ps

f (c
¯s
) c^s + qrc¯s

pr   2c¯s +
 2c
¯
2
s
pr

f (c
¯s
) c^s = fef^e (4.84)
qr
prZ
c
¯r
dr (( + 1) c  (   1) pr) frdcp^r + qs
pr
Z
c
¯r
xr (( + 1) c  (   1) ps) frdcp^s
  qrc¯r

pr   2c¯r +
c
¯
2
r
pr

f (c
¯r
) c^r + qsc¯r

ps   2c¯r +
 2c
¯
2
r
ps

f (c
¯r
) c^r = fef^e (4.85)
The e¤ect of squeezing the distribution of productivities on market prices depends on
the size of the change in the sunk entry cost fe. When this change is small, the market
prices will have to rise to keep on satisfying the free entry condition.
Suppose that the distribution of productivities becomes concentrated in one point.
Then two questions remain. First, does the model converge to a Ricardian comparative
advantage model with perfect competition or a Brander and Krugman Cournot model?
Second, will there be full specialization across countries? To address the rst question,
where the model converges to depends on what happens with sunk entry costs. When
some sunk entry costs remain, because uncertainty about productivity is not the only
source of the sunk costs, the model remains Cournot. The market price becomes higher
than marginal costs to cover the sunk entry costs and the number of rms is limited.
When uncertainty is the only source of sunk costs and so when there are no sunk costs left
when the distribution of productivities collapses to a single point, the model converges
to a perfect competition Ricardian model. Marginal cost will be equal to the market
price and the number of rms becomes innite as is clear from equation (4.13).
Observation 22 When the distribution of productivities becomes concentrated in one
point the model either converges to a Brander & Krugman Cournot model or a Ricardian
perfect competition model depending on the presence of sunk (or xed) costs. Two-way
trade emerges either from cost heterogeneity or the presence of sunk (or xed) entry
costs.
It should be observed that there are no wage di¤erences in the present model like in
most Ricardian models. Modeling wage di¤erences constitutes a possible extension of the
present model. Whether there will be full specialization depends on the relation between
market prices and marginal cost levels that emerges. There will be full specialization
when:
c
¯rA
< psA= < c¯sA
(4.86)
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crA < prA < c¯sA
(4.87)
The model converges either to a Cournot model or a Ricardian perfect competition model
depending on the presence of sunk costs. There is no strict link between the appearance
of full specialization and the type of market competition that emerges. There can be full
specialization with Cournot competition when productivity di¤erences are large enough.
Also, the Ricardian model does not imply full specialization. A country could still
produce for its own market in the Ricardian model in its comparative disadvantage
sector when trade costs are large enough. But two way trade is only possible with
Cournot competition. Moreover, full specialization is more likely in the Ricardian model
without xed costs, because market prices become equal to marginal costs (inclusive of
trade costs) in that case.
Observation 23 When the distribution of productivities collapses to a single point, full
specialization is more likely with lower trade costs, a larger cost di¤erence between coun-
tries and the absence of sunk costs.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
Introducing heterogeneous productivity in a trade model of Cournot competition leads
to results familiar from other heterogeneous productivity models. Market prices decline,
the least productive rms get squeezed out of the market and exporting rms gain market
share when trade is liberalized. These results are found in models with and without free
entry. Welfare rises in both variants of the model with trade liberalization, unless the
trade barriers decline from a prohibitive level in the short run. The model with unequal
countries shows that the Brander and Krugman (1983) reciprocal dumping model and
the Ricardian comparative advantage model can be nested as special cases. Furthermore,
delocation e¤ects are present in the unequal country model: unilateral liberalization leads
in the long run to higher prices in the liberalizing country, because rms delocate to the
other country. Finally, it is shown that the probability of zero trade ows rises with
distance and with the size of the importer country and that fob export prices decrease
with distance and with the size of the importer country. Possible extensions of the
model are the introduction of wage di¤erences between the two countries and specifying
a distribution of costs enabling simulations with the model with more countries and more
sectors.
A Basic Model
The appendices show how to derive equations from the main text.
Equation 4.7: SOC
Di¤erentiating the FOC in equation 4.6 with respect to rm sales qi leads to:
@2i
@q2i
=  2p
q
+
( + 1) p
2q
i (A.1)
B FREE EXIT MODEL 89
Substituting the rst order condition, i = 
p ci
p
into (A.1), generates equation (4.7) in
the main text:
@2i
@q2i
=   1

p
q

2   + 1

i

=   1

p
q

2   + 1


p  ci
p

=   1

p
q
2p  ( + 1) p+ ( + 1) ci
p
=   1

p
q
( + 1) ci   (   1) p
p
Combined FEZCP leads to stable equilibrium
Average prot unconditional upon entry in equation (4.21) can be di¤erentiated with
respect to the market price:
@
@p
= LP  1u
pZ
0
  (   1)
p
+ 
2c
p+1
  ( + 1) c
2
p+2

f (c) dc
=
LP  1u
p
pZ
0

  (   1) + 2c
p
  ( + 1) c
2
p2

f (c) dc
=
LP  1u
p
pZ
0

1  c
p

( + 1) c  (   1) p
p

f (c) dc > 0 (A.2)
The integrand in (A.2) is positive by the SOC in equation (4.7), hence average prot
unconditional upon entry rises in the market price. This reects two opposite forces:
rstly, a decline in the market price leads to larger market sales in the entire industry and
thus a larger prot conditional upon entry. Secondly, a decline in market price decreases
the average prot margin (weighted by the market share  and by the probability ).
This is due to a decline in the prot margin p c and to the declining market share. The
second e¤ect dominates the rst e¤ect. Hence, the model generates a stable equilibrium
market price.
B Free Exit Model
Equation 4.26: Direct and indirect e¤ect of trade liberalization in short-run free exit
model
The market price is dened in equation (4.25)
ps =

 (nds + nxr)  1
 
ndsX
i=1
cids +
nxrX
i=1
cixr
!
(B.1)
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Totally di¤erentiating equation (B.1) with respect to p and  , one nds:
dps =
nxrX
i=1
cixrd +
ndsP
i=1
cids +
nxrP
i=1
cixr +
expP
j=1
cjxr  
domP
j=1
cjdr
ns   1 + exp dom
 
ndsP
i=1
cids +
nxrP
i=1
cixr
ns   1 (B.2)
exp is the number of exporting rms that are entering the market because of the
change in tari¤s and dom is the number of domestic producing rms that have to leave
the market. These rms that are entering the export market and leaving the domestic
market all have marginal costs (inclusive of trade costs for the exporters) equal to the
market price. Therefore, equation (B.2) can be written as:
dps =
nxtX
i=1
cixrd +
ndsP
i=1
cids +
nxrP
i=1
cixr + (exp dom) p
ns   1 + exp dom  
ndsP
i=1
cids +
nxrP
i=1
cixr
ns   1
=
nxrX
i=1
cixrd +

ndsP
i=1
cids +
nxrP
i=1
cixr + (exp dom) p

(ns 1)
(ns   1 + exp dom) (ns   1)
 

ndsP
i=1
cids +
nxrP
i=1
cixr

(ns   1 + exp dom)
(ns   1 + exp dom) (ns   1)
=
nxrX
i=1
cixrd +
(exp dom) p (ns 1) 

ndsP
i=1
cids +
nxrP
i=1
cixr

( exp dom)
(ns   1 + exp dom) (nK   1)
=
nxrX
i=1
cixrd
So, the e¤ect through a change in the number of rms is zero. The direct e¤ect remains
which is positive. Using relative changes, one arrives at equation (4.26) in the main text.
Equation 4.39: Welfare in free exit model
Welfare is dened in equation (4.38) of the main text as:
Us =
Is
PUs
=
L+s
PUs
(B.3)
Labor income is xed. All Cournot-sectors are equal. Therefore total prot  is equal
to:
s = Qs = Q

psqds + pMqxs  
X
cisqids  
X
cisqixs

(B.4)
s is prot income in one Cournot-sector. To proceed one needs to assume that the two
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countries are equal. This implies that (B.4) can be rewritten as:

Q
= p (qd + qx) 
ndX
i=1
ciqid  
nxX
i=1
ciqix

Q
= pq   q
ndX
i=1
ciid   q
nxX
i=1
ciix

Q
=
IP  1U
p 1
0BB@p 
ndP
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ciid +
nxP
i=1
ciix
p
1CCA (B.5)

Q
= (L+)
P  1U
p
(p  ~c) (B.6)
The term
ndP
i=1
ciid +
nxP
i=1
ciix in (B.5) represents the market share weighted average of
costs, ~c. Therefore,

p 
ndP
i=1
ciid  
nxP
i=1
ciix

is dened as the market share weighted
average prot per unit of sales, ~. Solving for L+ from (B.6) yields:
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  P
 1
U
p
(p  ~c) = LP
 1
U
p
(p  ~c)


1  QP
 1
U
p
(p  ~c)
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= QL
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(p  ~c)
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QL
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1  QP 1U
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L
1  QP 1U (p ~c)
p
(B.7)
Substituting equation (B.7) into equation (B.3), one nds the following expression for
welfare, equation (4.39) in the main text:
W =
L
1  QP 1U (p ~c)
p
1
PU
=
L
1  Q(p ~c)
(Qp1 +1)p
1
PU
=
L
1  Q(p ~c)
Qp+p
1
PU
W =
L (Qp+ p)
p +Q~c
1
PU
(B.8)
Equation 4.40: Relative Welfare Change in free exit model
Log-di¤erentiating equation (B.8) with respect to trade costs  , treating the market price
p, the price index PU and average costs ~c as endogenous generates equation (4.40) in the
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main text:
W^ =
Qp+ p
Qp+ p
p^  p
p^+Qd~c
p +Q~c
  P^U
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
Qp+ p
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Equation 4.43 and 4.46: Conditions for positive welfare e¤ect of trade liberalization
Starting from equation (B.9), one can elaborate on the term d~c. Using equations (4.9),
(4.36), (4.37), d~c can be rewritten as follows:
d~c =
ndX
i=1
ci
p  ci
p
ci
p  ci "p;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nxX
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ci
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ci
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ci
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p
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Using equation (4.27) one can substitute for the price elasticity in equation (B.10) to
get:
d~c =
ndX
i=1

c2i
p
nxP
i=1
ci
ndP
i=1
ci +
nxP
i=1
ci
^ +
nxX
i=1

 2c2i
p
nxP
i=1
ci
ndP
i=1
ci +
nxP
i=1
ci
^   2
nxX
i=1

 2c2i
p
^ +
nxX
i=1

pci
p
^d~c
+ 
ndX
i=1
c2i
p
nxP
i=1
ci
ndP
i=1
ci +
nxP
i=1
ci
^ + 
nxX
i=1
 2c2i
p
nxP
i=1
ci
ndP
i=1
ci +
nxP
i=1
ci
^
  
 
2
nxX
i=1
 2c2i
p
 
nxX
i=1
pci
p
! ndP
i=1
ci +
nxP
i=1
ci
ndP
i=1
ci +
nxP
i=1
ci
^
d~c =
1
p

ndP
i=1
ci +
nxP
i=1
ci



ndP
i=1
c2i
nxP
i=1
ci^ + 
nxP
i=1
 2c2i
nxP
i=1
ci^   

2
nxP
i=1
 2c2i   p
nxP
i=1
ci

ndP
i=1
ci +
nxP
i=1
ci

^

(B.11)
Next, p = 
n 1

ndP
i=1
ci +
nxP
i=1
ci

, c = 1n

ndP
i=1
ci +
nxP
i=1
ci

, also implying that, p =
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n
n 1c can be used to rewrite (B.11) as:
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The following expression on the variance of costs is used:
V ar (ci) =
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Substituting equation (B.14) into equation (B.12) leads to the following expression:
d~c =
2n
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Bringing the summation of
nxP
i=1
ci outside the brackets in equation (B.15) gives the nal
expression for d~c in equation (4.43) in the main text:
d~c =
n
p2 (n  1)
nxX
i=1
ci [nc (c + p  2ci) + (n  1)V ar (ci)] ^
Inequality (4.46) can be derived as follows. The d~c part of the welfare change in equation
(B.9) can be written as:
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^
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The third term between brackets in equation (B.16), the gain through lower trade costs,
should be positive as p  ci 8i. This generates the following condition:
nxX
i=1
 2c2i
ndX
i=1
ci  p
nxX
i=1
ci
 
ndX
i=1
ci +
nxX
i=1
ci
!
 
nxX
i=1
 2c2i
nxX
i=1
ci (B.17)
Substituting the condition in (B.17) into the rst two terms of d~c in equation (B.16) one
can proceed as follows:
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So, from the inequality in (B.18) d~c is positive whenever V ar(ci)
2c
 n
(n 1)(n 1) , condition
(4.46) in the main text.
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C Free Entry Model
Equation 4.52: E¤ect of sectoral trade liberalization on market price in free entry model
Assuming equal countries, the combined FE/ZCP condition, equation (4.50) is given
by:
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Totally di¤erentiating equation (C.1) towards p and  and considering the e¤ect through
the market share as negligibly small, one can calculate the e¤ect of sectoral liberalization
as:
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Equation (C.2) can be rewritten as:
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Using the denition of market shares and multiplying by p

generates equation (4.52) in
the main text.
Equation 4.53: E¤ect of economywide trade liberalization on market price in the free
entry model
The e¤ect of economywide liberalization, also takes into account the e¤ect through the
price index PU . Totally di¤erentiating the combined ZCP/FE in equation (C.1) towards
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p and  considering PU as endogenous leads to:24LP  1u pZ
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One can calculate @PU
@p
= PU
Qp 
Qp1 +1 . Furthermore, the unconditional prots from do-
mestic and exporting sales can be dened as d = F (p) ~d and x =
F( p )
F (p)
~x. Rewriting
the rst term as in the sectoral liberalization derivation, one arrives at the following
expression with A, B and C dened as in the main text:
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Equations 4.65 and 4.66: Derivatives of average revenues with respect to trade costs
Average domestic and exporting revenues are dened in the main text in equations (4.63)
and (4.64). Di¤erentiating these expressions towards trade costs leads to:
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D Unequal Countries Model
Equations 4.69 and 4.70: E¤ects of unilateral trade liberalization on market prices
The combined FE/ZCPs in country s and r are given by:
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Totally di¤erentiating equation (D.1) towards ps, pr and sr gives:
LsP
 1
Us
ps
psZ
0

1  c
ps

( + 1) c  (   1) ps
ps

f (c) dcdps
+
LrP
 1
Ur
pr
pr
srZ
0

1  src
pr

( + 1) src  (   1) pr
pr

f (c) dcdpr
  LrP
 1
Ur
pr
2
pr
srZ
0

c  2src
2
pr

f (c) dcdsr = 0 (D.3)
Rewriting equation (D.3) in terms of relative changes and adding the equivalent expres-
sion for the other country, one arrives at:
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Dening the marginal e¤ects dcds, dcdr, dcxs, dcxr, dcxs and dcxr as in the main text,
equations (D.4) and (D.5) can be solved for p^s, p^r as a function of ^sr and ^rs, leading
to equations (4.69) and (4.70) in the main text.
Chapter 5
Firm Heterogeneity and Endogenous
Quality
5.1 Introduction
Empirical work by Schott (2004) shows that unit values of export goods within detailed
product categories are related to exporting country characteristics. In particular, goods
originating from richer countries display higher unit values. This empirical result poses a
problem for the standard heterogeneous productivity monopolistic competition model, as
introduced by Melitz (2003). With income likely to be strongly related to productivity,
goods from higher productivity countries should have higher prices. In Melitz (2003)
productivity is dened as the inverse of marginal costs. With a xed markup, more
productive rms charge lower instead of higher prices. The present chapter modies the
heterogeneous productivity monopolistic competition model in such a way that it can
account for the empirical regularities found by Schott (2004) on income of the exporter
country and unit values. Firms have a di¤erent productivity to produce quality. More
productive rms produce higher quality goods charging higher prices.
The model is in the spirit of Melitzs heterogeneous productivity model. Utility is
CES with a CES quality parameter specic for each variety. So, the CES parameter
measures the quality of a good. Firms can enter a market by drawing a productivity
to produce quality parameter. This parameter can be seen as the natural appeal of a
variety. The quality of a good can be increased by more investments in product develop-
ment, product branding and marketing. The productivity to produce quality parameter
determines the e¤ectiveness of these investments. A larger quality also requires larger
marginal costs. The model abstracts from between country di¤erences: there are two
identical countries trading with each other. Between country di¤erences are introduced
in the next chapter.
The model produces outcomes that can account for the empirical ndings of Schott
(2004). More productive rms have a larger quality and charge higher prices. Fur-
thermore, only more productive rms and thus rms with a higher quality can export.
Exporting rms are on average bigger. Trade creates a reallocation e¤ect, more produc-
tive rms gain market share at the expense of less productive ones. As a result, average
100 CHAPTER 5 ENDOGENOUS QUALITY
quality of goods rises in the economy. Also trade liberalization reduces the average
productivity and quality of exports, because also the less productive rms can export.
A possible critique to the presented model is that the denition of productivity is
unnatural. There are two replies. First, empirically productivity is measured as value
added divided by the value of inputs. So, also in the standard monopolistic competition
model theoretical productivity is not well related to measured productivity. Second,
there is a natural interpretation of the productivity to produce quality applied in this
chapter. It is a measure for the inherent appeal of a product variety, so it can be seen
as the productivity of a variety.
Another point of critique could be that the model features regular xed costs besides
xed costs in product development, branding and marketing. These regular xed costs
are needed to ensure that only a part of the entering rms can produce protably.
The regular xed costs can be motivated referring to standard xed costs like those
of overhead. Also in exporting regular xed costs are required besides xed costs in
product development, branding and marketing to ensure that only some rms can export
protably. There is wide empirical support for the importance of sunk export costs (See
for example Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Das et al. (2007)). This chapter only
assumes that these sunk export costs can be split up in a part that does a¤ect the
quality of the good like product development costs and a part that does not like setting
up distribution channels and costs to comply with local regulations.
The model in this chapter is related to the strand of literature on vertical product
di¤erentiation and trade. In particular there are three papers that follow an approach
that is close to but di¤erent from the approach in this chapter. The rst features
in Hummels and Klenow (2005). In one of the models in their paper costs are also
dependent on quality in a CES-framework. They also introduce a productivity to produce
quality parameter and rms can choose the amount of resources invested in product
quality. But in their model all rms in a country have the same quality productivity.
So, it is a model of between country di¤erences. Furthermore, quality is only related
to marginal costs. Choosing the framework of Hummels and Klenow (2005) to model
within country di¤erences does not lead to sensible results. The price rises in their model
only in quality, because rms in a country with larger quality productivity demand more
labor leading to higher wages. So, the quality di¤erences between countries are caused
by di¤erences in wage levels. Hence, one cannot generate within country di¤erences in
prices and quality with their modeling framework.1
A second paper comes closest to the model in this chapter. Helble and Okubo (2006)
also model vertical product di¤erentiation in a Melitz type monopolistic competition
model. More productive rms produce goods with higher prices, which reects larger
quality, confronting Schotts critique on monopolistic competition models. They use
1The model of Hummels and Klenow (2005) with quality only related to marginal costs can generate
within country di¤erences in quality and prices, when the marginal cost function would be made very
complex. But then the model would not be solvable anymore and for example the price index can not be
written anymore as an integral over the productivities. Besides the computational problems involved in
making the quality productivity only dependent on marginal costs, the setup in the present model has
more intuitive appeal. The quality of a good can be increased by investing more in product development
and marketing which are costs that are xed and sunk in nature.
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a di¤erent way to achieve this result than in the present chapter. More productive
rms have a higher marginal cost and therefore charge larger prices. Firms with higher
marginal costs are nonetheless more productive, because they need less marketing costs.
The model by Helble and Okubo (2006) contains some predictions that are congruent
with empirics. Exports have a more than average quality; trade liberalization decreases
the average quality of exports and more trading partners leads to a higher product
quality.
There are several di¤erences between Helble and Okubo (2006) and the present
model. First, Helble & Okubo dont model a steady state of entry and exit. A distribu-
tion of rms is given and there is no entry or exit. Second, because the distribution of
rms is given, there is no reallocation e¤ect. In the present chapter there is a realloca-
tion e¤ect: trade liberalization squeezes the least productive rms out of the market and
raises average product quality. Third, more productiverms are smaller, because they
charge higher prices due to the larger marginal costs. This implies that exporting rms
are on average smaller, which is at odds with empirical ndings. In the present chapter,
more productive and exporting rms do have a larger size. Fourth, Helble & Okubo
assume that more productive rms need to incur less marketing costs. It seems more
intuitive that more productive rms spend more on marketing, because it generates a
larger payo¤ for them like in the present model.
A third similar model is proposed in Baldwin and Harrigan (2007). They adapt the
Melitz model introducing quality in the utility function through the CES-weights and
making marginal costs dependent on quality. In this way higher quality goods display
higher prices. The present model contains the same elements as Baldwin and Harrigan
with marginal costs rising in quality, but has a richer setup. First, quality is a choice
variable for rms in the present model, whereas rms just draw their level of quality and
corresponding marginal costs in Baldwin and Harrigan. Second, the quality of goods
also depends on xed costs of product development in the present model.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section points out the set-up of the
model in a closed economy. Section 5.3 extends the model with trade in an open economy.
Section 5.4 concludes.
5.2 Closed Economy Model
This section proposes a model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous produc-
tivity, where more productive rms produce goods of larger quality and with larger
prices. The model is based on CES-preferences with rm specic CES-weights, their
taste parameters. All rms have a productivity to produce quality. Firms can produce
a higher level of quality reected in their taste parameter when their productivity to
produce quality is bigger. A larger taste parameter requires more investment in product
development, branding and marketing. The price of a good is dependent on its quality,
because the marginal cost of production varies with quality. The benecial e¤ect of
international trade works in the same way as in Melitz. Due to iceberg trade costs and
xed trade costs, only more productive rms can export. International trade raises the
expected prot of entry, induces more entry leading to higher real wages that squeeze
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the least productive rms out of the market.
A representative consumer has CES utility with taste parameter v for variety v:
U =
 R
v2V
vx
 1

v dv
 
 1
(5.1)
There are L consumers in the economy. Normalizing the wage at 1, the market demand
facing a rm is given by:
xv = 

vp
 
v P
 1L (5.2)
The price index P is dened as:
P =
 R
v2V
vp
1 
v dv
 1
1 
(5.3)
The cost function of a rm is given by:
C (xv) = av (v)xv + f + fpbm;v (5.4)
Labor is the only production factor. Firms have a marginal cost av that is dependent on
the quality of the good v produced. In the remainder it is assumed that this relation is
linear. The parameter restrictions to get a solution when a non-linear relation is chosen
will be discussed below.
av = v (5.5)
There are two types of xed cost, a regular xed cost f that consists of for example
overhead costs and xed costs of product development, branding and marketing fpbm.
The last type of xed costs a¤ects the quality of the good. There are several papers in
industrial organization that make a similar assumption with xed costs rising in quality,
i.e. Mussa and Rosen (1978), Shaked and Sutton (1983), Gal-Or (1983) and Motta
(1993)).
The taste parameter of a variety depends on the amount of product development,
branding and marketing xed costs spent fpbm and a quality productivityparameter
v. The relation is dened by the following expression:
v = v (fpbm;v)
 , 0 <  < 1 (5.6)
So, a rm can raise the attractiveness of its good by increasing the amount of product
development and marketing expenditures. The e¤ectiveness of these expenditures is
larger for rms that have drawn a larger productivity to produce quality parameter, v.
 < 1 is a necessary assumption for equilibrium. This assumption is realistic as long as
the equilibrium is in the range of product development, branding and marketing costs,
where there are decreasing returns.
A rm can enter the market by incurring sunk entry costs fe. After payment of the
sunk entry costs a rm can draw the quality productivity parameter v. So, the sunk
entry costs should be seen as a kind of market exploration costs, necessary for a rm to
5.2 CLOSED ECONOMY MODEL 103
get to know how popular its variety can become. After a rm knows v it either starts to
produce or leaves the market immediately. When it starts to produce a rm has to incur
product development costs and costs of marketing. There is a xed death probability 
of a certain variety.
The product development, branding and marketing costs fpbm are partly sunk and
partly xed in nature. Because the amount of sunk investments in product development
has to be decided on after the uncertainty of the quality productivity is released, the
sunk part of fpbm can be expressed as per period amortized costs using the probability
of death parameter . So, fpbm can be seen as a combination of costs that are more sunk
like product development costs and marketing costs that are more xed in nature.
In this model a rm has two choice variables, the price pv and the amount of product
development, branding and marketing xed costs fpbm;v . The pricing equation is the
familiar CES-markup equation:
pv =

   1v (5.7)
So, the price is rising in the endogenously determined quality level v. Substituting
equations (5.6) and (5.7), the prot of the rm is given by:
v = pvxv   avxv   f   fpbm;v (5.8)
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The rst order condition of equation (5.9) with respect to fpbm;v is given by:
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The optimal fpbm;v is:
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Substituting equation (5.11) back into (5.6) and (5.9), one gets:
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The price is given by:
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Equation (5.14) gives rise to the following observation:
Observation 24 The market price pv of an individual rm is rising in quality v and
in the productivity to produce quality v
Equation (5.7) shows that the market price is rising in quality and from equation
(5.14) it is clear that the market price is rising in the productivity to produce quality. The
empirical critique on the heterogeneous productivity monopolistic competition model
discussed in the introduction was that more productive rms charge lower prices, whereas
in reality more productive rms charge higher prices. Observation 24 shows that one
can modify the monopolistic competition model to confront this critique. In the present
model productivity is reformulated in terms of the ability to produce quality. In this
way more productive rms charge higher prices, because they choose a higher level of
quality.
Equilibrium in the economy can be found by combining a free entry condition and a
zero cuto¤ prot condition. The free entry (FE) condition is given by:
e = fe
1 G () (5.15)
e is average prot and  is the cuto¤ quality productivity. The zero cuto¤ prot
condition (ZCP) is given by:
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Equation (5.16) implies for :
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Writing average prot as an integral over quality productivities one can express the ZCP
as a function of average prot and the cuto¤quality productivity. Average prot is given
by:
e = h 1     11 i   1

 1
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 1
1 
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L

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
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1  () d   f (5.18)
 () = 1
1 G()g () is the distribution of productivities to produce quality of the rms
that are in the market. Combining equations (5.17) and (5.18), the ZCP can now be
rewritten as: e = f " 1

 1
1  1
1 G ()
1R


1
1  g () d   1
#
(5.19)
Or more concisely:
e = f
24 e

! 1
1 
  1
35 (5.20)
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With e the average productivity to produce quality of the rms in the market, dened
as: e = " 1
1 G ()
1R


1
1  g () d
#1 
(5.21)
Equations (5.15) and (5.20) together determine the cuto¤ quality productivity and av-
erage prot. It can be shown that (5.15) and (5.20) together yield a unique equilibrium
in the same way as in appendix B of Melitz (2003). The proof is in appendix 5A. From
the cuto¤ quality productivity and the average prot one can determine the average
quality productivity, the average quality, the number of rms and all other endogenous
variables. The number of rms can be derived from the condition for steady state of
entry and exit. This leads to the following expression (derivations in appendix B):
N =
L
 (e + f) (5.22)
The only variable left to determine is the price index P . Writing the price index as an
integral over the quality productivity gives the following solution for the price index as
a function of the cuto¤ productivity, the number of rms and parameters of the model:
P =

   1

1
N
 1 
 1  
L
 
 1 e1  (5.23)
The price index declines in the productivity to produce quality. At rst sight this seems
at odds with observation 24. But the price index is not only dependent on prices of
individual rms, but also on their quality levels. Higher productivity leads to higher
quality leading to a lower price index. This e¤ect through quality dominates the e¤ect
through prices.
The model solves as follows: the FE and ZCP in equations (145.15) and (5.20)
together determine the cuto¤ quality productivity and average prot. (5.22) can be used
to determine the number of rms and (5.23) to calculate the price index. In equation
(55.5) it was assumed that the relation between marginal costs and the taste parameter
is linear. This can be generalized to a non-linear relation:
v = (v)
 (5.24)
Appendix 5C shows that one nds a positive solution for fpbm;v that satises the second
order condition of the rm if the following condition is satised:
0 <  (1  ) +  < 1

(5.25)
Appendix A shows that  should be smaller than 1 to nd an equilibrium for the cuto¤
quality productivity. So, when  is 1 as in the standard model, the SOC is satised. A
larger  makes satisfaction of the SOC easier but can lead to a negative optimum. So,
 cannot be too large. For  = 2 ,  should be smaller than 2 for example to generate
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a positive optimum. The condition on  is a restriction on the model. To generate
large price di¤erences between rms, the taste parameters also have to display large
di¤erences.
5.3 Open Economy Model
International trade is introduced in a standard way. There are two countries of equal
size and with an equal quality productivity distribution, so as to guarantee equal wage
levels. There are per unit iceberg trade costs  and a rm has to incur separate product
development, branding and marketing costs for the exporting market, fpbm;x;v. There are
also xed costs of exporting fx which can be seen as well as sunk entry exporting costs as
there is no exporting uncertainty. It is assumed that the productivity to produce quality
is equal to the quality productivity at home.2 The prot from exporting (substituting
the CES pricing equation) is equal to:
v;x =
 1 v (fpbm;x;v)
   
 1
1 
P  1L

  fx   fpbm;x;v (5.26)
The equal countries assumption allows focusing on one country only. Country subscripts
will be omitted therefore. The subscripts d, x indicate whether a good is for the domes-
tic or exporting market. The rst order condition generates the following solution for
fpbm;x;v:
fpbm;x;v =

1

 1
1 

   1

 1
1 
P
 1
1 

L

 1
1 
(v)
1
1  (5.27)
Substituting this back into the prot equation leads to:
x;v =

1

 1
1  h


1     11 
i   1

 1
1 
P
 1
1 

L

 1
1 
(v)
1
1    fx (5.28)
This implies for the exporting ZCP:
x = (fx)
1   1
h


1     11 
i 1   1

1 
P 1 

L
(5.29)
Firms have to be more productive to export than for domestic production when:
x > 
 , fx 1 > f (5.30)
The partition of rms between domestic producing and exporting rms works in the
same way as in Melitz (2003). Equation (5.30) has the following implications:
2It can also be assumed that the quality productivity abroad is lower than in the home market. The
motivation would be that it is more di¢ cult to make a product appealing in a foreign market than in
the domestic market. The literature on cultural proximity lends support for this approach. Making such
an assumption creates problems for the proof of a unique equilibrium in the model where no specic
distribution of productivities is assumed.
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Observation 25 Only more productive rms can export and rms producing a larger
quality can export. Hence, the average quality of exported goods is larger than the average
quality of all goods in the economy.
The partition of rms in equation (5.30) implies that only more productive rms can
export. So, on average exporting rms are more productive. From observation 24 it
is known that more productive rms have a larger quality. The size of a rm, i.e. its
revenues, is equal to:
rv = pvxv = v


   1
1 
P  1L (5.31)
The following observation follows from equation (5.31) and observation 25:
Observation 26 Firms with higher quality are bigger. Hence, exporting rms are on
average bigger than domestic producing rms.
An exporting ZCP similar to the domestic ZCP in equation (5.20) can be derived from
equation (5.29). Adding the domestic and exporting ZCP leads to a relation between
average prot and the two cuto¤ quality productivities:
e = f
24 e

! 1
1 
  1
35+ fx
24 ex
x
! 1
1 
  1
35 (5.32)
With: ex = " 1
1 G (x)
1R
x

1
1  g () d
#1 
(5.33)
The free entry condition remains as in (5.15). The open economy model can be solved by
combining the FE in (5.15), the ZCP in (5.32) and the relation between the two cuto¤
quality productivities:
x =

fx
f
 1
1 
 1 (5.34)
Equations (5.15), (5.32) and (5.34) yield solutions for average prot e and the do-
mestic and exporting cuto¤ productivities,  and x. Appendix A shows that one can
nd a unique equilibrium for the cuto¤productivities from these equations. The number
of rms can be derived as in the closed economy (see appendix B):
N =
L
 (e + f + pxfx) (5.35)
px is the probability of exporting. px =
1 G(x)
1 G() . The expression for the price index
becomes:
P =

   1

1
N
 1 
 1  
L
 
 1
e 11  +  1 1  1 G (x)
1 G ()
e 11 x  1 1  (5.36)
The following observations on the e¤ect of trade liberalization hold in this model:
Observation 27 Trade liberalization increases the average productivity to produce qual-
ity and the average quality in the economy.
Observation 28 Trade liberalization decreases the average productivity to produce qual-
ity of exporting rms and decreases their average quality.
Appendix D proves that the domestic cuto¤ productivity  rises and the exporting
cuto¤ productivity x declines with trade liberalization. Average productivity e and
average exporting productivity ex, dened in equations (5.21) and equation (5.33) re-
spectively, are rising in their respective cuto¤ productivities. This proofs that average
productivity rises and average exporting productivity declines with trade liberalization.
It can be shown that average quality and average exporting quality rise in average pro-
ductivity and average productivity of exporting rms respectively, which proofs the last
parts of observations 27 and 28.
The reallocation e¤ects are familiar from Melitz (2003). The least productive rms
are squeezed out of the market with trade liberalization increasing average productivity in
the economy. Trade liberalization enables more rms to export, so also rms with a lower
productivity and quality can start to export. Observations 27 and 28 are empirically
testable. The predictions are that the economy wide average quality rises with trade
liberalization, but the average quality of exporting declines with trade liberalization.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
The model proposed in this chapter provides a theoretical reply to recent empirical
ndings on exporting unit values, in particular in Schott (2004). The heterogeneous
productivity Melitz model is modied in such a way that more productive rms produce
higher quality goods and charge larger prices instead of lower prices. This is in line
with empirical work showing that high income countries export goods with higher unit
values. The CES-model with quality weights is used, a productivity to produce quality is
introduced and a link between marketing expenditures and quality is created to produce
this result. A larger quality of the good in turn implies a larger marginal cost and thus
a larger price. This brings the heterogeneous productivity model more in line with the
empirical nding that goods from high income countries display higher unit values. The
model also generates some outcomes that are empirically testable. Exporting rms are
more productive, produce a higher quality and are bigger. Trade liberalization increases
the average quality in the economy, but it decreases the average quality of exports,
because more rms can export.
A Uniqueness of the Closed and Open Economy
Equilibrium
To prove that the FE and ZCP, equations (5.15) and (5.20) yield a unique equilibrium
for the cuto¤ quality productivity, one can proceed analogous to Melitz (2003) in his
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appendix B. Equations (5.15) and (5.20) can be combined to get the following equation:
(1 G ())
24 e ()

! 1
1 
  1
35 = fe
f
(A.1)
It will be shown that the LHS of (A.1) is monotonically decreasing from 1 to 0 on
(0;1), which is su¢ cient to show that there is a unique equilibrium. Dene k () as:
k () =
 e ()

! 1
1 
  1 (A.2)
Di¤erentiating k () in equation (A.2) with respect to  gives:
k0 () =
g ()
1 G ()
24 e ()

! 1
1 
  1
35  1
1  
 e ()

! 1
1 
1

(A.3)
j () is dened as:
j () = (1 G ()) k () (A.4)
j () is equal to the LHS of equation (A.1). j0 () can be computed as:
j0 () =   1
1  
 e ()

! 1
1 
1

< 0 (A.5)
It is easy to see that lim
!0
j () =1 and lim
!1
j () = 0. Hence, j () and thus the LHS of
(A.1) is monotonically decreasing from 1 to 0 on (0;1).
The equilibrium of the open economy model is constituted by equations (5.15), (5.32)
and (5.34). Combining these three equations leads to the following equilibrium equation:
fj () + fxj (x (
)) = fe (A.6)
Equation (A.5) showed that j () is monotonically decreasing from 1 to 0 on (0;1).
Given that x is monotonically increasing in 
, the LHS of (A.6) is also decreasing from
1 to 0 on (0;1) and hence there is a unique equilibrium.
B Number of Firms
First, the number of rms in the closed economy is derived and then in the open economy.
In the closed economy the steady state of entry and exit dictates that the number of
entering rms should be equal to the number of exiting rms:
(1 G ())Ne = N (B.1)
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Ne is the number of all successful and unsuccessful entrants. Labor market equilibrium
in the production sector and innovation sector are given by:
Lp = R   = Ner  Ne (B.2)
Le = Nefe =
N
(1 G ())fe = Ne (B.3)
Lp and Le are the amount of labor used in the production and innovation sector, respec-
tively. Adding the two labor market equilibria in (B.2) and (B.3) leads to:
L = Lp + Le = Ner (B.4)
Equation (B.4) can be rewritten to nd the number of rms as a function of average
prot:
N =
L
 (e + f) (B.5)
In the open economy the derivation is similar. Labor can be allocated in four di¤erent
ways, in domestic production Lp, in domestic innovation Le , in exporting production
Lp;x, or in exporting innovation Le;x:
L = Lp + Le + Lp;x + Le;x (B.6)
The expression for domestic innovation Le is equal to the closed economy one, given in
equation (B.3). The others become:
Lp = Nerd  Ned (B.7)
Lp;x = Nxerx  Nxex  Nxfx (B.8)
Le;x = fexNe;x = fe;xNx = fxNx (B.9)
Nx is the number of rms producing for the exporting market and Ne;x is the number of
rms entering the export market. So, adding the labor market allocations gives:
L = N (erd + pxerx) (B.10)
The expression for the number of rms becomes:
N =
L
 (e + f + pxfx) (B.11)
C More General Marginal Cost Function
When the marginal cost function is given by (5.24) the prot of the rm becomes:
v = (v (fpbm;v)
)
(1 )+


   1
1 
P  1
L

  fpbm;v   f (C.1)
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The rst order condition with respect to fpbm;v is:
 ( (1  ) + ) (v)(1 )+ (fpbm;v)((1 )+) 1


   1
1 
P  1
L

  1 = 0 (C.2)
So, the solution for fpbm;v is:
fpbm;v =
"
 ( (1  ) + )P  1L


   1

 1
(1 )+v
# 1
1 ((1 )+)
(C.3)
So, a positive solution for fpbm;v is found if:
 (1  ) +  > 0 (C.4)
The second order condition is satised when:
 (1  ) +  < 1

(C.5)
Conditions (C.4) and (C.5) together imply condition (5.25) in the main text.
D The E¤ects of Trade Liberalization on Cuto¤Pro-
ductivities
This appendix shows that the domestic cuto¤ productivity to produce quality  rises
with trade liberalization and that the exporting cuto¤productivity x declines with trade
liberalization. Equation (A.6) is the equilibrium equation of the open economy model.
Totally di¤erentiating this equation towards the cuto¤ productivity  and trade costs 
taking into account equation (5.34) for the relation between the domestic and exporting
cuto¤ productivities  and x, generates:
d
d
=  
fxj
0 (x) (   1)

fx
f
1 
 2
fj0 () + fxj0 (x)

fx
f
1 
 1
< 0 (D.1)
The RHS of (D.1) is negative as j0 () is negative for all values of . Hence from (D.1) it
follows that lower iceberg trade costs  lead to a higher cuto¤ productivity. Observation
28 can be proved by di¤erentiating equation (5.34) towards trade costs  :
@x
@
=

fx
f
 1
1 
 1

(   1) 


+
d
d

(D.2)
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Substituting equation (D.1) into equation D.2 leads to:
@x
@
=

fx
f
 1
1 
 2 (   1) 
2641  fxj0 (x)

fx
f
1 
 1
fj0 () + fxj0 (x)

fx
f
1 
 1
375 (D.3)
The second term between brackets of the LHS of (D.3) is smaller than 1. Therefore,
the exporting cuto¤ productivity x rises in trade costs  , implying that also average
exporting productivity rises in  .
Chapter 6
Within Sector Specialization in a
Monopolistic Competition Model of
Trade
6.1 Introduction
Empirical work by Schott (2004) shows that unit values of export goods within detailed
product categories are related to factor abundance of the exporting country. Hence,
there is strong evidence for within-sector specialization: more skill-abundant and capital-
abundant countries export goods with higher unit values. This chapter proposes a model
that can account for the nding of Schott (2004). Production is non-homothetic in
quality and higher quality goods require more skilled labor implying that skill abundant
countries produce higher quality goods.
The model assumes homogeneous rms. There is one sector, two countries and two
production factors, skilled and unskilled labor. Production is non-homothetic: a larger
quality good requires relatively more labor. The model implies that more skill abundant
countries produce higher quality goods. This result accounts for Schotts (2004) empirical
ndings that within product categories skill abundant countries export higher quality
goods. The model is a Hekscher-Ohlin factor abundance model, but factor abundance
does not determine in which sectors a country has a comparative advantage but in which
quality segment a country has a comparative advantage.
Two papers are related to the model in this chapter. Hummels and Klenow (2005)
also model between country di¤erences in the productivity to produce quality. They
just assume that countries have di¤erent productivities. The present chapter relates
the capability to produce quality to relative factor abundance and skill abundance in
particular. Therefore, Hummels and Klenows model is in a Ricardian spirit, whereas
the present model is of the Hekscher-Ohlin-type. Hummels and Klenows model can be
linked to the empirical nding that goods from higher income countries and so from
more productive countries display higher unit values, whereas the model in this chapter
accounts for the empirical nding that goods from more skill abundant countries display
higher unit values.
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Verhoogen (2008) introduces a model with heterogeneous rms and quality di¤er-
entiation where more productive rms pay higher wages to attract the most qualied
workers. The Verhoogen (2008) model contains the same building blocks as the present
model, but the setup is basically di¤erent. The demand system is di¤erent and moreover
the model is partial equilibrium with given higher average wages for skilled workers.
The two models of this chapter and chapter 5 could be combined in an integrated
model. Such a model could generate interesting results, in particular on the e¤ect of
trade liberalization on wage inequality. Solving the combined model requires numerics,
which is left for future work. The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section
outlines the model in a closed economy. Section 3 goes into the open economy model
introducing trade. Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
6.2 Closed Economy Model
Productivity di¤erences between countries can be modeled in Ricardian fashion and a
factor abundance fashion. In the former approach there are productivity di¤erences
between countries by assumption. In the latter approach productivity di¤erences are re-
lated to factor abundance di¤erences. A Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model
with Ricardian di¤erences in productivity is proposed by Hummels and Klenow (2005).
Schott (2004) shows that quality di¤erences between countries are related to factor
abundance. Therefore, here a monopolistic competition model with productivity di¤er-
ences between countries based on factor abundance will be considered. The novelty is
that production is non-homothetic in factors of production. Higher quality goods require
relatively more high skilled labor. The model assumes equal rms and hence no rm
heterogeneity to keep it analytically tractable.
Utility, the demand facing a rm and the price index are the same as in the previous
chapter. A representative consumer has CES utility with taste parameter v for variety
v:
U =
 R
v2V
vx
 1

v dv
 
 1
(6.1)
The market demand facing a rm is given by:
xv = 

vp
 
v P
 1L (6.2)
I = wsLs + wuLu is total income in the economy and the sum of skilled and unskilled
labors income. The price index P is dened as:
P =
 R
v2V
vp
1 
v dv
 1
1 
Production is increasing returns with a xed cost of production. There are two factors
of production, high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor. The cost function is a nonhomo-
thetic CES function described for example in Shimomura (1999). The cost function is
non-homothetic in quality. It is given by:
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C (;ws; wu) = (x+ f)
 
 ()w1 s + (1   ())w1 u
 1
1  (6.3)
ws and wu are the wage levels of skilled and unskilled labor, respectively.  is the
substitution elasticity between skilled and unskilled labor and  () is the CES-weight
in the unit cost function dependent on quality, constituting the non-homotheticity. So,
in this specication costs depend on quality through the marginal costs and through
the non-homotheticity in skilled and unskilled labor. The e¤ect through xed product
development, branding and marketing costs present in the within country heterogeneity
model of the previous chapter is omitted. The price of a good is given by the familiar
markup equation:
p =

   1
 
 ()w1 s + (1   ())w1 u
 1
1  (6.4)
Substituting the CES-pricing equation (6.4), prot of a rm becomes:
 = 


   1
 
 ()w1 s + (1   ())w1 u
 1
1 
1 
P  1
I

  f   ()w1 s + (1   ())w1 u  11  (6.5)
Taking the FOC of prot  in equation (6.5) with respect to  gives:
px

"
1

     1
   1
0 ()
 
w1 u   w1 s

 ()w1 s + (1   ())w1 u
#
  f
   1
 
 ()w1 s + (1   ())w1 u
 1
1  
0 ()
 
w1 u   w1 s

 ()w1 s + (1   ())w1 u
= 0 (6.6)
Assuming free entry and exit of rms a zero prot condition can be added to the model:
px

= f
 
 ()w1 s + (1   ())w1 u
 1
1  (6.7)
Substituting the zero prot equation (6.7) into the FOC for , equation (6.6), one nds:
px

"
1

  
   1
0 ()
 
w1 u   w1 s

 ()w1 s + (1   ())w1 u
#
= 0 (6.8)
The rst term between brackets in equation (6.8) measures the marginal benet of larger
quality for the rm, due to larger sales. The second term measures the loss due to a
larger required use of skilled labor when quality is larger. To solve for , an explicit
function for  () should be chosen that is rising in  and bounded between 0 and 1.
The following function is chosen:
 () = ;  > 1 (6.9)
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The condition on  is needed to satisfy the second order condition. This  () yields the
following solution for :
 =
264  1 1+
1 

wu
ws
 1
375
1

(6.10)
Equation (6.10) implies that quality is rising in the relative wage of unskilled over skilled
workers, ws
wu
.1 Log di¤erentiating equation (6.10) shows this:
cws
wu
=   1
   1
 
ws
wu
 1
  1
!b (6.11)
Unit wage costs of production are equal to:
UC (;ws; wu) =
 
 ()w1 s + (1   ())w1 u
 1
1  (6.12)
Normalizing the unskilled wage wu at 1, this expression can be log di¤erentiated as
follows: dUC = 1
   1


1  w1 s
 b
w1 s + 1  
+
w1 s
w1 s + 1  
cws (6.13)
Substituting the log di¤erentiation in (6.11) the relative change of unit wage costs in
(6.13) becomes 0. A larger skilled wage ws leads to lower quality. The net e¤ect is that
unit costs do not change in response to a change in the relative wage because of the
endogenous reaction in quality. This result is due to the specication chosen for  ().
The following observation can be made:
Observation 29 Unit wage costs do not change when relative wages change. An in-
crease in the relative wage of skilled labor decreases the quality of goods implying that
unit wage costs do not rise.
To solve for the endogenous variables in the model, two labor market equilibrium
equations can be added. Applying Shepards lemma to the cost function in equation
(6.3), one nds:
Ls = N (x+ f)
 
 ()w1 s + (1   ())w1 u
 
1   ()w s (6.14)
Lu = N (x+ f)
 
 ()w1 s + (1   ())w1 u
 
1  (1   ())w u (6.15)
Dividing the labor market equations (6.14) and (6.15) leads to:
Ls
Lu
=
 ()
1   ()

wu
ws

(6.16)
1 is smaller than 1 as long as wuws <


 1+
 1
 1
. So, it is assumed that  is not too large relative to
 and  . Unfortunately it is not possible to give a general condition for  < 1 depending on parameters
and exogenous variables only.
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Combining equations (6.10) and (6.16) generates an implicit relation between  and the
relative skill abundance Ls
Lu
:
Ls
Lu
=
 ()
1   ()

((   1) + )  ()  (   1)
((   1) + )  ()
 
 1
(6.17)
Log di¤erentiating equation (6.17) with respect to Ls
Lu
and  shows that the RHS of (6.17)
rises monotonically in :
cLs
Lu
=
1
1  b + ((   1) + )  ()  (   1)b (6.18)
Using (6.18) implies that the RHS of (6.17) rises monotonically. Also, it can be easily
shown that the RHS of (6.17) rises from    1
 1+ to 1 for  2 [0; 1]. So, there is a
unique positive equilibrium for  and for . Equation (6.18) also implies that quality
rises in relative factor abundance of high skilled labor. So,  and  rise when an economy
becomes more skill abundant. Therefore, equation (6.18) has the following implication:
Observation 30 The quality of goods produced rises in the skill abundance of the econ-
omy.
Equation (6.18) can be rewritten as:
b = (1  )    (1  )2 (   1)
1   + 
cLs
Lu
(6.19)
Equation (6.19) shows that the e¤ect of skill abundance on quality declines when the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor  is larger. From equation
(6.18) it can be easily seen that the e¤ect of skill abundance on quality rises with the
elasticity of substitution between consumed varieties  rises and with the parameter 
indicating the e¤ect of quality on skill intensity of production (cf. equation (6.9)).
Log di¤erentiating the market price equation (6.4) with respect to p and skill intensity
Ls
Lu
, substituting equation 6.19 and using remark 29 that the unit cost does not change,
one nds: bp = b = 1

(1  )    (1  )2 (   1)
1   + 
cLs
Lu
(6.20)
The implication of equation (6.20) is that:
Observation 31 The market price rises in the skill abundance of the economy.
The model presented in this subsection contains a link between skill abundance,
quality and market price. The relations are congruent with the ndings by Schott (2004).
More high skilled labor leads to higher quality and larger prices. The next subsection
introduces trade in the model.
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6.3 Open Economy Model
There are two countries, k; l = H;F . There are per unit iceberg trade costs  . There
are also xed costs of exporting fx. Venables (1994), Jean (2002) and Melitz (2003)
include xed export costs in their models as well, but their motivation is not grounded
on rm empirical evidence. When there is no uncertainty, the xed export costs can also
be seen as per period equivalents of sunk export costs for which there is ample empirical
evidence. The cost function of a rm in country k is given by:
Ck = (kdxkd + f)UC (kd; wsk; wuk) + (kxxkx + fx)UC (kx; wsk; wuk)
Country subscripts k; l = H;F indicate the country of origin and the subscripts d,
x indicate whether a good is for the domestic or exporting market. Substituting the
markup pricing equations, the prot of a rm in country k can be written as:
k = kd


   1UC (kd; wsk; wuk)
1 
P  1k
Ik

  fUC (kd; wsk; wuk)
+ kx


   1UC (kx; wsk; wuk)
1 
P  1l
Il

  fxUC (kx; wsk; wuk) (6.21)
Taking the rst order condition of prot in equation (6.21) with respect to quality in the
domestic and exporting market one nds:
pkdxkd

"
1
kd
     1
   1
0 (kd)
 
w1 uk   w1 sk

UC (kd; wsk; wuk)
1 
#
  f
   1
0 (kd)
 
w1 uk   w1 sk

UC (kd; wsk; wuk)
  = 0 (6.22)
pkxxkx

"
1
kx
     1
   1
0 (kx)
 
w1 uk   w1 sk

UC (kx; wsk; wuk)
1 
#
  fx
   1
0 (kx)
 
w1 uk   w1 sk

UC (kx; wsk; wuk)
  = 0
(6.23)
Zero prot equations can be added to the model. There are two zero prot equations, for
domestic and exporting production. This can be motivated as follows. Suppose prots
were negative in of the two markets. Then rms would leave that market. If prots were
positive in one of the markets, rms would enter that market. The domestic and ex-
porting market can be seen as separate markets, because there are xed exporting costs
besides regular xed costs. One can also interpret both xed costs as beachhead costs
to enter the respective markets. Entering the domestic market and paying the domestic
beachhead cost does not imply that one can also export as in the standard Krugman
(1980) model without xed export costs. Considering the domestic and exporting mar-
kets as separate markets leading to two zero prot conditions implies that the number
of rms in the two markets can be di¤erent. The zero prot conditions are given by:
pkdxkd

= fUC (kd; wsk; wuk) (6.24)
pkxxkx

= fxUC (kx; wsk; wuk) (6.25)
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Combining the zero prot conditions with the rst order conditions leads to:
pkdxkd

"
1
kd
  
   1
0 (kd)
 
w1 uk   w1 sk

UC (kx; wsk; wuk)
1 
#
= 0 (6.26)
pkxxkx

"
1
kx
  
   1
0 (kx)
 
w1 uk   w1 sk

UC (kx; wsk; wuk)
1 
#
= 0 (6.27)
Using the explicit expression for  () in equation (6.9), the solutions for the domestic
and exporting quality level become:
kd =
264  1 1+
1 

wuk
wsk
 1
375
1

(6.28)
kx =
264  1 1+
1 

wuk
wsk
 1
375
1

(6.29)
Comparing equation (6.28) and (6.29) shows that quality for the domestic market and
the exporting market are equal, which is convenient later on. This equality is due to the
absence of rm heterogeneity that was imposed to keep the model analytically tractable.2
As market size e¤ects are not the focus of the present chapter, it is assumed that
the two countries are of equal size, i.e. Lsk + Luk = Lsl + Lul . This implies that mar-
ket size e¤ects are small.3 Abstracting from market size e¤ects one can concentrate on
di¤erences in relative factor endowments instead of absolute factor endowments. The
analysis continues by focusing on the e¤ect of relative factor abundance di¤erences be-
tween countries. The labor market equilibrium equations can be added to solve for the
endogenous variables in the model:
Lsk = Nkd (kdxkd + f)UC (kd; wsk; wuk)
  (kd)w
 
sk
+Nkx (kxxkx + fx)UC (kx; wsk; wuk)
  (kx)w
 
sk (6.30)
Luk = Nkd (kdxkd + f)UC (kd; wsk; wuk)
 (1   (kd))w uk
+Nkx (kxxkx + fx)UC (kx; wsk; wuk)
 (1   (kx))wuk (6.31)
From equations (6.28) and (6.29) follows that kd and kx are equal. Dividing the
labor market equations, using as well the zero prot conditions, kdxkd + f = f and
2Firm heterogeneity combined with an assumption on the size of the domestic versus the exporting
beachhead costs would generate a larger average quality of exported goods as in the within di¤erences
model in the previous chapter.
3A precise analytic condition for the absence of market size e¤ects dependent only on the parameters
of the model and factor endowments cannot be given.
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kxxkx + fx = fx, leads to:
Lsk
Luk
=
 (k)
1   (k)

wuk
wsk

(6.32)
So, one arrives at the same expression as in the closed economy. Combining equations
(6.28) and (6.32) and log di¤erentiating towards relative factor abundance and quality
generates:
bpkd = bpkx = bkd = bkx = 1

(1  )    (1  )2 (   1)
1   + 
dLsk
Luk
(6.33)
The market price rises in the quality of a good like in the closed economy model. So,
observations 30 and 31 also hold in the open economy model:
Observation 32 Export goods from relatively more skill abundant countries have a
larger quality and a higher price.
6.4 Concluding Remarks
The model in this chapter extends the monopolistic competition Krugman model in
such a way that productivity di¤erences within sectors are related to factor abundance.
Production is non-homothetic in quality in the between country di¤erences model. The
larger the quality of a good, the more skilled labor is needed. This model setup implies
that more skill abundant countries produce higher quality goods. As marginal costs
also rise in quality, higher quality goods also have a larger price. As such the model
can account for the ndings in Schott (2004) that more skill abundant countries export
goods with higher unit values.
Combining the model of within country di¤erences in chapter 5 and the between
country di¤erences model in this chapter would make it possible to study the e¤ect of
trade liberalization on the skill premium. The expected e¤ect is that lower trade costs
leads to an increasing market share of high quality producing exporting rms that are
relatively skill abundant. As such the demand for skills would increase in both countries
and the skill premium would increase in both countries. But combining the two models
leads to an analytically intractable model that requires simulations and is left for future
work. The present chapters main goal was to show that the heterogeneous productivity
monopolistic competition model can be modied in a tractable way to bring this standard
model in line with recent empirical ndings on exporting unit values.
Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks
This thesis makes a contribution to the literature on rm heterogeneity in international
trade, the so-called new new trade theory. New trade models include imperfect compe-
tition in trade models to be able to account for intra-industry trade. New new trade
models generalize these models by accounting for di¤erences between rms. By includ-
ing rm heterogeneity the reallocation e¤ect of trade can be modeled: more productive
exporting rms gain market share at the expense less productive rms producing only
for the domestic market. Before proposing new models chapter 2 rst contained a survey
of the most inuential models on rm heterogeneity in international trade and compared
them with each other. The other chapters in this thesis are mainly theoretical responses
to di¤erent ndings in the empirical literature. Chapter 3 proposes a model of heteroge-
neous popularity and exporting uncertainty to account for the large fraction of rms that
exit the export market shortly after entry. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to the
popularity of their good, the popularity across goods di¤ers (but is correlated) and rms
are uncertain about the popularity of their good before they enter a new market. The
implication is that a fraction of the rms that start exporting based on the popularity
of their good in the domestic market cannot sell protably abroad and have to leave the
export market.
Chapter 5 introduces endogenous quality in a rm heterogeneity model of trade to
account for the ndings by Schott (2004) that within detailed product categories richer
countries export goods with higher unit values. Firms are heterogeneous with respect
to the productivity to produce high quality goods. More productive rms will produce
higher quality goods and charge higher prices.
Chapter 6 starts from another empirical nding by Schott (2004) that more skill-
abundant countries export goods with higher unit values. A monopolistic competition
model with a production function that is non-homothetic in quality is put forward to
account for Schotts nding. Higher quality goods require relatively more skills in pro-
duction. The implication is that more skill abundant countries produce higher quality
goods and given that marginal costs rise in quality also unit values rise with skill abun-
dance.
Chapter 4, nally, proposes a di¤erent model of rm heterogeneity. The Brander
and Krugman (1983) oligopoly model is extended with rm heterogeneity. There is
Cournot competition between rms with di¤erent productivity. The model distinguishes
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between the short-run and the long-run and derives several interesting results. There is
an intuitive reallocation e¤ect of trade: (freer) trade leads to more competition, lower
prices and squeezes the least productive rms out of the market. The welfare e¤ect of
freer trade is unambiguously positive in the long-run but can be negative in the short-run
due to the adverse e¤ect of increased cross-hauling of goods. The chapter derives under
what conditions on the distribution of productivities the welfare e¤ect of lower trade
costs is positive in the short-run. Unilateral liberalization can in the long-run lead to
higher prices in the import liberalizing country due to a relocation e¤ect of rms. The
model makes clear predictions on the e¤ect of importing country size and trade costs
on the probability of zero trade ows and the unit values of trade. Finally, the model
nests the Ricardian comparative advantage model and the Brander and Krugman (1983)
model as special cases.
The work in this thesis provides opportunities for new research paths in di¤erent
directions. On the one hand, the theory work can be extended in various interesting ways.
First, the model on exporting uncertainty and heterogeneous popularity in its present
set-up allows rms to enter the exporting market and get to know their popularity
only by incurring sunk export costs. Recent empirical work by Eaton et al. (2007)
shows that many rms enter the export market for the rst time with very small sales.
This suggests that rms have two possibilities to get to know their protability on
the exporting market: by doing market research and incurring sunk entry costs or by
experimentation and learning. The model of chapter 3 could be extended to allow for
the second possibility.
Second, the oligopoly model of chapter 4 could be extended to include the possibility
of FDI. Firms do not only have to possibility to trade, but also to start producing
abroad. But such an extension would require a signicant change in the setup of the
model, because xed costs of production have to be included in the model to prevent
that all rms will immediately start to produce abroad instead of exporting.
Third, a natural extension of the work in chapters 5 and 6 is to combine the two
models from these chapters in a simulation. With such a combination of the two models,
the e¤ect of trade liberalization on the skill premium could be derived. The expected
result is that trade liberalization squeezes the lowest quality rms out of the market
leading to an increase of the average quality of goods. The demand for skilled labor will
increase and therefore as well the skill premium. Such a nding would be similar to the
skill-upgrading e¤ect found in Verhoogen (2008).
Although most of the models in this thesis provide a theoretical account for existing
empirical ndings, the models generate various interesting additional predictions that
can be tested. First, the predictions from the oligopoly chapter on zero trade ows and
unit values depending on the size of the importer country and the size of trade costs
can be tested. These predictions are di¤erent from the predictions derived in Baldwin
and Harrigan (2007) in a Melitz-type model with quality di¤erences. Baldwin and
Harrigan (2007) nd empirical support for their ndings. But it could be that the
predictions of the oligopoly model are still valid in sectors where the oligopoly model
is a good approximation, i.e. in sectors with (nearly) homogeneous products without
quality di¤erences. The implication would be that the e¤ect of importing country size
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and trade costs on unit values and the probability of zero trade ows is sector dependent.
Second, the predictions derived in chapter 5 and 6 that richer countries and more
capital and skill abundant countries export goods with higher unit values can be tested
in a larger and wider dataset. Schott (2004) derived these empirical results with a
dataset of American imports. It is by no means sure that these results hold through in
a wider dataset.
A third and nal empirical extension follows from the combination of the models of
chapter 5 and 6 in a simulation. The expected prediction is that trade liberalization
would lead to an increasing demand for skills and a rising skillpremium. Do the data
support this view? As studies of episodes of liberalization involve all kind of compli-
cations (Tybout (2001)) indirect evidence could be found by exploring the skill and
capital intensity of exporters compared to importers. If their skill intensity is larger
than of domestic producing rms, more trade would lead to an increased demand for
skills and a rising skill premium. Such ndings would lead to an interesting contribution
to the heated debate about trade and wage inequality.

Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift levert een bijdrage aan de literatuur over de rol van heterogene bedri-
jven bij internationale handel, de zogenaamde nieuw nieuwe handelstheorie. De nieuwe
handelstheorie neemt imperfecte concurrentie op in handelsmodellen om intra-industriële
handel te kunnen verklaren. De nieuw nieuwe handelstheorie generaliseert deze modellen
door ook rekening te houden met verschillen tussen bedrijven. Door verschillen tussen
bedrijven expliciet op te nemen in de theorie, kan het reallocatie-e¤ect van handel gemod-
elleerd worden: door meer internationale handel winnen meer productieve exporterende
bedrijven marktaandeel ten koste van minder productieve bedrijven die alleen voor de
binnenlandse markt produceren.
Voordat nieuwe modellen van bedrijvenheterogeniteit bij internationale handel wor-
den geïntroduceerd, wordt eerst in hoofdstuk 2 de achtergrond geschetst bij deze mod-
ellen. Er wordt ingegaan op de introductie van imperfecte concurrentie in internationale
handelsmodellen en op de introductie van heterogeniteit van bedrijven in de imperfecte
concurrentiemodellen. In de traditionele handelstheorie verklaren comparatieve voorde-
len en overvloedigheid van productiefactoren inter-industriële handel in modellen met
volledige concurrentie. De nieuwe handelstheorie ontstaat aan het eind van de jaren 70
om een verklaring te geven voor de steeds verder groeiende intra-industriële handel in
modellen met imperfecte concurrentie. Terwijl de voordelen van internationale handel
in de traditionele handelstheorie voortkomen uit specialisatie, levert de nieuwe handels-
theorie vier voordelen van internationale handel op. Ten eerste kent het monopolistische
concurrentiemodel van Krugman (1980) een variëteitse¤ect: internationale handel zorgt
ervoor dat consumenten de keus hebben uit meer verschillende variëteiten. Ten tweede
is er sprake van een schaale¤ect in Krugman (1979) naast een variëteitse¤ect: handel
zorgt ervoor dat de markt groter wordt, waardoor er op een grotere schaal met lagere
kosten kan worden geproduceerd. Ten derde bevat het model van Ethier (1982) met
intermediaire goederen een arbeidsdelinge¤ect: handel zorgt ervoor dat er in het pro-
ductieproces met meer verschillende variëteiten geproduceerd kan worden, waardoor er
e¢ ciënter geproduceerd kan worden. Ten vierde komt in het oligopoliemodel van Bran-
der and Krugman (1983) het concurrentiebevorderende e¤ect van handel n aar voren:
in een grotere markt is er plaats voor meer aanbieders, waardoor er meer concurrentie is
met als gevolg lagere prijzen.
De imperfecte concurrentiemodellen in de nieuwe handelstheorie gaan er vanuit dat
alle bedrijven gelijk zijn. Door deze aanname te verruimen, ontstaat een vijfde voordeel
van internationale handel: het reallocatie-e¤ect. Handel zorgt ervoor dat meer produc-
tieve exporterende bedrijven marktaandeel winnen ten koste van minder productieve
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bedrijven die alleen voor de binnenlandse markt produceren. Het resultaat is dat de
gemiddelde productiviteit omhoog gaat. Het reallocatie-e¤ect kan ontstaan door meer
concurrentie op de productmarkt of door meer concurrentie op de arbeidsmarkt. In het
eerste geval leidt internationale handel tot meer concurrentie op de productmarkt, waar-
door de minst productieve bedrijven uit de markt verdwijnen. In het tweede geval leidt
internationale handel tot meer afzetmogelijkheden van de meest productieve bedrijven.
Het gevolg is dat de vraag naar arbeid stijgt, waardoor de lonen omhoog gaan en de
minst productieve bedrijven niet meer winstgevend kunnen produceren en verdwijnen.
Uit empirisch werk in de jaren 90 blijkt dat er brede steun is in de data voor het
reallocatie-e¤ect van handel. Tybout (1991) gebruikt data uit Chili, Colombia en
Marokko om het belang van het reallocatie-e¤ect aan te tonen. Bernard and Jensen
(2004a) doen hetzelfde met data uit de VS. Theorie over bedrijvenheterogeniteit wordt
pas aan het begin van 2000 gepubliceerd. Verschillende modellen worden voorgesteld.
Melitz (2003) voegt heterogene productiviteit toe aan een monopolistische concurren-
tiemodel met CES vraag. Bernard et al. (2003) stellen een model voor met Bertrand
concurrentie en bedrijvenheterogeniteit. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) bouwen bedri-
jvenheterogeniteit in in een model met monopolistische concurrentie en lineaire vraag.
In Melitz (2003) werkt het reallocatie-e¤ect via toegenomen concurrentie op de arbei-
dsmarkt, terwijl het reallocatie-e¤ect in de andere twee modellen wordt gedreven door
meer concurrentie op de productmarkt.
Een eerste bijdrage van dit proefschrift in hoofdstuk 4 bestaat uit een model van
heterogene bedrijven in een oligopoliesetting met Cournot concurrentie. Het model is
een logische uitbreiding van het wederzijdse dumping model van Brander and Krug-
man (1983). Er is CES vraag tussen sectoren en Cournot concurrrentie binnen sectoren
tussen bedrijven met heterogene productiviteit. Productie wordt gekenmerkt door con-
stante schaalvoordelen en bedrijven moeten verzonken toetredingskosten betalen om hun
productiviteit te weten te komen. Er wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen een lange en
korte termijn analyse, afhankelijk van de aanwezigheid van een vrij toetredingsconditie.
Alle resultaten worden afgeleid voor een algemene verdeling van de productiviteit van
bedrijven. De belangrijkste resultaten die gevonden worden, zijn: in een model met
weinig aannamen wordt een reallocatie-e¤ect van handel afgeleid; zowel op de korte als
op de lange termijn verdwijnen de minst productieve bedrijven van de markt en daalt de
marktprijs; het model nest het wederzijdse dumping model en het Ricardiaanse model
van comparatieve voordelen als speciale gevallen; Zoals in Brander and Krugman (1983)
kan het welvaartse¤ect van lagere handelsbarrières negatief zijn op de korte termijn van-
wege een toename in het zinloos transporterenvan goederen. Maar de analyse in het
model in dit proefschrift kan preciezer aangeven wanneer het welvaartse¤ect negatief
is, afhankelijk van de productiviteitsverdeling van bedrijven; het model bevat ook voor-
spellingen over de waarschijnlijkheid van nul handelsstromen tussen landen en de waarde
van importen afhankelijk van de handelskosten en de economische omvang van het im-
porterende land; een laatste interessant resultaat is dat unilaterale liberalisatie leidt
tot lagere prijzen op de korte termijn maar hogere prijzen op de lange termijn in het
liberaliserende land. Dit wordt veroorzaakt door relocatie-e¤ecten.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een model met exportonzekerheid en heterogene populariteit
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voorgesteld. Het model start vanuit de empirische bevinding dat veel exporterende bedri-
jven de exportmarkt alweer verlaten kort nadat ze zijn toegetreden. Eaton et al. (2007)
vinden bijvoorbeeld in een dataset van Colombiaanse bedrijven dat meer dan tweederde
van de exporterende bedrijven de exportmarkt weer verlaat in het eerste jaar. Besedes
and Prusa (2006) laten met Amerikaanse data zien dat een derde van de importen in een
bepaalde productcategorie weer stopt binnen 1 jaar. Het model dat wordt voorgesteld
om deze bevindingen te verklaren is een heterogene bedrijvenmodel waar bedrijven het-
erogeen zijn in de populariteit van hun variëteit. De populariteit is verschillend in
verschillende markten maar is wel gecorreleerd. Bedrijven kennen hun populariteit niet
voordat ze beginnen met produceren en moeten verzonken toetredingskosten betalen om
de populariteit te weten te komen. Dus als bedrijven de populariteit van hun goed op
de binnenlandse markt weten, weten ze nog niet hoe succesvol ze zullen zijn op de ex-
portmarkt. De implicatie is dat een gedeelte van de bedrijven probeert toe te treden tot
de exportmarkt, maar de exportmarkt alweer moet verlaten kort na toetreding omdat
ze niet winstgevend kunnen produceren.
Er zijn drie soorten handelskosten in het model, ijsberghandelskosten, verzonken ex-
portkosten en vaste exportkosten. Een analyse van het model laat zien dat voor alle drie
deze handelskosten lagere handelskosten leiden tot een hogere populariteit van het bedrijf
dat net in de markt kan blijven en dus leiden tot een reallocatie-e¤ect richting bedri-
jven met een hogere populariteit. Echter, de e¤ecten van lagere vaste exportkosten en
van lagere verzonken exportkosten op exportsucces (de kans om succesvol te exporteren
gegeven dat een bedrijf is toegetreden tot de exportmarkt) hebben een verschillend teken.
Lagere vaste exportkosten verhogen de kans op exportsucces, terwijl lagere verzonken
exportkosten de kans op exportsucces verlagen.
De bijdrage van dit hoofdstuk is drieërlei. Ten eerste geeft het model een logische
verklaring voor het grote percentage exporterende bedrijven die de exportmarkt alweer
verlaten kort na toetreding. Twee concurrerende verklaringen voor het relatieve hoge
percentage bedrijven dat de exportmarkt snel verlaat zijn een netwerkmodel van han-
del van Rauch and Watson (2003) en een model met schokken in variabelen die de
winstgevendheid van bedrijven beïnvloeden in Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2006). Ten
tweede generaliseert het model het heterogene bedrijven model van Melitz (2003) op een
niet-triviale manier zodat exportonzekerheid verklaard kan worden. Ten derde genereert
het model interessante comparatieve statica resultaten over de kan op exportsucces.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt het empirische werk van Schott (2004) als startpunt genomen.
Schott (2004) legt een verband tussen de waarde per eenheid product (unit value) van
importen van de US met export karakteristieken van landen die naar de US exporteren.
Hij vindt op een gedetailleerd productniveau dat rijkere landen goederen exporteren
met hogere unit values. Ervan uitgaande dat bedrijven in rijkere landen gemiddeld
genomen productiever zijn, zijn deze bevindingen in strijd met het standaard heterogene
bedrijvenmodel van Melitz (2003). In dit model hebben productievere bedrijven lagere
marginale kosten en gegeven een vaste markup dus een lagere prijs.
Het model in dit hoofdstuk brengt het heterogene bedrijven model van Melitz (2003)
in lijn met de empirische bevindingen van Schott (2004). Het breidt het heterogene
bedrijven model uit met endogene kwaliteit. Ieder bedrijf heeft een verschillende produc-
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tiviteit om kwaliteit te produceren en productievere bedrijven zullen hogere kwaliteits-
goederen die ook hogere marginale kosten met zich meebrengen. De implicatie is dat pro-
ductievere bedrijven hogere prijzen vragen. De bijdrage van dit hoofdstuk is eenduidig.
Het brengt het heterogene bedrijven model van Melitz (2003) in lijn met empirische
bevindingen van Schott (2004) over de relatie tussen unit values and exportkarakter-
istieken van landen. Daarnaast worden verschillende empirisch te testen voorspellingen
afgeleid.
Hoofdstuk 6 tot slot neemt ook de empirische bevindingen van Schott (2004) als start-
punt. Een andere belangrijke uitkomst van de analyse van Schott (2004) is dat binnen
gedetailleerde productcategorieën meer skill-overvloedige en kapitaalovervloedige landen
goederen exporteren met hogere unit values. Een monopolistische concurrentie model
met niet-homothetishe productie wordt voorgesteld om deze bevindingen van Schott
te kunnen verklaren. Hogere kwaliteitgoederen vereisen relatief meer hoogopgeleide
arbeid in productie. De implicatie is dat landen met relatief meer hoger opgeleiden
hogere kwaliteit goederen zullen produceren. Omdat marginale kosten van een goed
stijgen met de kwaliteit van het goed, zullen unit values ook stijgen met relatieve skill-
overvloedigheid. De bijdrage van dit model is gelijkwaardig aan de bijdrage van het
vorige model. Het brengt een zeer invloedrijk model in de internationale handelsliter-
atuur in lijn met belangrijke empirische bevindingen over unit values en relatieve pro-
ductiefactorenovervloed.
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